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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The 2003 Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection Integrated Project represents the 
combined efforts of approximately 60 students and 15 faculty members from different  
Naval Postgraduate School departments.  The Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA-4) Team 
integrated these efforts into the final product, a system of systems conceptual solution for 
expeditionary warfare force protection.   The project began in 2002 with the office of the  
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (OPNAV N7) 
requesting an examination of future expeditionary warfare operations in terms of current and 
emerging operational concepts.  The 2002 study identified and defined capability gaps, 
developed platform solutions, and generated conceptual design requirements for an 
expeditionary warfare family of ships, a heavy lift aircraft, and other systems designed to be 
capable of fully implementing the Ship to Objective Maneuver and Sea Basing doctrines 
identified as the future concepts of operation.  The 2003 Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection 
Integrated Project was tasked to develop a system of systems conceptual solution to provide 
force protection for the Sea Base developed in the 2002 study.  SEA-4 accomplished the task by 
employing a distinct Systems Engineering methodology, defining the problem, creating a 
scenario, conducting analyses, and using modeling and simulation tools to draw conclusions and 
determine the results. 
Conclusions, results, and recommended system architecture were based on the attributes 
of force composition, sensor architecture, weapons architecture, and weapons type.  The key 
findings of this study were: 
• The distributed sensor and weapons architectures improve force survivability by 
providing increased available reaction times and more engagement opportunities.  
These architectures are particularly effective against Undersea Warfare (USW) 
threats because submarines can be detected and engaged prior to closing within 
effective torpedo ranges.  Limited torpedo defense capabilities were identified as 
the primary cause of mission kills in the point sensor architecture. 
• Conceptual weapons when paired with distributed sensors, improve survivability 
by increasing available reaction time.  Conceptual weapons included  
higher-speed, longer-range variants of existing weapons, and a free-electron laser.  
Detecting threats at greater ranges provides commanders with more time to 
evaluate threats before committing weapons. 
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• The distributed architecture conserves weapons by detecting targets at ranges 
close to the maximum range of the interceptor.  The longer detection ranges, in 
conjunction with the increased maximum ranges of the conceptual weapons, 
allow threat platforms to be engaged before they can launch their weapons.  For 
example, if an aircraft capable of launching four anti-ship cruise missiles is 
destroyed before launching those missiles, then only one interceptor is used 
instead of four.  Also, the greater reaction time provided by the distributed sensors 
allows for improved targeting, which contributes to the conservation of weapons. 
• The selected cruiser-destroyer (CRUDES)-based and the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS)-based force compositions were tactically equivalent.  Ultimately, another 
measure of effectiveness, such as manning, life cycle costs, etc., would have to be 
used to select a preferred concept. 
The Systems Engineering and Management Process was used as the primary 
methodology to complete this multidisciplinary task and is an iterative, four-phase process 
designed as an organized approach to solving complex engineering problems.  The four phases 
are:  problem definition, design and analysis, decision-making, and implementation.  Within each 
phase there are several iterative steps.  Because this study was an academic exercise, the 
implementation phase was omitted. 
Defining the problem was the most critical task in this study.  In defining the problem, 
the team outlined critical assumptions, identified the primary functions of the system, addressed 
critical issues, assessed the threat environment, and generated system requirements.  
Survivability was determined to be the most critical factor in the protection of the Sea Base and 
its transport assets.  Survivability is the measure of all defensive actions and consists of two 
components:  susceptibility and vulnerability.  Survivability can be increased by reducing 
susceptibility (probability of being hit) and reducing vulnerability (probability of kill given a hit).  
Threats to the Sea Base were reviewed, analyzed, and prioritized.  The problem was scoped by 
generalizing threats in the form of threat categories, and by identifying and focusing force 
protection efforts on the primary threats identified by the analysis.  Due to resource limitations, 
the threat analysis did not encompass the full range of threats that the Sea Base might face in the 
future, but it was able to provide a realistic basis, with regards to the capabilities and 




After defining the problem, system design and analysis focused on detailed analyses of 
sensor concepts, search concepts, and weapons engagement concepts.  An important part of 
effectively countering any threat is the ability to detect it.  The analysis began by assessing the 
ability of various sensors (radar, lidar, infrared, and sonar) to detect threats as the first step in 
defending the Sea Base.  Analysis of sensors showed that a distributed sensor network offers 
greater detection ranges by extending the sensors’ horizons and by achieving greater target 
aspects.  The analysis also provided insight into which sensors were best in detecting a specific 
threat.  For example, the infrared sensor performed better than radar when detecting a  
high-diving, supersonic, anti-ship cruise missile.  From this, various threat-sensor pairs were 
developed, studied, and analyzed in order to determine potential detection ranges of the sensors 
against associated threats.  The search analysis applied search detection models based on area or 
volume covered and beam spread or field of view for each sensor to determine probabilities of 
detection for each threat-sensor pair.  First principal probability of detection equations were 
applied in addition to the detection ranges calculated in the sensor analysis to provide insight into 
the type of sensor architecture needed to best protect the Sea Base.  These preliminary analyses 
identified a capability gap that drove the need for a sensor system that would be capable of 
detecting threat platforms at long range and with ample time to counter them before reaching 
their weapons’ maximum effective ranges.  The functional analysis identified the basic functions 
of deploy, detect, defeat, prevent, and withstand as individual capabilities needed to protect the 
Sea Base.  Using these factors, the team proposed architectures based on characteristics of force 
composition, sensor architecture, weapons architecture, and weapons type. 
Supporting studies from individual student theses and student faculty teams, including 
those from the Temasek Defense Systems Institute, were used as a basis for developing these 
characteristics and the associated architectures.  A breakdown of the teams and brief descriptions 
of their contributions is shown in Figure I-1. 
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Figure I-1 Overview of Supporting Studies 
Understanding the complex nature of force protection of the Sea Base required the use of 
modeling and simulation tools.  The tools initially assessed included:  Joint Army Navy Uniform 
Simulation (JANUS), Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS), Naval Simulation System (NSS), 
Enhanced ISSAC (Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat) Neural Simulation Toolkit 
(EINSTein), EXTEND, and Microsoft Excel.  After completing a detailed risk analysis, the team 
decided to include NSS, EINSTein, EXTEND, and Microsoft Excel as parts of the study. 
In order to adequately determine the relative performance of the proposed architectures 
developed by the team, a thorough and systematic design of experiments was developed to 
maximize the model runs.  The primary characteristics of the proposed architectures are force 
composition, sensor and weapons architecture, and weapon types.  Using the notion of a 2n 
factorial design, two levels of each characteristic were developed.  The force composition levels 
are courses of action (COA) A and B.  COA A is a CRUDES-based protection force comprised 
of three CGs, three DDGs, three FFGs, and one SSN.  COA B is a LCS-based force protection 
force comprised of one CG, one DDG, 12 LCSs, and one SSGN.  The sensor and weapons 
architecture are point and distributed.  Weapon types are current and conceptual weapons. 
For Official Use Only
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• Physics Team – Cooperative Radar Network, Distributed Sensors
• OR Team – Number and Placement of Assets, Distributed Defenders
• IA Team – Identification of IW threats to the Sea Base
• ME Team – Distributed Sensors, Battle Space Preparation










• Overall Integration – Problem Definition, Modeling and Analysis
• Requirements Generation – LCS Attributes
Force Protection
Architecture
• LCS Thesis – Stealth, Distributed Fires, Helo/UCAV Control
• SSGN Study – Battle Space Preparation
• MSSE Study – Layered Defense, Hardkill & Softkill Weapons
• LCS Design – SEA SWAT
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From the functional analysis, survivability was determined to be the key function in force 
protection of the Sea Base.  The primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) of protecting the  
Sea Base, therefore, was determined to be the survivability of the Sea Base and its transport 
assets.  The output of each of the models was designed to facilitate the collection of information 
needed to determine the survivability of the Sea Base and its transport assets. 
EXTEND, a process-based, discrete-event modeling and simulation tool, provided a 
macro-view of sensor-weapon architecture-threat interactions.  Results from the EXTEND model  
(see Figure I-2) demonstrated that distributed sensors increase the survivability of the Sea Base 
and its transport assets, that an LCS-based protection force is tactically equivalent to a 
CRUDES-based protection force; and that current weapons are not statistically different with 
respect to survivability when compared to conceptual weapons.  Additionally, the submarines 
and torpedoes were by far the highest threats to the Sea Base.  Torpedoes, which in this model 
made up roughly 10% of the threat, caused approximately 90% of the mission kills  
(see Figure I-3). 
Figure I-2 Comparison of Alternate Force Architectures 
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Figure I-3 Comparison of Torpedo and ASCM Threats 
NSS, an object-oriented Monte Carlo modeling and simulation tool, provided a means of 
analyzing the characteristics of the two proposed force protection architectures.  NSS model 
results showed that the distributed architecture provides improved survivability for defending 
assets placed along the threat axis (see Figure I-4).  The model also showed that the distributed 
architecture seems to facilitate a quicker drawdown of threats.  Additionally, the NSS model 
showed that the distributed architecture is more effective in its use of weapons because of its 
ability to provide better targeting information and more effective threat-weapon assignments.  
Furthermore, the distributed architecture was able to detect and defeat threat platforms before 
they were able to launch their weapons. 
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SUB/TORP Threat Inflicts 
Most Ship Mission Kills
 ~10% of the threat accounts for 
~90% of mission kills
 Distributed architecture mitigates 
the shooter
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Figure I-4 Distributed Architecture Increases Survivability Along Threat Axis 
From the models analyzed, the key factor in attaining higher survivability for the  
Sea Base and its transport assets was the ability of the sensor system to provide more reaction 
time, and therefore more engagement opportunities, to the weapons systems.  The distributed 
sensor architecture allows the weapons systems to take fewer shots, thereby conserving the 
force’s fighting potential.  As a result of these analyses, the proposed architecture can be either 
LCS- or CRUDES-based and possess either current or conceptual weapons.  Ultimately, the 
decision to use an LCS-based or CRUDES-based force and the decision to use the given current 
or conceptual weapons must be based on a measure of effectiveness other than survivability.  
Figure I-5 summarizes the system of systems conceptual solution for Sea Base force protection. 
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Figure I-5 Proposed System Solution for Sea Base Force Protection 
Because the analysis itself was broad, the results are broad-based as well.  Further study 
efforts should be conducted to provide more thorough analyses of areas of particular concern.  
Some suggested areas include actual sensor and weapon capabilities, emerging technologies, 
reliability and maintainability factors, acquisition strategies, realistic timelines for deployment, 
associated trade-offs, and COA analyses.  Finally, research into existing classified systems, 
emerging technologies, and non-lethal weapons technologies is recommended to provide 
additional options for protecting the Sea Base. 





• High frequency radar (~ 20 GHz)
– UAVs for 360 degree coverage
• High frequency radar (~ 20 GHz)
• 3-5 µm IR
– UUVs for 360 degree coverage



















– FEL (3 x 108 m/s, 10 km)
– INT-2 (1650 m/s, 370 km)
– INT-4 (1980 m/s, 93 km)
– Torpedo 2 (26 m/s, 11 km)
 Force Composition
– LCS-based or CRUDES-based





A. PROJECT ASSIGNMENT 
In the Winter Quarter of 2002, students in the Systems Engineering and Integration (SEI) 
program provided project inputs to the board of advisors for the Wayne Meyer Institute of 
Systems Engineering.  This board, made up of flag officers and distinguished civilians, assisted 
the Institute in choosing project work that is academically challenging, as well as relevant to 
Department of Defense (DOD) interests and needs.  The board selected Expeditionary Warfare 
as an area of interest.  Subsequently, in April 2002, the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (OPNAV N7) tasked the Institute to conduct 
an Expeditionary Warfare study (McGinn, 2002).  In the first year of this two-year project, the 
SEI-3 students used a “system of systems” approach to engineer an architecture with an 
overarching set of system requirements for a system of systems to conduct expeditionary 
operations in littoral regions; explore interfaces and system interactions; and compare current, 
proposed, and conceptual sea-based platforms against these requirements.  The SEI-3 group also 
completed excursions to examine the effects of speed, reduced footprint ashore, Sea Basing, 
modularity of design, and reduced manning. 
As part of their final report, the SEI-3 group made several recommendations for areas of 
further study.  As with similar studies, the resources dictated the depth of the study.  The amount 
of time and available number of students focused the scope of their examination on new ways to 
conduct Expeditionary Warfare.  Their examination also raised several questions.  Their 
recommendations were intended to describe areas where further study will enhance the 
understanding of Expeditionary Warfare from a system of systems perspective.  One 
recommendation was to conduct a more thorough analysis of Force Protection.  Based on input 
from OPNAV N7, advisor recommendations, time constraints, the number of students available, 
and other factors, the Wayne Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering faculty decided that further 
analysis of Force Protection would be the best subject for this year’s follow-on study.  This 
year’s team consisted of students in the revised Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) 
program, this team was designated SEA-4.  The SEA-4 Team endeavored to “develop a system 
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of systems conceptual solution to provide force protection for the Sea Base and its transport 
assets while performing forced entry and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) operations in 
support of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).”  
(Calvano, 2003, 1)  The SEA-4 Team was also tasked to work closely with the Total Ship 
Systems Engineering (TSSE) students on a LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) design specifically 
suited for Force Protection of the Sea Base, as well as incorporating work completed by the 
Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) students into the conceptual system of systems 
solution to the Force Protection problem. 
B. EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE 
An expeditionary force is an armed force organized to accomplish a specific mission in 
foreign lands far from a supportable home base.  This force is supported by a temporarily 
established means and will leave the foreign land when the mission is complete.  Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare is the conduct of that specific mission by those established means.  The 
concept of Expeditionary Warfare is the driving force that is being used to shape the future of the 
Marine Corps and Naval Amphibious Forces.  The future of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is 
based on the tenets of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and STOM.  OMFTS 
employs the capability to use the sea as a maneuver space.  STOM is the tactical application of 
OMFTS.  STOM depends on ships located offshore, beyond the range of most threats, to support 
the landing forces.  Sea Basing of command and control, logistics, combat service support, and 
operational support is the backbone of STOM. 
C. SEA BASING 
The concept of Sea Basing is designed to revolutionize the projection, protection, and 
sustainment of sovereign warfighting units around the world.  Sea Basing capitalizes on the 
inherent mobility, security, and flexibility of naval forces to overcome the emerging military and 
political limitations to overseas access.  The mobility of the Sea Base allows it to maneuver as 
part of the Expeditionary Task Force to support sustained operations ashore.  This capability 
should reduce the need to build up logistical stockpiles ashore that may burden or endanger allies 
and drastically complicate force-protection requirements.  By employing direct replenishment 
from ship-to-objective, the build up of forces ashore (“Iron Mountain”) and operational pause 
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can be reduced or eliminated.  In addition, there is no need to allocate resources to protect this 
Iron Mountain.  The thrust of the force protection efforts now lies in protecting transport assets at 
sea, and airborne assets between the Sea Base and the objective.  Sea Basing will provide afloat 
positioning of command and control, and logistics support will strengthen force protection and 
free airlift-sealift to support missions ashore.  It will also reduce early demands on the national 
strategic lift assets.  Sea Basing will enable the Navy to conduct sustained, persistent combat 
operations from the sea, and when fully implemented will provide a viable option to eliminate 
the limitations imposed by reliance on overseas shore-based support.  Figure II-1 shows a 


















Figure II-1 Sea Base Diagram 
D. FORCE PROTECTION 
The Navy-Marine Corps team has been executing expeditionary operations since its 
inception.  Few of these operations have been unopposed.  Future adversaries will continue to 
probe perceived weaknesses, and will develop plans to deny access to their regions. 
Conventional and asymmetric strategies will be employed to conduct attacks on the Sea Base, 
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landing craft, and aircraft components of the Expeditionary Warfare Force.  Although  
Sea Basing reduces overall force protection requirements, it focuses those requirements on 
protecting the ships of the Sea Base and its airborne and seaborne transport assets.  Chapter IV, 
Section C, details specific threats that will pose considerable challenges to the Sea Base in the 
2015-2020 timeframe. 
The term “Force Protection” can have several definitions.  The SEA-4 Team, with 
stakeholder approval, adopted the following definition of Force Protection from the DOD 
dictionary:  actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile action against the Sea Base to include 
resources, facilities, and critical information.  These actions conserve the force’s fighting 
potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and 
synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint 
force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.  Force Protection does not include actions to 
defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. 
E. CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE 
The conceptual architecture addressed in the SEI-3 report was developed as an alternative 
to the planned architecture of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) in the 2015-2020 timeframe.  This conceptual architecture includes new ships 
designed for the purpose of future Expeditionary Warfare operations considering the tenets of 
OMFTS and STOM, and the elimination of the traditional Iron Mountain.  The SEI-3 Team used 
the systems engineering process to generate requirements for, and design, a force that includes 
new amphibious assault ship designs, logistic ship designs, and the design of a heavy lift aircraft 
that would successfully accomplish the Expeditionary Warfare mission.  The resulting 
conceptual architecture incorporates conceptual, planned, and existing assets. 
1. Expeditionary Warfare Ships (ExWar) 
The ExWar ships created by the 2002 TSSE group were designed to be self-deployed and 
self-sustained platforms.  They were an amalgamation of LHA, MPF, and LMSR ships with a 
transoceanic capability, and speeds greater than 27 knots.  The design provided the needed 
maneuverability at sea for the Expeditionary Strike Group to conduct OMFTS and STOM.  The 
flight deck of the ExWar ship provides 16 aircraft spots from which to conduct air operations.  
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All aircraft require one spot, with the exception of the Heavy Lift Aircraft, which requires two 
spots.  A family of six ExWar ships form the Sea Base; Figure II-2 is a conceptual illustration of 
one of these six ships and its flight deck.  Additionally, three other ships with the same hull form 
are used as logistics ships to transit back and forth from an offshore base to resupply the  
Sea Base. 
Expeditionary Warfare Ship
Designed by 2002 TSSE  Group as part of the 2002 Expeditionary 
Warfare Study.  Ref – SEI-3 Report
 
Figure II-2 Expeditionary Warfare Ship Design 
The ExWar ship was designed with basic combat systems capabilities required for  
self-defense.  Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS) was considered to be an extremely important 
mission because of the need to provide the forces ashore with effective fires in a STOM 
environment.  Therefore, an Electromagnetic Rail Gun (ERG) was added to provide that 
capability.  This was the only combat systems capability that could be considered offensive in 
nature.  Some other weapon systems included a Free-Electron Laser (FEL) and  
Unmanned Underwater and Aerial Vehicles.  Consideration was given to stealth technology as a 
means of reducing the radar cross section of the ship as a means of defense.  Figure II-3 
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Figure II-3 Expeditionary Warfare Ship Weapon and Sensor Systems 
2. Aircraft 
The aircraft of the Sea Base include the MV-22, AH-1Z, UH-1, the Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF), and the Heavy Lift Aircraft (HLAC) designed by the 2002 Aerospace Engineering Team.  
The MV-22 and HLAC are used for transport of assets to the objective and/or landing area. 
a. MV-22 
The MV-22 Osprey is a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable, medium lift,  
Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) tiltrotor aircraft designed for combat, combat support, 
combat service support, and Special Operations missions worldwide.  It is scheduled to replace 
the CH-46E and CH-53D medium lift helicopters.  The tiltrotor combines the speed, range and 
fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical takeoff and landing 
and hover capabilities of helicopters.  The MV-22 is designed to have a cruise speed of 240 knots 
and to take up to 24 fully loaded combat troops up to a range of 200 nm.  The MV-22 can be air 





Figure II-4 MV-22 Osprey 
b. Long Range Heavy Lift Aircraft (LRHLAC) 
The Heavy Lift Aircraft was designed with the capability to carry an external payload of 
37,500 lbs 300 nm from the Sea Base to the Objective, offload its payload, and return to the  
Sea Base without refueling.  Additionally, the Heavy Lift Aircraft was designed to carry an 
internal load of 20,000 lbs for 300 nm, offload, and return to the Sea Base without refueling. 
The Heavy Lift Aircraft combat survivability was also addressed in the SEI-3 report.  At 
the time, the primary threat to the troop and material transport aircraft was considered to be 
shoulder-fired, infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles (SAM) with contact warheads, and small 
caliber (7.62mm and 12.7mm), armor-piercing, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) platforms.  Based on 
this, the aircraft was designed to be capable of sustained operations in a threat environment 
consisting of man-portable SAMs, small caliber AAA, and small arms fire with minimum impact 
on mission capability.  The Heavy Lift Aircraft design concept is shown in Figure II-5. 
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Heavy Lift Aircraft Design
 
Figure II-5 2002 Heavy Lift Aircraft Design 
c. Joint Strike Fighter 
The Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a single engine, multi-role Short Take-Off 
and Vertical Landing (STOVL) strike fighter designed to replace the AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/D.  
The JSF has more than twice the range of the AV-8B on internal fuel, operates at supersonic 
conditions, incorporates low observable characteristics, and houses internal weapons.  The JSF is 
designed to fulfill USMC air-to-air and air-to-ground combat requirements for the battlefield of 
the future.  It will also provide tactical air control and tactical reconnaissance capabilities and be 
able to perform the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission.  JSF requirements 
focused on readiness, expeditionary capability, combined-arms operations, and the conduct of 
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Figure II-6 USMC Joint Strike Fighter 
d. AH-1Z 
The AH-1Z upgrade was designed to be a very capable and flexible multi-mission attack 
helicopter.  It was designed with state-of-the-art dynamics, weapons, and avionics suites that 
incorporate the latest survivability equipment available.  The AH-1Z will have enhanced 
survivability characteristics and the capability to fully support Expeditionary Warfare operations.  
Features will include improved weapons capability, improved survivability and crashworthiness, 
use of modern technology, improved targeting system, improved air-to-air combat capability, 
enhanced maintainability, a modern cockpit design, and commonality with the UH-1Y.  The  





Figure II-7 AH-1Z Super Cobra 
e. UH-1Y 
The UH-1Y tactical utility helicopter was designed as an upgrade to one of the oldest 
helicopters in the Marine Corps inventory.  New features will include dramatically improved 
survivability, maneuverability, and supportability using the most modern technologies available.  
A new four-bladed main rotor system replaces the older two-bladed system.  Airframe 
improvements, improved engines, a “glass” cockpit, and other advanced systems, are designed to 
deliver substantial increases in tactical capability.  It will also have an increased payload 
capacity, while increases in range and speed will allow faster delivery of combat assets to the 
landing area and/or objective.  Survivability improvements will be made in the form of increased 





Figure II-8 UH-1Y Tactical Utility Helicopter 
3. Landing Craft 
The landing craft of the Sea Base include the Heavy Lift Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
(HLCAC), the Landing Craft Utility (Replacement) (LCU(R)), and the Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV). 
a. HLCAC 
The HLCAC beam will measure approximately the same as the current LCAC’s, but it 
will be half its length longer, giving the new LCAC a 1.5 greater payload capacity than its 
predecessor.  The HLCAC will also have improved engines, which will make it faster and more 
reliable.  The proposed craft would increase in both length and cargo area—by 33%—over the 
present LCAC and would have double the payload (144 tons).  The HLCAC would be capable of 
carrying two M1A1 tanks or 10 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV).  The LCAC is shown in  





Figure II-9 LCAC 
b. LCU(R) 
The LCU(R) is designed to replace the LCU 1600 Class Utility Craft.  It will provide a 
technologically advanced, heavy lift, utility landing craft to complement the high-speed,  
over-the-horizon (OTH), ship-to-objective amphibious lift required to support OMFTS.  For 
purposes of this study, the LCU(R) will be able to operate from the well deck of the TSSE  
2002-designed Expeditionary Warfare ship described in this Chapter, Section E.  The craft will 
have higher operational speeds, and improved OTH lift capability.  LCU(R) will have the 
capability to conduct sustained, independent operations for up to 10 days with an operational 
range of 1,000 nautical miles.  The LCU(R)’s enhanced characteristics will greatly reduce  
ship-to-beach cyclic time, and will include a drive through design with forward and aft ramps to 
improve vehicle and cargo load out and discharge time when offloading equipment.  The craft 
will have a secondary mission to serve as an alternative launch, recovery, and salvage platform 
for the Marine Corps’ new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).  The LCU and a 





Figure II-10 LCU and LCU(R) 
c. AAAV 
The AAAV is designed to transport 18 Marines and a crew of three over water at speeds 
of 29 miles per hour up to a range of 65 miles; the design uses a planning hull propelled by two 
water jets.  On land, the AAAV will achieve speeds of 45 miles per hour at a range of up to  
300 miles, with cross-country mobility equal to an M1 Abrams tank.  A command and control 
variant of the AAAV will provide access to information from satellite and computer-based 
intelligence sources, as well as from ships, aircraft, and other vehicles, while controlling 





Figure II-11 Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
F. SUMMARY 
The information contained in this chapter provides the foundation from which this study 
was conceived, and is intended to give the reader a basic understanding of  
Expeditionary Warfare; the future Naval-Marine Corps tactics desired to be employed in the 
2015-2020 timeframe; and the friendly assets that will execute those tactics.  Protecting those 
assets is the main focus of this study’s efforts.  This study, as a continuation of past efforts, 
began with the constraints defined by the SEI-3 Team.  Those constraints were the mission area, 
the concepts, the platforms, and the assumptions.  Efforts to clearly define these constraints using 
open-source information, and what conceptual system of systems will best serve the  
Navy-Marine Corps Team with regards to accomplishing the force protection mission, will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. 
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
A system is a set of interrelated components working together toward a common 
objective.  The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines  
Systems Engineering as: 
“An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization 
of successful systems.  It focuses on defining customer needs and 
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting 
requirements, then proceeding with design synthesis and system 





° Cost & Schedule 
° Training & Support 
° Disposal 
Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty 
groups into a team effort forming a structured development process 
that proceeds from concept to production to operation.   
Systems Engineering considers both the business and the technical 
needs of all customers with the goal of providing a quality product 
that meets the user needs.” 
This definition shows that the function of Systems Engineering is essentially to guide the 
engineering and development of multidisciplinary systems.  Nowhere is this more critical than in 
the design and implementation of joint combat systems. 
There are several processes that can be used for guidance in these efforts.   
Systems Engineers have developed several formal methodologies for accomplishing this task, 
many of which are tailored for specific uses.  The common thread in each of these methodologies 
is a basic framework that includes a structured method for defining the problem.  Some methods 
also include processes to generate alternative solutions, analyze the alternatives, and then select 
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the best alternative.  This basic framework is appropriate for multidisciplinary engineering 
systems such as those that address large-scale, complex military problems.  The design 
methodology, called the Systems Engineering and Management Process (SEMP), was introduced 












































Desired End State: 
What should be?
Systems Engineering and Management Process
 
Figure III-1 The Systems Engineering and Management Process (SEMP) 
The SEMP is a four-phase process designed as an organized approach to solving a 
complex engineering problem.  The four phases are problem definition, design and analysis, 
decision-making, and implementation.  The depiction of the SEMP shows that  
problem definition is the first phase of the process and that the other phases follow in order.  Use 
of the SEMP must be tailored to the engineering design problem being addressed and therefore 
may require altering the order shown or movement into one phase prior to completion of another.  
Depending on the situation, the variables, and what already exists, extra time may be spent 
completing one step while other steps may be omitted.  In addition, any step may be re-visited in 
an iterative way. 
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B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
This phase’s purpose is to ensure Systems Engineers have a clear understanding of the 
problem at hand.  The client’s needs, wants, and desires must be captured.  In some cases, the 
clients themselves may not have a clear understanding of the problem to be solved.  The  
problem definition phase addresses these issues and allows the Systems Engineers to define the 
problem in a logical manner.  This requires two major steps:  needs analysis and value system 
design. 
1. Needs Analysis 
The engineering design process begins with a problem statement developed by the client.  
This statement may, in some cases, be vague.  Again, the client may not have a clear 
understanding of the problem or may not be sure what they want or need.  They also may not 
have a clear vision of where they are or where they are going. 
To gain an understanding of the problem, Systems Engineers must thoroughly research 
the problem area; interact with the client to determine their objectives; and interact with users, 
manufacturers, maintainers, and all other relevant stakeholders to determine their needs as well.  
This research and interaction, shown in Figure III-2, should culminate in the development of an 
effective need statement, which the client, stakeholders, and analysts all agree clearly defines the 




Figure III-2 Needs Analysis 
There are several tools available to support a needs analysis and help the  
Systems Engineers to better understand the problem.  The SEMP focuses on three primary tools:  













2. Stakeholder Analysis 
The purpose of stakeholder analysis is to identify the people and/or organizations that are 
relevant to the problem and to determine their needs, wants, and desires with respect to the 
problem to be solved.  These groups are referred as stakeholders because they have a 
considerable stake or vested interest in the problem and its eventual solution.  Typical 
stakeholder classes include clients, sponsors, decision-makers, users and analysts. 
The stakeholder analysis allows Systems Engineers to begin identifying critical 
assumptions and constraints on the problem.  These assumptions and constraints set the 
boundaries that Systems Engineers have to work within to solve the problem.  These boundaries 
come from a variety of sources and may include assumptions ranging from strategic to tactical.  
Resources such as time, personnel, and funding are the most typical constraints; however, there 
may be physical, legal, environmental, social, and technological constraints to consider as well. 
3. Functional Analysis 
The primary purpose of functional analysis is to identify and decompose critical system 
functions, and to organize them in such a way as to facilitate a better understanding of the system 
functional requirements.  In other words, it describes what the system must do, but not how it 
will be implemented.  Functions are purposeful actions of the system that involve the 
transformation or alteration of material, energy, information, and/or other resources.  A function 
also implies some input that undergoes a transformation process to produce a desired output. 
Functional analysis is a two-step process.  The beginning of this process is  
functional decomposition.  The purpose of functional decomposition is to identify and 
decompose the system’s critical functions.  System decomposition contains four elements:  
system functions, system components, hierarchical structure, and system states.   
System functions are purposeful actions of the system that involve the transformation or 
alteration of material, energy, information, and/or other resources.  This function implies some 
input that undergoes a transformation process to produce a desired output.  System components 
can be structural (static elements of the system that do not change as the system performs its 
transformation function), operating (dynamic elements that perform the processing), or flow 
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components (transformed elements that are changed by the system).  The system’s components, 
or the system as a whole, may assume different quantitative and/or qualitative values that 
describe the current state of the system.  These values are variables used to describe the 
components or to measure the system state.  As the system performs its function, the values of 
the state variables will change to reflect an instantaneous condition (or state) of the system.  The 
hierarchical structure is the physical and/or functional relationship between components. 
The result of a functional decomposition is a list of functions and subfunctions required 
of the proposed system.  The most difficult part of the functional decomposition is avoiding the 
tendency to develop solutions based on existing systems.  Thinking in terms of existing systems 
limits the range of possible solutions.  The Systems Engineer needs to focus on the purpose of 
the intended system and avoid preconceived solutions.  After completing the  
functional decomposition and development of a list of functions and subfunctions, the next step 
of functional analysis is to organize this list in a meaningful way.  One method of doing this is by 
creating a functional hierarchy.  This hierarchy, or tree, captures the results of the  
functional decomposition by showing the top-level functions required of the system broken down 
into subfunctions.  Each of these functions and subfunctions in the hierarchy must be well 
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Figure III-3 Generic Functional Hierarchy 
Another method of organizing the list of functions and sub functions from the functional 
decomposition is a functional flow diagram.  The functional flow diagram’s purpose is to lay out 
in a sequential manner the order in which functions are performed in a system using a flow chart.  
Figure III-4 is an example of a functional flow diagram for a fire request. 
 
Figure III-4 Functional Flow Diagram 
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Functions are diagrammed in series and parallel to depict the relationship between 
functions.  As with a functional hierarchy, an ideal functional flow diagram is logical and helps 
in the design process without implying particular solutions.  This method of organizing the 
system functions allows the systems engineer to identify critical interfaces between system 
functions that may later be used to develop alternative subsystems that will function together as 
an integrated system.  Functional flow diagrams may identify functions that are repeated and 
present opportunities to combine or reorder functions as appropriate. 
Depending on the problem, either or both functional hierarchy or a function flow may be 
used.  Functional flow diagrams may be more appropriate for a system when the functions are 
ordered or sequential.  Those systems whose functions do not flow in a sequential manner are 
better suited for a functional hierarchy.  In some cases, both can be used. 
The functional analysis’ results are used in the next phase of the SEMP, which is the 
design and analysis phase.  The design of alternative systems will depend on the system 
functions identified in the functional analysis. 
C. FUTURES ANALYSIS 
The futures analysis’ purpose is to analyze the environment in which the system will be 
operating.  This phase requires making several projections and predictions about the future from 
many different aspects.  The primary objective is to identify the key variables that will shape the 
future environment and ultimately drive the system and/or organizations that use the system.  
These factors, or drivers, will aide in the design of a system better prepared to operate in the 
future.  As a result, the completed system should be robust enough to meet both the present and 
future needs of the stakeholders and operate successfully in the present and in future 
environments. 
1. Value System Design 
The value system design’s primary purpose is to develop a value hierarchy that will be 
used to evaluate potential alternative solutions and ultimately select the best of the proposed 
alternatives.  A value hierarchy is a pictorial representation of the structure of the functions, 
objectives, and evaluation measures for a given system.  It is developed from efforts completed 
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during the needs analysis and should be a reflection of the needs and objectives of the 
stakeholders. 
Development of the value hierarchy begins with the effective need statement developed 
during the needs analysis.  Major critical functions form the next layer, much like the  
functional analysis.  As with the functional analysis, functions and/or objectives are decomposed 
into subfunctions.  The primary difference between the value hierarchy and the  
functional hierarchy is the identification of objectives for each bottom level subfunction.  These 
objectives should be specific and measurable.  Evaluation measures are then developed for each 
objective as a metric that can be used as a measure of how well a proposed alternative meets that 
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Figure III-5 Generic Value Hierarchy 
As the value hierarchy is refined, it is important to note that the values and objectives 
should reflect the stakeholders’ values.  These values should be approved and accepted by the 
client and then presented to the stakeholders before proceeding further.  Ultimately, it is the 
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client that will use the value hierarchy to aid in any decisions regarding the best alternative 
system that will be designed to solve their problem. 
D. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The SEMP’s design and analysis phase designs and proposes alternative solutions to the 
problem identified in the problem definition phase and then analyzes the performance of these 
proposed solutions.  The two steps in this phase are alternatives generation and modeling and 
analysis. 
1. Alternatives Generation 
Alternatives generation is the process of bringing system alternatives into being.  It is the 
creative mental process of producing concepts and ideas in order to solve problems.  In the 
previous steps of the SEMP, it was important to avoid introducing preconceived solutions into 
the process.  Since there is no single solution to most systems engineering problems, one of the 
goals in this step is to avoid considering only known or traditional alternatives.  Some complex 
problems are best solved using non-traditional means, so the creation of those means should not 
be influenced by traditional methods. 
This process is creative, yet structured.  Several alternatives will be created, as well as a 
structured approach to selecting the best ones for analysis.  Best is defined as those alternatives 
that will satisfy the needs of the stakeholders using the resources available to the client.  Several 
alternatives may meet the stakeholders’ needs.  The job of the Systems Engineers is to propose 
alternatives, recommend a preferred alternative, qualify that recommendation, and allow the 
client to choose which alternative to implement. 
Approaches to generating alternatives vary, but each relies on the identification of critical 
functions that that system must perform.  Research and brainstorming are good methods to 
develop alternative ways to perform each function and subfunction.  Alternatives for each 
function and/or subfunction can then be packaged as a complete system alternative.  It is 
important that each alternative be significantly different from one another.  Each alternative 
should offer the client a markedly different method to meet the effective need.  Alternatives 
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should be detailed to allow sufficient means of comparison and to facilitate modeling efforts in 
later steps.  In general, alternatives will fall into four categories: 
• Do Nothing 
• Off the shelf 
• Adaptation 
• New and Unique 
Using these four categories can help in the process of alternatives generation.  It gives the 
Systems Engineers a place to start and a method of organizing potential alternatives. 
2. Modeling and Analysis 
The modeling and analysis phase’s purpose is to predict or estimate the performance of 
the proposed alternatives with respect to the evaluation measures developed in the value 
hierarchy.  The alternatives were developed with sufficient detail to provide a clear picture in 
terms of system parameters and variables to allow accurate modeling and facilitate prediction of 
performance based on those evaluation measures.  The first step in the process is to select the 
models that will be used to evaluate the proposed alternatives.  The models, either existing or 
developed, must be properly formulated, applied, and interpreted so that the results accurately 
reflect the real system’s characteristics. 
Models come in three basic forms:  physical, visual, and mathematical.  Physical models 
are simply scaled physical representations of an object or system.  Visual models are graphical or 
pictorial representations of an object or system.  Mathematical models use symbols of math and 
logic to represent the various components, subsystems, functions and their relationships in an 
object or system. 
Once modeling and analysis for each alternative is complete, the next step is to compile 
and organize the data in a useful manner.  The organization of the data should present all of the 
information necessary to analyze and compare each proposed alternative.  This should serve as 
the basis for presenting the information to the client in a format suitable for decision-making. 
Ultimately, the data will be converted to a decision-making format that will be used to 
recommend the best alternative to the client.  The proper implementation of this phase is very 
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important as a significant error in modeling could lead to the wrong recommendation and 
ultimately to the wrong decision. 
E. DECISION MAKING 
The purpose of the decision-making phase is to use the information from previous phases 
to select the best proposed alternative, and present that alternative to the client as a 
recommendation of the best method to meet their effective need.  Once approved by the client, 
the next phase of the SEMP can begin.  The two steps in this phase are:  alternative scoring and 
the decision. 
1. Alternative Scoring 
The purpose of alternative scoring is to use a structured method to compare the results of 
modeling dissimilar alternatives with respect to the evaluation measures developed in the value 
systems design.  Scores for each alternative are calculated using information obtained from 
research and modeling efforts in the modeling and analysis phase.  Scores are based on 
performance in respect to each evaluation measure and the relative importance of those measures 
as delineated in the value system design.  This process involves constructing a utility relationship 
for each evaluation measure and using that relationship to calculate a total score for each 
alternative.  The total score for each alternative reflects its aggregate performance with respect to 
all of the evaluation measures.  These scores are then used as a basis for making a 
recommendation and ultimately driving the final decision.  Generally, the alternative with the 
highest score is the one recommended to the client. 
2. Decision 
This step of the SEMP represents the decision from the client based on the 
recommendation from alternative scoring.  The recommendation may be presented to the client 
in person or in a written report.  To aid in conveying the recommendation, performance data for 
each alternative must be gathered and presented in a succinct manner.  Matrices can be used for 
comparisons and graphs can be used to depict the sensitivity of decision variables.  All should be 
focused to support the recommended alternative.  The most important part of this phase is to 




Normally, this phase would begin once the client has made a decision.  The construction 
of the selected system is planned and executed.  Construction entails nonrecurring engineering 
efforts, prototypes, test and evaluation, and manufacturing and production.  This step ultimately 
solves the problem presented by the client.  Although there are various steps in this phase, they 
do not apply for a paper study.  As this study is a paper study only, it would ideally end with the 
presentation of the recommended system to the client, and the acceptance and approval of the 
system by the client and the stakeholders. 
G. SUMMARY 
It should be noted that use of the SEMP will normally be tailored to the individual project 
and that the phases of the SEMP are iterative in nature.  For a given project, some steps may be 
omitted and extra time may be spent on others.  Some phases and/or steps may be repeated as 
necessary to ensure that the requirements of that particular phase of the process are met and to 
ensure that the solution to the engineering design problem best meets the needs of the client and 
stakeholders.  Most importantly, the SEMP as a whole is iterative, meaning that it too should be 
repeated as necessary to readdress the system solution and how it meets the needs of the client. 
The SEMP is integral to this study’s approach to force protection of the Sea Base.  It was 
important to start with this process, as there were several supporting teams working a project that 
was not clearly understood in the beginning.  The SEMP allowed the SEA-4 Team to 
methodically approach the problem to be solved and integrate the previous study and the efforts 
of several supporting teams.  Chapter IV will discuss the SEA-4 Team’s use of the SEMP and 
how it was tailored to meet the needs of this study. 
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IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. OVERVIEW 
This section will review plan of action and milestone (POA&M) development and 
problem definition for the Expeditionary Force Protection Study.  The SEA-4 Team started by 
identifying the ultimate driver⎯graduation day.  Using this as a guideline and working 
backwards, the team identified critical tasks and chose attainable milestones for each.  From this 
“strawman,” an overall plan was developed.  The POA&M illustrated in Figure IV-1 became the 
standard that was used to govern the project. 
Figure IV-1 Plan of Action and Milestones 
After POA&M development, the next task for the SEA-4 Team was to define the 
problem in a logical manner and ensure a clear understanding of the task.  Using the  
Systems Engineering and Management Process (SEMP) described in Chapter III, this study 
initiated a top-down analysis of expeditionary force protection.  The needs analysis and value 
systems design processes provided the structure by which the SEA-4 Team was able to scope 
and bound the problem at hand and is described in detail in the following sections. 
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B. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
The SEA-4 Team began the Needs Analysis with the official “Project Guidance” 
provided by the Meyer Institute, which states: 
“You will develop a system of systems conceptual solution, 
supported by other teams on campus in various discipline areas, to 
provide force protection for the Sea Base and its transport assets 
while performing forced entry and STOM operations in support of 
the Ground Combat Element of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.  
…  The practical impact is that your study must address protection 
of the ships of the Sea Base while at sea in the operating area as 
well as the protection of the airborne transport assets moving 
between the Sea Base and the objective and the surface assets 
moving between the Sea Base and the beach or a port.” (Calvano, 
2003, 1) 
The primitive need was developed using the project guidance and defined to be: 
• Protect the Sea Base while at sea in the operating area 
• Protect airborne transport assets from Sea Base to objective 
• Protect surface transport assets from Sea Base to beach or port 
To gain a thorough understanding of the problem, this study conducted additional 
research by reviewing the governing documents referenced in the SEI-3 report and by reviewing 
specific areas of the SEI-3 report itself.  While conducting this research, several challenging 
issues were uncovered that would need to be addressed before proceeding further.  These issues 
were discussed with the stakeholders to the satisfaction of all parties involved.  The following 
chapter speaks to those issues. 
1. Force Protection Issues 
The charter given to the SEA-4 Team was to “develop a system of systems conceptual 
solution to provide force protection for the Sea Base and its transport assets while performing 
forced entry and Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) operations in support of the  
Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).”  (Calvano, 2003, 2)  
As part of the needs analysis, this study examined the concept of force protection by assessing 
the threat, the environment, the mission, and the forces required to accomplish that mission.  
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This step in the systems engineering process helped the team to identify four primary issues in 
developing a system of systems to provide force protection for the Sea Base and its airborne and 
seaborne transport assets: 
• Key Assumptions 
• Composition of the Sea Base 
• Distance from Objective and/or Shore 
• Carrier Strike Group (CSG) Role 
a. Key Assumptions 
The results of any study are affected by the assumptions made by the participants 
conducting the study.  Carefully crafted assumptions help to scope the problem and yield 
realistic results.  The SEA-4 Team and their stakeholders agreed on the key assumptions needed 
to provide a system of systems architecture capable of protecting the Sea Base and its transport 
assets in the selected timeframe.  The overarching assumptions governing this study are as 
follows: 
• MEB operations occur in the 2015-2020 timeframe. 
• MEB size Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) composition and 
sustainment requirements remain constant between the present and  
2015-2020. 
• The United States Marine Corps (USMC) adopts STOM doctrine. 
• SEI-3’s conceptual expeditionary warfare architecture is operationally available in 
2015-2020. 
• All current United States Navy (USN) and USMC legacy platforms will remain 
operational through 2015-2020 and will not retire early. 
• All proposed USN and USMC acquisitions of new aircraft and land vehicles will 
be operationally available in 2015-2020. 
• MEB forces may be projected as far as 200 nm inland.  The ships of the  
Sea Base may be as far as 200 nm offshore, but not to exceed 275 nm from  
Sea Base to objective. 
• A CSG is available for battle space preparation. 
• Expeditionary warfare force protection is modeled and analyzed in the SEA-4  
Sea Base defined region only. 
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Obviously many more assumptions were made as the study proceeded through the 
SEMP; those assumptions pertaining to specific analysis will be addressed in later sections in 
much greater detail. 
b. Composition of the Sea Base 
As stated in the Naval Transformation Roadmap, Sea Basing is a transformational 
concept that will revolutionize the projection, protection, and sustainment of sovereign 
warfighting capabilities around the world for the United States Navy and Marine Corps.   
Sea Basing will capitalize on the inherent mobility, security, and flexibility of naval forces to 
overcome the emerging military and political limitations to overseas access.  This future 
capability will reduce the need to build up logistical stockpiles ashore that may burden or 
endanger allies and drastically complicate force protection requirements. 
There are several similar definitions for the Sea Base but they all have one thing in 
common⎯they define the Sea Base as a concept and not as a “thing.”  Since it would be difficult 
to design a system of systems to protect a concept, this study defined the Sea Base (for force 
protection purposes) in terms of a finite number of specific platforms.  Composition of the  
Sea Base was derived from two sources:  Chapter XII of the SEI-3 report, which stated “The  
Sea Base will be formed by merging at a minimum of two Marine Expeditionary Unit  
(MEU)-sized Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), their escorts, logistics and pre-positioned 
equipment support ships, and associated CSG”; and the Project Guidance Memorandum, that 
directed this study to focus on the “conceptual architecture” developed in the SEI-3 report when 
developing a proposed solution to the force protection problem.  With this, the Sea Base (for 




• 6 Expeditionary Warfare (ExWar) Combat Ships 
° 6 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) per ship 
° 6 Aero Design Heavy Lift Aircraft (HLACs) per ship 
° 18 Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAVs) per ship 
° 14 MV-22s per ship 
° 4 AH-1Zs per ship 
° 4 UH-1Ys per ship 
° 2 Landing Craft Utility (Replacement) (LCU(Rs)) per ship 
° 3 Heavy Lift Landing Craft Air Cushioned (HLCACs) per ship 
• 3 Expeditionary Warfare Logistic Ships 
Though force protection requirements might eventually dictate the addition of combatants 
such as CG, DDG, and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), they were not considered as part of the 
initial Sea Base.  Therefore, for purposes of this study, the force to be protected is defined as the 
Sea Base ships, their surface transfer assets, and their air transfer assets. 
After defining the Sea Base, an additional challenge arose.  The disposition of the 
logistics ships raises questions regarding the “expansion and contraction” of the Sea Base as 
these assets enter and depart the operating area to resupply.  When do they become part of the 
Sea Base and thus fall under the force protection umbrella?  Do they become part of the Sea Base 
as soon as they leave the Continental United States (CONUS)?  At 300 miles?  Are they still part 
of the Sea Base while loading supplies at an overseas base?  Will they have to be protected by 
Sea Base assets while they are in port?  Will they need escorts?  What procedures are involved in 
joining or departing the Sea Base?  After discussion with the stakeholders, it was determined that 
these questions were relevant, but difficult to answer.  Further discussion concluded that those 
questions would best be addressed in further study efforts and would be considered beyond the 
scope of this study.  For the purposes of this study, the expansion and/or contraction of the  
Sea Base would not be addressed, nor would circumstances involving ships entering or leaving 
the Sea Base, or the protection of assets while in port. 
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2. Distance from Objective and/or Shore 
The distance of the Sea Base from the objective and distance from shore will have an 
impact on force protection.  For example, small boats may not be a threat 200 nm offshore, but 
may be the primary threat if the Sea Base is 10 nm offshore.  As noted in the Key Assumptions 
section, the land force could be as far as 200 nm inland, while the ships of the Sea Base may be 
as far as 200 nm offshore.  Force protection postures may be significantly different based on 
distance from the objective and distance from shore.  To address these differences, the  
SEA-4 Team elected to split expeditionary operations into phases, and concentrated on the 
relative difficulty of force protection in each phase. 
After researching the basic tactics employed during STOM operations, the SEA-4 Team 
divided an expeditionary warfare mission into three distinct phases.  Phase I encompasses the 
staging and buildup of the Sea Base forces offshore.  In this phase there are no aircraft flying and 
there are no landing craft in the water.  Phase I was assumed to be the least challenging in terms 
of force protection because it can be accomplished outside of the threat area and out of range of 
the enemy’s weapons.  Phase II covers the assault and the movement of troops and equipment 
from the Sea Base to the landing area and/or the objective.  Phase II was assumed to be the most 
challenging phase because of the number of transport assets in the air and on the water.  Also, the 
limited ranges of the landing craft force the Sea Base to move closer to shore and into enemy 
weapons envelopes.  Phase III includes the sustainment of the troops and equipment ashore; it 
involves transfer of assets to the landing area and/or the objective, but only enough to sustain the 
forces ashore. 
The threats were then apportioned by the likelihood of occurrence during each phase of 
the operation (See Threat Analysis).  It then became clear that for each phase, the geography, the 
threats, and location of the objective dictated the relative location of the Sea Base.  The team 
decided on the “worst-case” phase and designed the conceptual system of systems to address 
force protection in this situation only.  Resource constraints did not allow for excursions into 
other scenarios or phases, therefore, this study chose to model force protection of the Sea Base 
during Phase II operating the Sea Base at a distance less than 75 nm from shore.  Further study of 
different scenarios and distances is recommended later in this report. 
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3. CSG Role 
The official project guidance stated that there would be a CSG in the vicinity.  This raised 
several questions.  What is “the vicinity” in terms of distance?  Will the CSG be engaged in other 
activities or will it be in direct support of the expeditionary operation?  What platforms make up 
the CSG?  What are their capabilities?  To bound these questions the team decided to make some 
assumptions and have the stakeholders validate those assumptions before moving forward.  The 
team proposed a specific platform mix for the CSG.  The capabilities of the platforms were 
considered to be inherent to the ship-type.  For this study, the CSG consists of: 
• 1 CVN 
• 2 CGs or CG (Xs) 
• 2 DDGs 
• 1 DD (X) 
• 1 SSN 
• 1 AOE 
Based on the current fleet and programs of record, the team believed that these platforms 
adequately represent a future CSG along with its required capabilities.  The CSG was also given 
the sole responsibility for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) and responsibility for 
preparation of the battlefield as dictated by the expeditionary warfare force.  Therefore, TBMD 
was not addressed in the system of systems concept for direct force protection of the Sea Base. 
The team proposed to define a maximum and minimum distance from the CSG to the 
lead Sea Base ship and a specific platform mix for the CSG.  The CSG will maintain a minimum 
distance of 20 nm from the Sea Base and a maximum distance of 200 nm.  Additionally, CSG air 
assets must be able to strike the area in and around the objective, as well as any selected landing 
areas. 
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional Analysis is viewed as one of the critical steps in completing the  
Needs Analysis.  The primary purpose of the Functional Analysis is to identify and decompose 
critical system functions, and organize them in such a way to facilitate a better understanding of 
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the system functional requirements.  In other words, it graphically describes what the system 
must do, not how it will function.  The first step in the Functional Analysis is to create a system 
decomposition.  To start, the role of force protection in the overall expeditionary warfare mission 
had to be determined.  Research into the SEI-3 study provided that relationship and a graphical 
adaptation is provided in Figure IV-2. 
Figure IV-2 Expeditionary Warfare Functions 
Concentrating on the force protection function in Figure IV-2, this study then developed a 
general top-level functional hierarchy (Figure IV-3) in order to obtain a better understanding of 
the inherent functions required for force protection of a conceptual Sea Base and its transport 
assets. 
Expeditionary Warfare







Complete Expeditionary Warfare Mission
* Adaptation from SEI-3 Final Report, Figure VIII-1
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Figure IV-3 General Force Protection Functional Hierarchy 
This general functional hierarchy indicates that survivability is the key function to force 
protection.  The subfunctions of survivability are susceptibility and vulnerability.  Definitions of 
the terms survivability, susceptibility, and vulnerability, as used in this study are: 
• Survivability – The measure of all defensive actions, including design actions 
that reduce damage and its effects.  The two components of survivability are 
susceptibility and vulnerability.  The probability of survival is characterized by 
the following equation: 
Equation (1)  PSurvival = (1 - PHit * PKill|Hit) 
• Susceptibility – The inability of the platform to avoid being subjected to a hostile 
man-made environment.  Susceptibility incorporates all factors that determine the 
probability that the platform will be damaged by a given threat and is 
characterized by the probability of being hit (PHit). 
• Vulnerability – The inability of the platform to withstand damaging effects of a 
hostile man-made environment to which it has been subjected.  Vulnerability 
includes all factors that determine the degradation of any given mission area given 





















The general force protection functional hierarchy was used to develop the functional 
hierarchy for protection of the Sea Base and its airborne and seaborne transport assets.  Threats 
to the Sea Base were considered, along with specific mission areas, in order to develop the 
functional hierarchy shown in Figure IV-4. 
Figure IV-4 Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection Functional Hierarchy 
Each warfare area was then examined and a separate more detailed, functional hierarchy 
was developed for each.  Figure IV-5 shows the Air Warfare (AW) analysis; Figure IV-6 shows 
the Surface Warfare (SUW) analysis; and Figure IV-7 shows the Undersea Warfare (USW) 
analysis, which includes Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Mine Warfare (MIW).  Initially, 
all threats were considered.  After some iteration, only the primary threats to the Sea Base, as 
















Protect the Sea Base
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Figure IV-5 AW Functional Hierarchy 





































Figure IV-7 USW Functional Hierarchy 
Because expeditionary warfare involves Navy and Marine Corps forces and assets, a 
physical decomposition of the conceptual expeditionary force was required to better understand 
the problem at hand.  Based on conclusions from the Makeup of the Sea Base discussion earlier 























Figure IV-8 Physical System Decomposition 
In this physical decomposition, force protection assets are not specifically defined 
because they will be varied as part of the study to determine the optimal mix of assets needed to 
protect the Sea Base.  Those assets may be existing, planned, conceptual, or any combination of 
the three. 
Another method of organizing the list of functions and subfunctions of a system is to 
employ a Functional Flow Diagram.  The purpose of a functional flow diagram is to sequentially 
lay out the order in which functions are performed in a system through the use of a flow chart.  
Functions are diagrammed in series and parallel to depict the relationship between functions.  
Several functional flow diagrams were used to depict the various functions of force protection in 
an ordered and sequential manner.  These were adapted from functional flow diagrams 
developed and used by the SEI-3 Team in the previous study.  Figure IV-9 is an example of one 
of the functional flow diagrams used by this study. 













































Figure IV-9 SEI-3 MCM Functional Flow Diagram Example 
D. FUTURES ANALYSIS – DEFINING THE THREAT 
Futures analysis is the final phase of the needs analysis.  The futures analysis’ purpose is 
to analyze the environment and develop plausible alternate future worlds in which a conceptual 
expeditionary force may have to function.  The futures analysis conducted by this study did not 
intend to predict the future as much as it attempted to propose a plausible future in which to test 
the conceptual system of systems solution to the force protection issue.  A detailed threat 
analysis was determined to be an integral part of the futures analysis.  Once again, the goal was 
not to predict exact future weapons systems, but rather to identify plausible and challenging 
threats that the conceptual system of systems might have to defeat. 
The primary objective of this phase was to identify the key variables that could shape the 
future environment and ultimately drive the system and/or organizations that use the system.  
These factors, or drivers, aid the design of the system so that it is better prepared to operate in the 
future.  As a result, the final system should be robust enough to meet both the present and future 
needs of the stakeholders, as well as possess the operational capability to successfully function in 
present and future environments. 













































The futures analysis tool allowed the SEA-4 Team to determine several key drivers and 
characteristics of these future worlds.  The following list is a summary of those drivers and 
characteristics: 
• The number and nature of powerful political and economic actors 
• Organizing principles of actors 
• Centralized or decentralized power distribution 
• Interest groups and constituents 
• Population growth in developing countries 
• Political and social will 
• Global economic capability 
• World economic conditions 
• The relative economic strength of the United States 
• U.S. competitive capability 
• The size of the U.S. defense budget 
• The degree of global economic integration 
• The availability of energy and natural resources 
• The degree of regionalism 
• The degrees of cultural commonality and continuity that could be envisioned in 
the world 
• Political instability in the third world 
• The nature and extent of military alliances 
• Terrorist disruption and disruptive potential 
• Technology diffusion and proliferation 
• The future vulnerability of data, hardware, and transmission 
• The degree of conflict 
• Biogenetic threats or havens 
• The locale in which military activities will take place 
• The type of available weaponry 
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From these various drivers and characteristics, four key dimensions and associated values 
were developed: 
• Sovereign interconnectedness—low or high 
• Weapons proliferation—low or high 
• Hostile nations and organizations—few or many 
• The will to oppose U.S. interests that would necessitate use of force—strong or 
weak 
When analyzed with emerging strategic battle spaces, this study felt the worst-case 
scenario would involve a distant country seeking to oppose U.S. interests by creating regional 
instability.  This instability would include the use of military aggression against U.S. allies, while 
rejecting the spirit of international cooperation.  From this alternative future, the South China Sea 
2016 scenario presented in SEA-4’s Joint Campaign Analysis course (OA4602) was adopted and 
shaped to address these future concerns.  Separate from this scenario, yet universally applicable 
to it, this study also conducted detailed research into future weapons systems and threats that will 
pose realistic and considerable challenges to U.S. platforms in the 2016 timeframe.  The 
following sub-chapters will describe these efforts. 
1. South China Sea 2016 Scenario 
The South China Sea 2016 scenario places China in a unique position within the world 
order.  Following China’s integration into the World Trade Organization in 2001, its economy 
continued its rapid growth.  In addition to enhancing educational and social programs, the China 
invested its windfall funds in military forces, focusing on strategic and naval forces capable of 
establishing a longer-range “sphere of influence” from its shores.  In 2012, Taiwan and China 
signed a treaty formally recognizing each party’s government and set a timetable for unification 
under a single government by 2018. 
Strategic and naval forces growth was seen by China as a strategic necessity to affirm 
rights to the offshore oil reserves in the South China Sea.  In 2015, China publicly claimed 
hegemony over the entire South China Sea⎯justifying its actions through claims of historical 
rights and economic requirements⎯and guaranteed the freedom of innocent merchant shipping 
through its economic zone.  That same year, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy 
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reinforced its presence in the Spratly Islands (specifically on Mischief and Alison Reef) by 
creating three paved runways, pier and maintenance facilities, air defense area batteries, and 
installing ballistic missile sites.  The Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, 
Singapore, Japan, and the United States all condemned China’s announcement and Spratly 
development, but fell short of consensus on a combined response.  Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines, however, formed a hasty common defense treaty and again protested China’s 
aggressive behavior in the area.  The United States and the Philippines established a similar 
treaty in 2010. 
China increased its naval presence in the South China Sea by deploying ships and aircraft 
from its northern fleets to augment the South China Fleet.  Despite repeated protests, Chinese 
naval exercises frequently disregarded the territorial seas of the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia.  Early in 2016, a Philippine jet aircraft, after issuing a warning to clear its territorial 
waters, strafed a Chinese destroyer that was firing its gun within two miles of Palawan Island’s 
(the Philippines) coast.  Ten Chinese sailors were killed and the destroyer returned fire, but failed 
to hit the aircraft. 
Two months later, claming self-defense and the need to establish a “safety” perimeter 
around the South China Sea, China invaded Kepulalian Natuna (Indonesia) with a division of 
Chinese infantry supported by an air defense regiment, and 10 shore-based, anti-ship cruise 
missile batteries.  They further threatened to invade Palawan Island if any the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reacted.  In coordination, the PLA Navy established a 
quarantine on Puerta Princesa port (Palawan).  This quarantine extended to the edges of the  
Sulu Sea.  The Chinese government immediately called for a treaty with the Philippines and 
Indonesia to establish a New Era of South China Sea Cooperation among perimeter nations. 
Led by the United States, ASEAN nations condemned China’s action and submitted a 
joint United Nations resolution to establish sanctions against China.  This resolution was vetoed 
in the Security Council.  Reacting to the quarantine placed on Puerta Princesa, United States and 
ASEAN ships⎯claiming freedom of navigation⎯attempted to enter the Sulu Sea.  PLA Navy 
missile-gun boats fired on the combined U.S./ASEAN patrol and sank two ASEAN vessels.  
Two days later, the PRC invaded Palawan Island and began fortifying their positions. 
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2. Threat Analysis 
a. Introduction 
As part of a systems approach to defending the Sea Base, the following Threat Analysis 
was derived from unclassified sources.  This study reviewed the myriad of threats that threaten a 
Sea Base and its ability to project power.  It endeavored to scope the problem by selecting certain 
generic, and thus universal, threats that will pose considerable challenges to U.S. platforms in the 
2016 timeframe.  By no means does this analysis encompass the full gamut of threats that the 
U.S. might face in the future, but it does provide a realistic basis, with regards to the capabilities 
and characteristics, of the types of enemy systems future architectures will have to counter in 
order to be successful.  This Threat Analysis will demonstrate the flow by which this study came 
to these conclusions.  This study first listed the threats posed to the Sea Base and categorized 
them by warfare type (see Table IV-1). 
WARFARE THREAT TO SEA BASE 
Air Warfare (AW) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Aircraft (sea based or air assets) 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) 
Ballistic Missile  
Space-based Laser 
Low Slow Flyer 
Surface Warfare (SUW) Ships 
Small Boats (jet ski, PB, PGM, etc.) 
Unconventional Ships 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) 




Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) 
Information Warfare (IW) Viruses 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
Electronic Attack (EA) 
Chaff / Flares 
Sensor Overload 
Land Warfare (LW) Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) 
Small Arms 
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) 
Rockets 
Mortars 
Miscellaneous Land-based Gunfire 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear Effects 
Land mines for Craft Landing Zones (CLZ) 
Table IV-1 Warfare Areas and Associated Threats to the Sea Base 
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This study researched the basic tactics employed during STOM operations, and broke 
down a forced entry amphibious mission into the three phases discussed previously.  Phase I 
encompasses the staging and buildup of the Sea Base forces offshore; Phase II covers the assault; 
and Phase III includes the sustainment of the troops and equipment ashore.  The threats were 
then apportioned by the likelihood of occurrence during each phase of the operation.  The 
difficulties of defeating these threats were also taken into account before prioritizing them.  The 
reasoning behind prioritizing the threats per phase follows the reasoning behind the problem 
definition phase of the SEMP—what exactly is the problem at hand?  The SEA-4 Team felt it 
necessary, and reasonable, to scope and bound the force protection problem in order to better 
define the problem by concentrating on certain threats rather than all.  The likelihood of 
occurrence and prioritization of the threats stemmed primarily from research, the operational 
experience of the officers conducting the study, and the study’s stakeholders’ expert opinions.  
Table IV-2 lists the top five most likely threats the Sea Base might encounter by phase. 



















Table IV-2 Sea Base Operation Phases and Associated Threats 
Further investigation into the prioritized threats revealed that some could be categorized 
as platforms and others as weapons.  For example, a submarine is a platform that can employ 
torpedoes, mines, surface to air missiles, or anti-ship cruise missiles.  The weapon the submarine 
employs is considered the threat, not the submarine itself (assuming the sub is not used as a 
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Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
Unguided Munitions 
Surface to Air Missile 
Table IV-3 Threat Platforms and Associated Weapons Capable of Employment 
This study then conducted detailed research into the history and range of capabilities and 
characteristics of the threats and platforms listed in Table IV-3.  In order to scope the numerous 
variations of enemy assets that exist today, the three (and in some cases four) most capable 
threats or platforms from each category were chosen to serve as the “baseline” for future assets 
an enemy may employ or possess.  These generic categories were set in order to keep this 
discussion on an unclassified level, and to provide a more universal feel to the study itself.  After 
analyzing the characteristics and capabilities of platforms, representative threats a Sea Base may 
encounter in the 2016 timeframe were defined in the “Future” section of the subsequent 
paragraphs of the Threat Analysis. 
The paragraphs (b, c, and d) are categorized by the medium in which these threats 
operate: below, on, or above the water.  Each threat is then described in further detail by the 




b. Below the Water 
(1) Mines 
(a) Definition 
This study defines a naval mine as an explosive device laid in the water with the intention 
of damaging or sinking ships or surface transport assets, such as the HLCAC, LCU(R), and 
AAAV.  The term does not include devices attached to the bottoms of ships or to harbor 
installations by personnel operating underwater, nor does it include depth-charge type devices. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
Mines can be employed by hostile forces to disrupt Sea Base operations in littoral 
regions.  Mines are not only capable of damaging and sinking Sea Base assets, but they can 
interfere with operations by channeling, blocking, or delaying ships and landing craft.  The mere 
uncertainty of their presence may slow operations, limit mobility, and/or cause planners to 
redefine operating areas to avoid the mine threat.  Due to their relatively low cost and ease of 
use, mines may play a prominent role in an adversary's sea denial arsenal. 
(c) History 
The idea of using mine warfare has been around since the Revolutionary War, when 
David Bushnell floated contact mines using barrels of gunpowder to attack British warships.  
During World War I (WW I) and World War II (WW II), simple mines were used to interdict 
shipping and to close vital ports.  In WW I, a total of 966 ships and submarines were sunk or 
damaged by mines.  In WW II, a total of 3,200 ships and submarines were sunk or damaged by 
mines.  During the Korean War, an amphibious landing at Wonsan was delayed for eight days 
while United Nations mine countermeasure forces struggled to clear a channel.  The commander 
of the amphibious task force at Wonsan, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith stated, “We have lost 
control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels 
that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”  In the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), 
the USS Tripoli (LPH 10) and USS Princeton (CG 59) were damaged by mines off the coast of 
Kuwait.  Amphibious forces threatened Iraq with a possible landing in Kuwait.  This diversion 
greatly contributed to the ground war’s success.  Intelligence reports after the war revealed Iraqi 
56 
 
minefields were larger and denser than anticipated, and could potentially have caused a disaster 
for U.S. amphibious forces (Morris, 1997). 
As shown in Figure IV-10, since 1950, mines have caused damage to 14 U.S. warships.  
This is significantly more than the damage caused by terrorist, missile, torpedo, and aerial 
attacks combined. 
Figure IV-10 Damage to U.S. Warships Since 1950 (National Research Council, 2000, 6) 
Mines are easily deployed, relatively inexpensive, and thus widely proliferated.  More 
than 50 countries have mining capabilities with more than 300 types of mines (Morison, 2000).  
One appealing aspect of mines is their cost effectiveness.  Table IV-4 shows the costs to 
transport and repair U.S. ships that were struck by mines and the cost of the mines themselves. 
Ship Damage Cost Mine Cost 
USS Samuel B. Roberts $52.1 M < $1,500 
USS Princeton $24 M $3,000 
USS Tripoli $3.5 M $1,500 
Table IV-4 Cost of Mine Damage Compared to Cost of Mine 
(d) Future 
Improvements in technology are further complicating the mine threat. Mines are being 
developed with active burial systems and non-metallic parts to reduce their target signature.  
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Mines are becoming more robust with hardened casings and resistant fuses.  Mines are also 
becoming more resistant to mine countermeasures through the use of ship counters.  Although 
advances in technology are improving mines, vintage mines from WW II still pose a threat to 
U.S. forces.  Table IV-5 shows characteristics of mines the Sea Base assets may encounter in 
various water regions. 
 MINE-1 
SURF ZONE & CLZ 












Type Bottom Bottom Bottom / Moored Moored 
Actuation Contact / Influence Contact / Influence Contact / Influence Influence 
Delivery Personnel / Ship / Aircraft Ship / Aircraft / Sub Ship / Aircraft / Sub Ship / Aircraft / Sub 
Warhead (lbs) 700 1000 700 800 
Dimensions (ft) Length - 1.5  
Diameter - 3.0 
Length - 5.5 
Diameter - 2.0 
Length - 3.5 
Diameter - 4.0 
Length - 6.5 Diameter 
- 1.5  
Active Sonar Assumptions* 
H2O Temp = 25 C  
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Reflectivity = 0.1 
Active Sonar @ 25 kHz 
Target Strength (dBsm)* -22.82 -26.34 -20.32 -28.84 
*See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 
Table IV-5 Mine Threat Representative Characteristics 
(2) Torpedoes 
(a) Definition 
This study defines a torpedo as a steerable, self-propelled, underwater projectile filled 
with an explosive charge used for destroying ships or submarines. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
The torpedo poses a threat to the Sea Base for numerous reasons.  A single torpedo is 
capable of seriously damaging or destroying Sea Base ships and/or any escorts.  Torpedoes can 
be employed from air, surface, or subsurface platforms.  Torpedoes are difficult to locate visually 
and may be difficult to detect.  Furthermore, they are highly maneuverable and travel at speeds 
faster than Sea Base shipping. 
(c) History 
The torpedo has evolved from a floating mine used in the Revolutionary War to the  
fast-moving, self-guided, homing torpedoes used today.  WW I- and WW II-era torpedoes 
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traveled in a straight line on a pre-set course.  The homing torpedo is fired in the direction of the 
target and automatically changes its course to seek out the target. 
(d) Future 
Torpedo technology is proliferating and advancing throughout the world.  There are more 
than 30 different torpedo models with varying capabilities that include:  silent, wake-free 
propulsion; high speed capability; multiple, selectable attack geometries; long range; at least 12 
different guidance, homing, or fusing techniques; decoy rejection; state of the art signal 
processing to improve the chance for target acquisition; multiple re-attack logic; use of a wide 
band of the acoustic spectrum (less than 10 kHz to nearly 100 kHz); adaptive,  
countermeasure-resistant homing (Braga, 1996). 
Representative torpedo threats the Sea Base may encounter will likely have the 







(Air or Surface Launched) 
Length (ft) 26 26 8 
Diameter (in) 21 21 13 
Warhead (lbs) 600 600 100 
Speed (kts) 50 200 40 
Range (nm) 25 4 4 
Depth (ft) 700 700 1200 
Guidance passive / active 
acoustic wake homing
passive / active 
acoustic homing 
passive / active  
acoustic homing 
Passive Sonar Assumptions* 
Depth of Torp = 10 m 
Speed of Torp1 = 50 kts 
Speed of Torp2 = 200 kts 
Speed of Torp3 = 40 kts 
H2O Temp = 25 C 
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Reflectivity = 0.1  
Passive Sonar @ 25 kHz 
Source Level (dB)* 135 285 125 
Active Sonar Assumptions* 
Depth of Torp = 10 m 
Speed of Torp1 = 50 kts 
Speed of Torp2 = 200 kts 
Speed of Torp3 = 40 kts 
Target Angle = 0 o 
H2O Temp = 25 C 
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Reflectivity = 0.1  
Active Sonar @ 25 kHz 
Target Strength (dBsm)* -27.50 -27.50 -35.88 
*See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 





This study defines a submarine as a warship that can operate on the surface or 
underwater.  For purposes of the study, the submarine will be focused primarily on traditional 
submarine mission areas:  anti-surface and anti-submarine. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
The submarine poses a versatile threat capable of both direct and indirect actions towards 
the Sea Base.  Indirectly, the submarine can act as an intelligence platform intercepting valuable 
communications and/or providing targeting data to other assets.  Conversely, a potential 
adversary could easily deny access to a region by advertising its presence.  In a more direct 
sense, a submarine threatens the Sea Base by possessing the capability to seriously damage or 
sink Sea Base shipping through the use of torpedoes, mines, or ASCMs. 
(c) History 
Submarines have proven their destructive potential throughout history.  During WW I, 
German U-boats exacted a huge toll on merchant shipping while practicing unrestricted 
submarine warfare.  In order to mitigate this problem, a new warfare area was created,  
anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  ASW included the use of depth charges and maneuvering 
surface assets in convoys.  During WW II, U.S. submarines played an important role against 
Japan’s surface assets.  By 1945, about one-third of all Japanese warships and over half of 
Japan’s merchant vessels were destroyed by U.S. submarines.  During the Cold War, nuclear 
attack submarines were developed to protect carrier battle groups against Soviet submarines.  
After the end of the Cold War, the focus of the submarine threat moved to the littorals. 
Although the overall number of submarines in the world has decreased, their quality and 
versatility have improved.  Forty-five countries around the world have submarines in their 
inventory.  Due to affordability, nations that are unable to produce their own submarines are able 
to purchase submarines from other countries.  Nations are also obtaining the submarine’s threat 
capability by purchasing cheaper “midget” submarines.  Midget submarines can deploy as diver 




Research has indicated that foreign militaries are concentrating much of their naval 
efforts on costal defense and area denial capabilities in their own littorals.  An intricate part of 
littoral defense is the employment of submarines.  As indicated above, many foreign militaries 
have obtained submarines, or have increased the number of submarines in their inventories.  It is 
quite probable that future expeditionary forces may be particularly vulnerable to submarine 
attacks while operating in the littorals.  Sea Base assets may encounter three generic types of 
attack submarines listed in Table IV-7. 
 
 SUB-1 SUB-2 SUB-3 
Length (ft) 240 360 66 
Beam (ft) 30 36 7 
Displacement (tons) 
(surfaced/submerged) 
2325 / 3076 6000 / 7000 90 / 110 
Speed (kts) 
(surfaced/submerged) 
10 / 19 15 / 30 8 / 11 
Armament 
 
6 – 21 in torpedo tubes  
(18 torpedoes) 
24 – Mines  
(replaces torpedoes) 
8 – SAMs 
6 – 21 in torpedo tubes  
(18 torpedoes) 
24 – Mines  
(replaces torpedoes) 
8 – SAMs 
2 - 21 in tubes  
(2 torpedoes) 
Propulsion Diesel electric (AIP) Nuclear / Pressurized Water 
Reactors 
Diesel electric 
Endurance (days) 45 45 2 
Diving depth (ft) 1000 1000 125 
Passive Sonar Assumptions* 
Depth of Sub = 300 m 
Target Angle = 0 o 
H2O Temp = 20 C 
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Reflectivity = 0.1  
Active Sonar @ 1 kHz 
Source Level (dB)* 100 100 90 
Active Sonar Assumptions* 
Depth of Sub = 300 m 
Target Angle = 0 o 
H2O Temp = 20 C 
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Reflectivity = 0.1  
Active Sonar @ 1 kHz 
Target Strength (dBsm)* -2.82 -1.23 -15.46 
*See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 
Table IV-7 Submarine Threat Representative Characteristics 
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c. On the Water 
(1) Small Boats 
(a) Definition 
This study defines small boats as an extensive range of craft designed to operate in 
shallow coastal water such as patrol boats, patrol gunboats, torpedo boats, missile boats,  
fast-attack craft, drones, suicide craft, and motorboats.  The armament mounted or carried on 
small boats range from miscellaneous side- and shoulder-fired weapons to large caliber machine 
guns, cannons, mortars, rockets, and torpedoes.  These small craft are inherently constrained in 
range, endurance, and capability due to their size, seaworthiness, and reliance on non-organic 
platforms for over-the-horizon targeting information and support. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
Small boats are a considerable challenge to Sea Base assets operating in the littoral 
environment.  The small radar cross section of vessels in this class make them particularly 
difficult to detect and target.  Their speed (up to 50 knots in some cases) and maneuverability 
complicate the difficulty of targeting them with current weapons systems.  Furthermore, the 
current means of addressing the small boat threat are not cost effective.  In mass, small boats 
could attrite the weapons inventory as Sea Base assets use costly means to defend themselves. 
(c) History 
“When John Paul Jones pleaded for a fast-sailing ship because he intended ‘to go in 
harm’s way,’ he set the tone for the first hundred years of American naval history (Hagan, 1991, 
XI).”  The United States Navy was “built around fast ships skippered by bold captains, officered 
by ambitious lieutenants, and manned by individualistic seamen (Hagan, 1991, XI).”  The Navy 
employed “hit and run” tactics in order to disrupt enemy merchant traffic and engage smaller 
enemy combatants.  Though the Navy’s roots stemmed from using fast, small “boats” as an 
effective platform from which to conduct warfare at sea, it wasn’t until those same tactics were 
used against the U.S. Navy that small boats were viewed as a viable threat. 
The Tanker War, from 1984-1987, would bring to light the large combatant’s inherent 
vulnerability when challenged by fast, small boats.  The Iranians conducted 43 small boat attacks 
62 
 
against merchant shipping during this conflict.  Their swarming tactics proved to be quite 
successful and though they rarely sank a ship, they were effective at inflicting serious damage on 
the tankers and their crews.  These small boats harassed U.S. ships as well, but luckily, the 
Iranians made no significant efforts to go toe-to-toe with the Americans.  The U.S. Navy, whose 
assets were not designed or equipped to deal with the small boat threat, countered the Iranians 
with Special Operations Forces and helicopter gun-ships. 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), a.k.a. the Tamil Tigers, an ethnic insurgent 
group fighting for independence in Sri Lanka, have notably been the most successful group to 
employ small boat swarm tactics against larger naval forces.  This group generally employs  
10-15 craft, armed with machineguns, and will overwhelm their enemy by attacking from many 
different directions.  “Sri Lanka has lost at least a dozen naval vessels, both in harbor and at sea, 
as a result of LTTE attacks (Sakhuja, 2003).”  The Tamil Tigers have also successfully employed 
“kamikaze” style attacks against their targets. 
(d) Future 
As foreign militaries concentrate on coastal defense because they cannot afford a blue 
water naval capability, small boats will likely play a larger role in future enemy strategies to 
deny access to, or disrupt, U.S. naval and amphibious operations in the littorals.  Small boats 
require smaller crews to operate, thereby reducing manning, training, and operating costs.  
Furthermore, small boats are cheaper to acquire and replace, and are easier to hide or disguise.  
For terrorists, non-state actors, or rogue governments seeking high payoff targets, small boats are 
likely to become a viable asymmetric option to counter U.S. supremacy of the sea.  The ExWar 
ships and the Sea Base transport assets may be particularly vulnerable to small boat attacks, 
while attempting to project power to an objective during the assault phase of the amphibious 
operation. 





  SB-1 SB-2 SB-3 
Dimension (ft) Length 10 82 190 
 Beam 4 18 26 
 Height 2 20 33 
Displacement (lton)  0.34 46.5 280 
Speed (kts)  40 50 40 
Range (nm)  125 500 1500 
Engine Type  1.2L Turbo 3 Diesel 4 Diesel 
Engine Power (MW)  .12 1.54 7.94 
Hull  Fiberglass Steel / Aluminum Steel / Aluminum 
Armament Type  Machine gun / RPG / 
Explosives 
Machine gun / Rocket / 
Torpedo / Missile 
Machine gun / Rocket /
Torpedo / Missile 
Radar Cross Section  (RCS) Assumptions* 
Target Angle = 0o  (Nose on) 
Radar Freq = 3 GHz 
Reflectivity = 0.1 
Total RCS (m2)*  0.058 2630 5490 
Passive Sonar Assumptions* 
Target Speed  = 10 kts 
H2O Temp = 25 C 
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Passive Sonar @ 1 kHz 
Source Level (dB)*  90.78 110.01 117.02 
Active Sonar Assumptions* 
Target Speed  = 10 kts 
Target Angle = 0 o 
H2O Temp = 25 C 
Salinity = 34 ppt 
Reflectivity = 1.0  
Active Sonar @ 1 kHz 
Target Strength (dBsm)*  -2.34 7.98 14.00 
*See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 
Table IV-8 Various Small Boat Characteristics 
(2) Unconventional Vessels 
(a) Definition 
This study defines unconventional vessels as innocent craft such as, sailboats, junks, 
dhows, small merchants, large merchants, container ships, cargo vessels, Petroleum Oil 
Lubrication or natural gas container ships used with the intent of causing harm or providing 
targeting information against friendly forces.  These vessels require an increased level of 
identification to discern their disposition.  Unconventional vessels cover an extensive range of 
surface craft. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
Unconventional vessels are a potentially devastating threat to the Sea Base operating in 
the littoral environment for numerous reasons.  These vessels can cause harm to the Sea Base 
both directly and indirectly.  Direct action means gaining access to the Sea Base by closing 
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distances due to an unsuspecting nature, and conducting direct action missions employing 
various types of conventional or unconventional weapons.  Indirect attack includes actions such 
as: saturating the operating area to make maneuver difficult; laying mines; clandestine movement 
of enemy assets; intelligence gathering operations; or providing targeting information to fixed or 
mobile enemy weapons systems.  If an organized effort was made, either directly and indirectly, 
to inhibit the movement of Sea Base assets, disrupt operations, or target friendly assets, the  
Sea Base may be unable to execute certain critical missions, thus making the overall mission a 
failure. 
(c) History 
Deception and military operations go hand in hand.  The Greeks successfully conquered 
Troy after their “gift” to the Trojans was moved inside the city.  Though not a sea-going vessel, 
the Trojan horse can easily be used as an example of the devastation that may befall friendly 
forces if an unconventional vessel is allowed within weapons range or successfully accomplishes 
its mission.  The USS Cole (DDG 67) was severely damaged in October 2000, by an 
unsuspecting surface craft that was helping it moor to an offshore fuel point. 
(d) Future 
Foreign militaries, terrorists, non-state actors, and rogue nations will continue their 
efforts to counter the U.S. using asymmetric means.  Unconventional vessels allow America’s 
enemies a new platform from which to implement their weapons systems.  A Sea Base 
attempting to conduct a forced-entry mission and sustainment of forces ashore would be 
extremely vulnerable to these types of vessels.  For example, a large merchant vessel could 
transit close to the Sea Base using a standard shipping lane and quickly unleash a barrage of  
anti-ship cruise missiles from its containers. 
d. Above the Water 
(1) Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) 
(a) Definition 
This study defines cruise missiles as unmanned, self-propelled vehicles that sustain flight 
through the use of aerodynamic lift.  ASCMs are cruise missiles capable of engaging ships or 
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other surface vessels.  Because of the maneuverability inherent in ships and surface craft, 
ASCMs are typically guided by one or more means and possess flight controls that allow them to 
maneuver in order to hit their designated target(s). 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
ASCMs present a significant threat to the Sea Base.  ASCMs are widely proliferated and 
increasingly able to travel further and faster while enjoying greatly reduced signatures through 
the use of low observable technologies.  They are capable of being employed on a variety of 
platforms including surface craft, aircraft, submarines, and coastal batteries.  Due to an 
advantage in accuracy, ASCMs, in the littoral, are regarded as a far more dangerous threat than 
that posed by other threats such as ballistic missiles.  Many ballistic missile systems use 
inherently inaccurate inertial guidance systems and do not possess a means of guiding onto 
maneuvering targets such as ships.  The typical ASCM, however, is able to use many forms of 
guidance, both internally and externally.  Modern ASCMs are capable of using inertial 
navigation augmented by inputs from the Global Positioning System (GPS) or other remote 
sensors, such as digital scene mapping and/or radar altimeters.  Target designation and terminal 
guidance may be provided through a variety of means including infrared (IR), electro-optical 
(EO), and/or radar.  These enhanced guidance packages greatly reduce the typical ASCM’s 
circular error probable (CEP) as compared to the CEP of a typical ballistic missile. 
(c) History 
For several decades, warfare at sea has concentrated on the threat posed by ASCMs.  
Indeed, many countermeasures and weapon systems have been developed specifically to address 
this ever-increasing threat.  The growing trend in ASCM proliferation demands that modern 
navies develop and deploy effective means of dealing with ASCMs.  Two notable examples in 
recent history demonstrate the effectiveness of modern ASCMs:  during the 1983  
Falkland Islands conflict, three Exocet ASCMs were used to sink or damage three British ships 





Many students of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have pointed to the 
emergence of high-speed, long-distance, and highly accurate weapons as a key technological 
development for future warfare.  Several countries have recognized these observations.  
Recently, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, India, and several European countries have 
shown great interest in hypersonic technology.  Advances in ramjets and scramjets have 
produced vehicles with ranges greater than 700 km and sustained speeds in excess of Mach 5.  
These technologies will undoubtedly make their way into future ASCMs. 
Two current threat representative ASCMs and one potential future ASCM, with 
corresponding characteristics and flight profiles, are presented as likely future threats.  The 
information for these ASCMs was obtained or derived using open source material.  The three 
phases of an ASCM’s flight, generally referred to as boost, midcourse, and terminal, are assumed 
for the three missiles.  The missile characteristics and associated flight profiles are listed in  
Table IV-9 and Figure IV-11. 
 ASCM - 1  ASCM - 2 ASCM - 3 
Length (ft) 12.3 29.2 38.1 
Diameter (ft) 1.38 2.2 3.0 
Speed (kts) 583 1602 3208 
Max Range (nm) 81 162 540 
Cruise Altitude (ft) 16 33 79000 
Terminal Altitude (ft) 10 16 79000 (30o dive) 
Seeker Type Radar / EO / IR Radar / EO / IR Radar / EO / IR 
Radar Cross Section (RCS) Assumptions 
Target Angle = 0o (Nose on) 
Radar Freq = 3 GHz 
Reflectivity = 0.1 
Total RCS (m2) 0.014 0.035 0.066 
Infrared (IR) Assumptions 
Target Angle = 0o (Nose on) 
Emissivity = 0.9 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ) 
Wavelength (λ) = 3 - 5 µm 29.76 3357.22 125130.12 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ) 
Wavelength (λ) = 8 - 12 µm 250.82 2117.78 13599.65 
Table IV-9 ASCM Threat Representative Characteristics 
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Figure IV-11 ASCM Threat Representative Flight Profiles 
(2) Rotary Wing Aircraft/Fixed Wing Aircraft/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
(a) Definition 
For this study’s purpose, aircraft include both manned rotary wing and manned fixed 
wing platforms, although each will be treated separately.  Rotary wing aircraft require the 
generation of lift, largely from overhead spinning rotors, and are regarded as manned helicopters.  
Fixed wing aircraft require the generation of lift by the rapid flow of air over a surface, or wing, 
that for the most part does not move, and is firmly attached to or is a part of the aircraft’s main 
body.  While the wings of a fixed wing aircraft may be variable geometry, the motion of the 
wings themselves does not contribute directly to the generation of airflow. 
A UAV may either be fixed wing or rotary wing, but it differs from the term aircraft as 
used here in that it is unmanned and can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely.  A UAV can 
be expendable or recoverable and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.  Ballistic or  
semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned 
aerial vehicles. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
Rotary wing aircraft, fixed wing aircraft, and UAVs present a significant threat to the  
Sea Base and the associated delivery vehicles.  Numerous varieties of attack aircraft are 
produced in many countries around the world.  Many of these aircraft are widely proliferated and 
are increasingly able to travel large distances at relatively high speeds while carrying greater 
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payloads and enjoying greatly reduced signatures through the use stealth and other low 
observable technologies.  These aircraft are typically capable of conducting air superiority, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance in addition to their attack roles.  Attack aircraft, in the littoral, 
are regarded as dangerous threats because of their versatility and ever-increasing capabilities. 
(c) History 
Since WW I, aircraft have played ever-increasing roles in warfare at sea, on land, and in 
the air.  The military uses of aircraft have evolved from scouting to air defense, air superiority, 
and strike/attack.  The means of conducting these missions have involved an increasing variety 
of both hard and soft kill armament. 
The ability to achieve air superiority has proven decisive in many of the conflicts in 
modern history.  The ability to strike an opponent’s forces while denying him the ability to do 
the same is of great importance to military planners.  While augmented by surface-to-air 
missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles, these missions rest primarily 
with manned aircraft. 
UAVs do not have as long a history as manned aircraft, yet several variants have enjoyed 
great success in recent conflicts.  UAVs have proven invaluable because of their relatively long 
endurances, low observability features, and tactical flexibility.  In Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
UAVs proved extremely reliable and capable in performing surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
attack missions. 
(d) Future 
Because of the significant investment in equipment and training required to obtain 
modern fighter-attack aircraft and the pilots to man them, many countries may turn instead to the 
relative affordability offered by UAVs.  The development of UAVs, such as the  
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), promise an affordable weapon system capable of 
performing a wide variety of tactical missions, either autonomously or remotely, as early as 
2010. 
The use of both rotary wing and fixed wing manned aircraft cannot be discounted for 
future warfare.  The proliferation and continued development of manned aircraft ensure that 
these platforms will remain in the arsenals of many countries for the foreseeable future. 
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Two current threat representative manned aircraft, one potential future manned aircraft, 
and one potential future multi-role UAV with corresponding characteristics are determined to 
present likely future threats.  The information for these aircraft and the UAV was obtained or 
derived using open source material.  The aircraft and UAV characteristics are listed in  
Table IV-10. 
 ACFT - 1 
Rotary Wing)
ACFT - 2  
(Fixed Wing) 
ACFT - 3  
(Fixed Wing,  
Low Observable) 
UAV / UCAV-1 
(UAV,  
Low Observable) 
Fuselage Length (ft) 49.2 56.8 66.6 26.2 
Fuselage Height (ft) 13.1 15.4 12.5 6.6 
Rotor Diameter / Wingspan (ft) 47.6 36.1 43.6 33.8 
Tail Height (ft) N/A* 6.6 N/A* N/A* 
Tail Width (ft) N/A* 6.6 N/A* N/A* 
Tail / Wing / Rotor Thickness (ft) .16 .33 .16 .16 
Max Speed (kts) 184 1602 583 551 
Max Range (nm) 248 905 1080 999 
Service Ceiling (ft) 18,045 60,368 61,024 39,370 
Max Payload (lbs) 5512 8818 4409 2998 
Sensors EO, IR, FLIR, 
Laser, Radar, 
Visual 
EO, IR, FLIR, 
Laser, Radar, 
Visual 
EO, IR, FLIR, 
Laser, Radar, Visual 
EO, IR, FLIR, 
Laser, Radar 
Radar Cross Section  (RCS) Assumptions** 
Target Angle = 0o  (Nose on) 
Radar Freq = 3 GHz 
Reflectivity ACFT 1/2 = 0.1 
Reflectivity ACFT 3/UAV = 0.0001 
Total RCS (m2)** 92.30 165 0.08 0.06 
Infrared (IR) Assumptions** 
Target Angle = 0o  (Nose on) 
Emissivity ACFT 1/2  = 0.9 
Emissivity ACFT 3/UAV = 0.9999 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ)** 
Wavelength (λ) = 3 - 5 µm 
6.74 9.91 9.91 6.74 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ)** 
Wavelength (λ) = 8 - 12 µm 
128.48 152.84 152.84 128.48 
*Not Applicable. 
**See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 
Note:  Specific weapon types carried by these platforms are not addressed in this section.  The types of weapons 
carried by these platforms will be similar to the weapons addressed in other sections of this document. 
Table IV-10 Aircraft and UAV Threat Representative Characteristics 
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(3) Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) 
(a) Definition 
For the purposes of this study, SAMs are defined as surface-launched missiles that are 
used against airborne targets. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
SAMs will present a significant threat to the Sea Base’s airborne assets.  SAMs are 
widely proliferated throughout the world in a variety of forms and are typically fast and very 
accurate.  Many SAMs are capable of using a variety of both passive and active methods for 
guidance and homing.  These methods include radar, laser, EO, IR, and ultraviolet (UV).  
Furthermore, many SAM systems are highly mobile and do not rely on fixed site emplacement.  
These SAMs are normally man-portable or are employed on tracked or wheeled vehicles or 
onboard surface craft.  The ability of these systems to shoot and move greatly complicates 
counter-targeting by enemy forces. 
(c) History 
SAMs have enjoyed great success in several conflicts in recent history.  They have been 
widely used in many areas and at various times with devastating results.  While not able to gain 
air superiority themselves, SAMs have acted as effective barriers to the attainment of air 
superiority by opponents. 
(d) Future 
SAMs will continue to be used in future conflicts.  Their affordability and lethality are 
attractive alternatives to the establishment of an expensive air defense composed of high-cost,  
air-defense fighters.  Furthermore, SAMs provide an effective deterrent against many modern  
air forces. 
SAMs will most likely continue to increase in speed, range, and accuracy.  Many experts 
attribute the success of the U.S. in recent conflicts to the attainment of air superiority.  Future 
enemies will most likely focus on the denial of air superiority through increases in the 
performance capabilities of their air defense systems. 
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Two current threat representative SAMs with corresponding characteristics are likely to 
present future threats.  The information for these SAMs was obtained or derived using open 
source material.  The SAMs’ characteristics are listed in Table IV-11. 
 SAM - 1 SAM - 2 
Length (ft) 23 4.9 
Diameter (ft) 1.5 .3 
Max Speed (kts) 3600 1602 
Max Range (nm) 108 5.4 
Max Altitude (ft) 98,425 19,685 
Launch Platform Mobile / Semi-Mobile 
(TEL, ship) 
MANPAD 
Sensors EO, IR, Radar EO, IR, UV, Laser, Visual 
Radar Cross Section (RCS) Assumptions* 
Target Angle = 0o (Nose on) 
Radar Freq = 3 GHz 
Reflectivity = 0.1 
Total RCS (m2)* 0.016 0.00078 
Infrared (IR) Assumptions* 
Target Angle = 0o (Nose on) 
Emissivity = 0.9 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ)* 
Wavelength (λ) = 3 - 5 µm 
181943.69 2625.63 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ)* 
Wavelength (λ) = 8 - 12 µm 
17166.46 1890.59 
*See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 
Table IV-11 SAM Threat Representative Characteristics 
(4) Unguided Weapons 
(a) Definition 
For the purposes of this study, unguided weapons are defined as projectiles that follow a 
ballistic trajectory with no in-flight control.  Unguided weapons encompass small arms, artillery, 
and ballistic rocket systems. 
(b) Threat to Sea Base 
Unguided weapons present a significant threat to the Sea Base and its associated delivery 
assets.  Unguided weapons are relatively cheap and widely proliferated throughout the world in a 




(c) Threat to Sea Base 
Unguided weapons present a significant threat to the Sea Base and its associated delivery 
assets.  Unguided weapons are relatively cheap and widely proliferated throughout the world in a 
variety of forms. 
(d) History 
Unguided weapons have been used in almost every conflict since Man first picked up a 
rock.  They have evolved from simple slings and spears to catapults and crossbows to modern 
day machine guns and long-range howitzers. 
(e) Future 
Unguided weapons will continue to be heavily used in future conflicts.  Their 
affordability, lethality, and ease of use ensure their continued existence in every arsenal.  
Unguided weapons will most likely continue to increase in range, accuracy, and firepower. 
The Sea Base may encounter three representative unguided weapons listed in  
Table IV-12.  The information for these unguided weapons was obtained or derived using open 
source material. 
 
 DW - 1 (MLRS-type) 
DW - 2 
(Crew Served) 
DW - 3 
(Assault Rifle) 
Projectile 227mm 40mm 7.62mm 
Effective Range 16 nm 1695 yds 328 yds 
Max Rounds Per Minute (RPM) 6 rockets per launcher (644 submunitions per rocket) 60 600 
Armor Penetration of Rolled 
Homogenous Armor (RHA) 
4 in 
(per submunition) 2 in N/A 
Portability Truck w / 13-ft bed 3 man 1 man 
Radar Cross Section (RCS) Assumptions** 
Target Angle = 0o (Nose on) 
Radar Freq = 3 GHz 
Reflectivity DW1 = 0.1 
Reflectivity DW2/3 = 0.7 
Total RCS (m2)** 0.0041 0.00088 0.000032 
Infrared (IR) Assumptions** 
Target Angle = 0o (Nose on) 
Emissivity DW1 = 0.9 
Emissivity DW2/3 = 0.3 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ)** 
Wavelength (λ) = 3 - 5 µm 125130.12 27.22 3357.22 
Radiant Exitance (W/m2-µ)** 
Wavelength (λ) = 8 - 12 µm 13599.65 240.94 2117.78 
*Not Applicable. 
**See Sensor Analysis (Chapter V-B) for further details. 




In the complicated process of weapons development, very few innovations have arisen 
solely from original thinking, flown in the face of convention, or challenged the status quo.  
Many weapons are developed through a person or group of people who are able to bring unique 
points of view and sets of experience to known facts.  Many other advances in weaponry can be 
traced ultimately to the steady march of technology.  While scientific breakthroughs cannot be 
discounted and may have great impacts on the battlefields of the future, the threats or platforms 
examined by this study are currently in existence or are reasonably judged to be in existence by 
2016.  This study has matched the future threats with future platforms and has listed them in 
Table IV-13. 
 
PHASE PLATFORM WEAPON 
I SUB-1/2 Mine-3/4, Torp-1/2, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2 
 UnconVes Mine-3/4, Torp-3, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2, DW-1/2/3 
 Land ASCM-2/3 
 SB-3 Mine-3/4, Torp-3, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2, DW-1/2/3 
 ACFT-2/3 & UAV ASCM-1/2, TORP-3, MINE-3/4, DW-2/3 
   
II SUB-1/2 Mine-2/3, Torp-1/2, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2 
 SUB-3 Mine-2/3, Torp-1/2 
 UnconVes Mine-1/2/3, Torp-3, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2, DW-1/2/3 
 Land ASCM-1/2/3, SAM-1/2, DW-1/2/3 
 SB-1 DW-2/3, SAM-2 
 SB-2 MINE-1/2/3, SAM-2, DW-2/3 
 SB-3 Mine-2/3, Torp-3, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2, DW-1/2/3 
 ACFT-1/2/3 & UAV ASCM-1/2, TORP-3, MINE-1/2/3/DW-2/3 
   
III SUB-3 Mine-2/3, Torp-1/2 
 UnconVes Mine-1/2/3, Torp-3, ASCM-1/2, SAM-2, DW-1/2/3 
 Land ASCM-1/2/3, SAM-1/2, DW-1/2/3 
Table IV-13 Phases and Associated Threat Platforms with Possible Future Weapons 
The characteristics of weapons and platforms listed in Table IV-13 will be used as inputs 
for the modeling and simulation, and design of critical systems that will make up the conceptual 
architecture of this study’s force protection recommendation. 
E. EFFECTIVE NEED 
The end product of the needs analysis is the effective need statement.  After identifying 
and addressing force protection issues, defining the functions of the system, analyzing the system 
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operating environment, and understanding the needs of the stakeholders; the SEA-4 Team was 
able to develop an effective need statement.  The effective need was determined to be: 
“Conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the 
decisive time and place.  Conserving the force’s fighting potential 
is achieved through maximizing survivability by minimizing 
susceptibility and vulnerability.” 
This effective need statement was used to provide focus and used as the central theme in 
the continuation of the study. 
F. VALUE SYSTEM DESIGN 
Building from the effective need statement and functional analysis, survivability was 
determined to be the primary measure of effectiveness of force protection for the Sea Base and 
its transport assets.  Survivability was further divided into the measures susceptibility and 
vulnerability.  Using these critical functions as starting points, the value system design phase was 
started.  Traditionally, the primary purpose of the value system design is to develop a value 
hierarchy that will be used to evaluate potential alternative solutions and ultimately select the 
best-proposed alternative.  However, this study took a different approach to the value hierarchy 
concept.  Instead of applying values to the critical functions (survivability, susceptibility, and 
vulnerability) with regards to stakeholder needs, wants, and desires, this study concluded that 
relative values should be applied with regards to the ability of the team to affect the design of the 
architecture.  In other words, on what should the SEA-4 Team focus its efforts in order to attain 
the greatest affect on asset survivability?  Review of the governing documents, brainstorming, 
and discussions with stakeholders allowed the SEA-4 Team to create the value hierarchy 
displayed in Figure IV-12. 
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Figure IV-12 Force Protection Weighted Value Hierarchy 
Vulnerability is the ability of the system to withstand enemy attacks or actions.  Possible 
methods of withstanding enemy attacks might include adding armor to a system or component, 
damage control actions or training, implementing quality construction practices, or adding 
redundant elements to vital systems.  Because many of the systems considered for possible 
inclusion into this study’s conceptual solution were already designed, little could be done by the 
SEA-4 Team with regard to affecting this critical function.  Therefore, a weighting of .25 was 
applied to vulnerability and thus minimal effort was expended on trying to decrease the level of 
system vulnerability in order to increase the overall measure of survivability.  Vulnerability is 
addressed, however, in the modeling section of this study.  Friendly assets were broken down 
into critical regions in order to determine how many enemy hits they could withstand prior to 
becoming a “mission kill.” 
Susceptibility is the ability of the system to prevent and defeat enemy attacks or actions.  
The SEA-4 Team’s initial inclination into what a possible conceptual solution to the force 
protection problem might be lead the team to expend the majority of its efforts on attempting to 
increase the overall measure of survivability by defeating and preventing enemy attacks against 
















electronic or IR countermeasures, executing evasive maneuvers, deploying chaff, flares or 
decoys, or designing systems with signature management as the primary goal.  Once again, as in 
the example regarding vulnerability, this study could do little to affect many of these mitigation 
efforts as most of the systems were already designed.  Therefore, a value of .25 was applied to 
the preventing attacks subfunction of susceptibility.  The SEA-4 Team did address susceptibility, 
with the intent of reducing friendly asset susceptibility to enemy weapons systems, by placing 
certain friendly assets at greater distances from enemy forces. 
The defeating attacks subfunction was considered something this study could affect with 
regards to a conceptual solution to the force protection problem.  Methods of defeating enemy 
attacks might include employing kinetic or directed energy weapons against enemy threats.  
Various missile, gun, and directed energy weapons were considered as varying elements of the 
final force protection architecture proposal, and thus a weighting of .75 accompanied that 
subfunction. 
Though not listed in Figure IV-12, this study considered the ability to detect enemy 
threats as the genesis of protecting the Sea Base and its transport assets.  Methods for detecting 
enemy threats might include the employment of radar, lidar, IR, ultra-violet, sonar, or  
electro-optical sensors.  The SEA-4 Team expended considerable effort on this subject as it 
ultimately served as the origin for possible alternative solutions to the force protection problem. 
G. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION 
1. Overview 
The generation of requirements is not a formal part of the SEMP, but is necessary for any 
system.  The key to success for any project is to have well defined and well understood 
requirements.  A requirement is considered to be something that must be accomplished, 
transformed, produced, or provided.  A requirement must accurately translate the client’s need to 
the supporting teams.  Ideally, the Systems Engineers would complete the problem definition 
phase, and then develop detailed requirements for the supporting teams.  In this study, the 
supporting teams had to begin work before the Systems Engineering Team was able to begin 
with the SEMP.  Therefore, the supporting teams were only provided with a set of general 
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overarching requirements.  Detailed requirements were provided to the TSSE Team in the design 
of a LCS that would be specially designed to support force protection of the Sea Base. 
2. Overarching Requirements 
The systems engineering methodology described in Chapter III did not include a formal 
requirements generation phase.  During the problem definition phase, the SEA-4 Team 
developed a set of overarching requirements using the SEI-3 study for guidance.  Force 
protection was broken into specific mission areas as shown in the functional analysis.  A set of 
overarching requirements was developed focusing on self-defense and the primary threats in 
each specific mission area.  The initial overarching requirements for Sea Base force protection 
were: 
• Self-defense for ExWar ships 
° Defense against ASCMs (AAW) 
° Defense against small-boat attack (ASUW) 
° Defense against submarine/UUV attack (ASW) 
• Robust organic Mine Countermeasures (MCM) capability (MIW) 
• Capability to identify and defend against unconventional attacks 
• Highly survivable transport aircraft and landing craft 
• Provide protection for logistic transports from the Sea Base to the objectives 
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Enhanced Conventional 
Weapons (CBRNE) defense 
These were validated using the results of this study’s functional analysis and with 
functional flow block diagrams and functional analysis sheets completed by the SEI-3 Team as 
shown in the SEI-3 report. 
3. LCS Requirements 
The TSSE Team was tasked with the design of a Littoral Combat Ship specifically suited 
for force protection.  This mandated the generation of detailed requirements by the SEA-4 Team.  
Detailed requirements were delivered to the TSSE Team in the form of a requirements 
document.  The document contained a general description of the required operational capability 
that included the mission need statement, overall mission area, and a description of the proposed 
system.  The document also described system states and associated threats along with specifics in 
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each warfare area.  Requirements for supportability and human systems integration were also 
included.  The entire LCS requirements document is included in this report as Appendix A. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Defining the problem is considered the most difficult part of any systems engineering 
problem.  The SEA-4 Team endeavored to scope and bound the problem using several 
techniques.  An overall skeleton was erected by determining a realistic time schedule in which to 
study, analyze, and deliver a final product to the stakeholders.  Assumptions were then made and 
associated critical issues were developed and discussed in order to further scope and bound the 
problem.  The force protection function was broken down into subfunctions in order to better 
understand how measures of effectiveness might be evaluated.  Studying the operating 
environment and projecting a plausible future in which the critical functions of force protection 
could be tested then set the stage for this study’s modeling efforts.  Throughout this process, a 
solid understanding of stakeholder needs, wants, and desires served as the basis from which the 
effective need statement was developed.  Developing the effective need allowed the  
SEA-4 Team to begin adding the muscle to the skeleton and essentially concluded the needs 
analysis phase of the Systems Engineering Management Process.  Diverging from the practiced 
method of value system design, the SEA-4 Team was able to focus its efforts towards critical 
elements that could actually be affected by this study.  The next step was to concentrate on those 





A. ALTERNATIVES GENERATION 
Alternatives generation is the means of bringing system alternatives into being while 
fulfilling the functions of the system that were developed during the problem definition phase.  
This process is also referred to as ideation, or the creative process of producing concepts and 
ideas in order to meet system requirements.  Concepts serve as the map from functions to form 
and require scoping and bounding in order to compose a list of feasible solutions for Sea Base 
force protection. 
This study analyzed the threats to the Sea Base and determined the key functions 
associated with the protection of the Sea Base.  From functional analysis and requirements 
generation, survivability was determined to be the primary measure of effectiveness of force 
protection.  Survivability was further divided into the measures of susceptibility and 
vulnerability.  Susceptibility is the ability of the system to prevent and defeat enemy attacks or 
actions, while vulnerability is the ability of the system to withstand the enemy attacks or actions.  
This functional hierarchy was applied to the three primary mission areas of air warfare, surface 
warfare, and undersea warfare and their respective threats from the Threat Analysis. 
In order for any system to be successful in minimizing force susceptibility, it must 
adequately detect and defeat threats.  If the system cannot detect and defeat the threats, it must 
limit its vulnerability, or be able to withstand the attack.  There are numerous methods to detect, 
defeat, and withstand the threats. 
From a very top-level view, detection was determined to include human intelligence 
(HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery, and field detection.  SIGINT includes 
communication intelligence and electronic intelligence.  Imagery includes electro-optical (EO),  
infrared (IR), ultraviolet (UV), radar, lidar, sonar, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and  
inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR).  Field detection includes magnetic anomaly detection 
(MAD) or quantum effects. 
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The force protection function of defeating the threat was divided into two categories:  
destruction of the threat and distraction of the threat.  Destruction of the threat included any 
means that provided for the physical defeat (i.e., hard kill) of the threat and included both kinetic 
and directed energy weapons.  Distraction was determined to be the prevention of a successful 
attack by the threat (i.e., soft kill) after the attack has commenced.  Distraction could be 
accomplished through any number of means including decoys, chaff, flares, signature 
management, and countermeasures (electronic, infrared, acoustic). 
If the system were unable to defeat or prevent the attack, it must be able to withstand the 
intended effect of the threat.  The primary means of withstanding attacks consist of redundancy 
of vital systems, compartmentalization, armor (to include reactive and reflective), and inherent 
resiliency of systems (easily restored). 
Finally, this study determined a myriad of platforms from which to deploy or operate the 
desired functionality.  These platforms could include aircraft, aerostats, ships, shore-based 
facilities, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 
unmanned surface vehicles (USV), and satellites. 
Through subject matter expert brainstorming sessions and unclassified research, the study 
produced a number of means to accomplish the desired force protection functions.  These 
methods, or means, are best displayed graphically, divided by function.  Table V-1 illustrates 
some of the possible means of accomplishing the desired functions. 
DETECT DEFEAT PREVENT WITHSTAND DEPLOY 
Radar Missile Chaff Armor Ship 
Lidar Gun Flare Reactive Armor Aircraft 
IR Laser Decoys Reflective Armor UAV 
EO Microwave Maneuver Redundant Vital Systems Aerostat 
UV Acoustic Electronic Countermeasures Quality Construction Satellite 
SAR/ISAR  IR Countermeasures  Submarine 
Hyperspectral  Acoustic Countermeasures  UUV 
Sonar  Signature Management  Shore 
Seismic     
Table V-1 Function to Form 
In order to continue the process of ideation, a morphological chart was developed to 
represent possible concepts to investigate further (see Table V-2).  The morphological chart was 
used to scope and bound the concepts for further research and analysis.  This iterative process of 
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scoping and bounding is detailed in the following Sensor, Search, and Weapons Analysis 
sections. 
DETECT DEFEAT PREVENT WITHSTAND DEPLOY 
Radar Missile Chaff Armor Ship 
Lidar Gun Flare Reactive Armor Aircraft 
IR Laser Decoys Reflective Armor UAV 
EO Microwave Maneuver Redundant Vital Systems Aerostat 
UV Acoustic Electronic Countermeasures Quality Construction Satellite 
SAR/ISAR  IR Countermeasures  Submarine 
Hyperspectral  Acoustic Countermeasures  UUV 
Sonar  Signature Management  Shore 
Seismic     
Table V-2 Morphological Chart 
Ultimately, the SEA-4 Team endeavored to construct a force protection architecture that 
would meet the needs, wants, desires, and requirements of this study’s stakeholders.  The 
transformation of force protection functions into various forms was accomplished through 
detailed deterministic modeling.  The SEA-4 Team was able to screen the alternatives laid out in 
Table V-2 by establishing suitable threat-sensor pairs, sensor-platform pairs, and the appropriate 
weapons with which to accomplish the goal of increasing force survivability.  Insights and 
enhancements to this architecture were made, or drawn from a myriad of supporting studies 
reviewed or coordinated by the SEA-4 Team.  These supporting studies provided the means by 
which to fill resource gaps.  The conclusion of this chapter combines the deterministic models 
and the supporting studies in order to propose and outline two overarching force protection 
architectures that a future Sea Base might employ while conducting forced entry amphibious 
operations. 
B. SENSOR ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The Threat Document identified certain “baseline” future representative threats that will 
pose considerable challenges to Sea Basing assets in the 2016 timeframe.  The “Future” sections 
of the Threat Document displayed several capabilities and characteristics of each identified threat 
platform or threat weapon.  An important part of effectively countering these threat platforms 
and weapons is the ability to detect them.  For these reasons, this study assessed the ability of 
various sensors (radar, lidar, IR, and sonar) to detect threats as a critical first step in defending 
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the Sea Base and its associated transport assets.  A general approach, using first principle 
equations is used to ensure an unclassified discussion and an inclusive threat matrix.  Where 
possible, the results obtained by this study were verified using open source documents.  This 
chapter will outline the preliminary analysis completed regarding the sensors studied, the 
methodology employed, and equations used to derive the values displayed in the  
Sensor Analysis, as well as the Threat Document. 
2. Preliminary Analysis 
a. Conventional Radar 
This study modeled conventional microwave radar, and focused on two frequencies  
(3 GHz and 20 GHz) in order to determine detection ranges and cross sections of the future 
representative threats.  These two frequencies were chosen because they represent typical air 
search or surface search frequencies possessing relative extremes with respect to beam spread 
and resolution; furthermore, these two frequencies are not susceptible to significant atmospheric 
attenuation.  It is readily apparent that viewing the target’s broadside, (90° target angle) and 
using a higher frequency presents a much larger radar cross section for many targets and 
therefore allows for a greater detection range.  It is also important to note that, in many cases, the 
radar is limited by its line of sight.  These facts support the use of a greater height of eye for 
radar.  A higher sensor can, in many circumstances, obtain a greater radar cross section through 
an increased look angle, while simultaneously extending the radar horizon. 
However, if a greater height of eye is achieved through the use of an aircraft, UAV, 
aerostat, or satellite, two key attributes of the radar system⎯power and antenna size⎯will most 
likely change as well.  By placing radar on an airborne asset, one could expect the radar to have a 
reduced capacity for power generation and a reduced antenna size, thus lowering the radar’s 
capability to detect and range various targets.  These trade-offs are considered in the Sensor and 





This study’s laser radar model concentrated on one wavelength (10 µm) in order to 
determine detection ranges and cross sections of the future representative threats.  This 
wavelength was chosen based on the limited unclassified information available to this study.  It 
is apparent that lidar does not provide very good detection ranges.  Because of its small 
wavelength, various aspects of the target are largely irrelevant in determining the detection 
range.  Furthermore, lidar is largely affected by target reflectivity and shows a much reduced 
detection range against targets with low reflectivity (i.e., low observable targets).  The poor 
detection ranges can also be largely attributed to atmospheric attenuation.  If lidar were to be 
used as an area detection sensor, it should be used as a part of an extensive distributed network in 
order to obtain reasonable detection probabilities (see Search Analysis).  Though capable of 
measuring chemical concentrations and compositions of remote targets (i.e., target exhaust) at 
extended ranges, for the purposes of this unclassified study, that option was not explored, and 
therefore, lidar was considered better suited for target identification and tracking rather than 
search applications.  Used in conjunction with another system to initially assist in directing it, 
lidar’s capability to discriminate and track targets could prove quite useful to a cooperative 
sensor network. 
c. IR 
This study modeled the infrared search and track system by concentrating on two ranges 
of wavelengths (3-5 µm and 8-12 µm) in order to determine detection ranges and cross sections 
of the future representative threats.  These wavelength bands were chosen because of the 
relatively low attenuation characteristics when compared to other IR frequencies.  Initial results 
show that IR systems do not perform, as well as radar when considering detection range; 
however, IR is a passive sensor and therefore greatly reduces the chance of counter-detection by 
the enemy.  Furthermore, IR systems can be used as a cueing sensor for active systems and can 
be used themselves to determine ranges and track targets through triangulation.  Viewing the 
targets’ broadside gives the IR system a much greater projected area and associated greater 
detection range.  The height of eye limitations are not as great as those associated with the radar 
systems, but a slightly greater height of eye would prove beneficial against some of the threats.  
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For these reasons, once again, IR systems should be considered for use as part of an elevated and 
cooperative sensor network. 
d. Sonar 
The last sensor this study considered with regard to detecting the future representative 
threats identified in the Threat Document was sonar.  Both active and passive sonar were 
modeled.  This study concentrated on three frequencies, 1 kHz, 25 kHz, and 56 kHz, in order to 
determine detection ranges.  These frequencies were based on the unclassified information 
available to this study.  Initial active sonar findings indicate that lower frequencies tend to 
propagate with less attenuation at extended ranges and are therefore more effective at detecting 
larger targets at longer ranges.  Because of many threats’ small aspects when viewed from small 
target angles, higher sonar frequencies appear to be more effective at target detection at short 
ranges.  Above 25 kHz, however, greater attenuation appears to overcome the benefits of the 
additional target strength associated with greater frequencies.  Developing or employing a lower 
frequency distributed sonar system that can search the underwater battle space may prove 
beneficial to the force protection mission. 
Initial passive sonar results demonstrate that passive sonar may not be a particularly 
effective detection sensor against several of the threats when used in an area of heavy shipping.  
Furthermore, passive sonar does not provide good detection results against submarines or slower 
moving vessels when used in an area of moderate shipping.  Because it is a passive sensor, two 
or more should be used in conjunction to achieve reasonable detection probabilities (see  
Search Analysis), as well as determine the target’s range.  For these reasons, passive sonar may 
be used with greater results when distributed throughout the operating area. 
3. Methodology 
This study first considered what sensors the Sea Base in the 2016 timeframe would most 
likely employ against the stated future representative threats.  Radar, lidar, IR, active, and 
passive sonar were all considered.  Next, this study employed the Systems Engineering Process 
to determine what sensors could reasonably detect which threat platform or weapon.  
Brainstorming, functional decomposition, and expert opinion were some of the tools used to 
develop the following threat-sensor pairs displayed in Table V-3. 
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THREAT ASSOCIATED SENSOR 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Radar, Lidar, IR 
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Radar, Lidar, IR 
Aircraft / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (ACFT / UAV) Radar, Lidar, IR 
Unguided Weapon (DW) Radar, Lidar, IR 
Small Boat (SB) Radar, Lidar, IR, Active Sonar, Passive Sonar 
Submarine (SUB) Active Sonar, Passive Sonar 
Torpedo (TORP) Active Sonar, Passive Sonar 
Mine (MINE) Active Sonar 
Table V-3 Threats and Associated Sensors 
From these initial pairings, and by making several assumptions with respect to the threats 
themselves and the environments in which they function, this study was able to begin the  
sensor-modeling phase of the analysis.  Applying these assumptions, certain characteristics of the 
threat platforms or weapons such as radar cross section (RCS), radiant exitance, projected area, 
and sonar source level (SL) were then calculated, or in some cases, obtained from open source 
references.  These results, as well as other sensor system characteristics, were then used as inputs 
into mathematical spreadsheet sensor models for each sensor. 
Next, this study concentrated on the future representative threats and how their shapes 
should be represented and modeled within the mathematical spreadsheets.  In order to simplify 
many of the calculations, the threats (MINE, TORP, SUB, SB, ASCM, ACFT, and DW) were 
assumed to have basic shapes in the forms of flat plates, cylinders, or spheres.  These shapes 
were often used in conjunction with each other in order to “build” a threat.  Of course, the 
threats' shape changes with the target look angle; therefore, this study looked at the two extreme 
angles a target might present itself to a sensor:  0o (nose-on) and 90o (broadside).  Drawing from 
the threat-sensor pairs listed in Table V-3, this study then applied these shapes (specifically, the 
associated formulas used to calculate their surface areas) to the various mathematical models.  In 
only two cases (SB 2 and 3) were different shapes used to represent the same threat to different 
sensors.  SB 2 and 3 were modeled using flat plates in the radar, lidar, and IR models and were 
then modeled using a spherical bow and cylindrical body in the sonar model.  (Note:  In this case 
(SB and sonar), the SB shapes were assumed to be half of a sphere and cylinder because only 
part of the shape was below the waterline.) 
Though these shapes are rather simplistic, RCS results from the mathematical models, 
when compared to other open source RCS figures, demonstrate that they are reasonable, 
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conservative, and thus appropriate for use as a gross level look at the effects each future 
representative threat may have on various sensor suites.  The assumptions were also briefed to, 
and approved by, this study’s stakeholders.  Figure V-1 shows the various shapes used to model 
the future representative threats for a specific sensor. 
Figure V-1 Threat Shapes 
Additional assumptions regarding threat characteristics were then made in order to 
continue with the modeling process; specifically, target reflectivity (π), emissivity (ε), and 
radiated noise levels (NL) (NL to be discussed later).  These assumptions were determined from 
various open source materials such as online articles, Principles of Underwater Sound, and 
Combat Systems Vol. 2:  Sensor Elements.  The low reflectivity assumptions drive this study’s 
mathematical sensor models to “perform” at higher levels in order to achieve the required 
probabilities of detection.  This study, along with its stakeholders, views the assumptions and 
basic approach as reasonable, conservative, and appropriate.  The extremely low reflectivity 
assumption for ACFT-3/4 relates to the “stealth” characteristics that a future adversary would be 
expected to possess by the 2016 timeframe.  Table V-4 summarizes the assumed shapes, sensor 
modeled, and values of reflectivity and emissivity for each threat. 
Sonar Radar/ Lidar / Infrared
Small Boat













THREAT / PLATFORM SENSOR MODELED SHAPE REFLECTIVITY EMISSIVITY
MINE-1 / 2 / 3 / 4 Sonar Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Body 
0.1 N/A* 
TORP-1 / 2 / 3 Sonar Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Body 
0.1 N/A* 





Radar, Lidar, IR Flat Plates 0.1 0.9 SB-2 / 3 
Sonar Spherical Bow 
Cylindrical Body 
1.0 N/A* 
ASCM-1 / 2 / 3 Radar, Lidar, IR Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Body 
0.1 0.9 
ACFT-1 / 2 Radar, Lidar, IR Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Fuselage 
Flat Plate Wings / Tails / Rotors 
0.1 0.9 
ACFT-3 / 4 Radar, Lidar, IR Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Fuselage 
Flat Plate Wings / Tails / Rotors 
0.0001 0.9999 
SAM-1 / 2 Radar, Lidar, IR Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Body 
0.1 0.9 
DW-1 Radar, Lidar, IR Spherical Nose 
Cylindrical Body 
0.1 0.9 




Table V-4 Threat Characteristic Assumptions Applied to Sensor Models 
Finally, this study considered several other critical assumptions regarding such things as 
the environment, and additional sensor physical characteristics.  This led to assumptions 
regarding attenuation coefficients, radiation propagation characteristics, sensor aperture 
diameter, power output, system frequency, physical location on larger platforms, and required 
carrier to noise ratios (CNR) a sensor would need in order to achieve reasonable probability of 
detection thresholds, etc.  These assumptions will be covered in greater detail in the following 
section, as it describes the governing equations used to represent both the threats and the sensor, 
and results of those calculations. 
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4. Modeling Equations and Results 
a. Radar 
This study used the following radar range equation to model its microwave radar sensor: 







⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 where: 
R = Range (km) 
PT = Power (W) 
D = Antenna Diameter (m) 
σ  = Target Cross Section (m2) 
λ = Radar Wavelength (m) 
 k = Boltzmann’s Constant (J/K) 
T = Ambient Temperature (K) 
B = Radar Bandwidth (Hz) 
F = Radar Noise Figure 
            CNR = Sensor Required Carrier-to-Noise Ratio (linear) 
All of the variables within the radar range equation can be changed with the exception of 
Boltzmann’s Constant.  Through careful research, this study made the following assumptions 
with regards to the values for the variables associated with the radar range equation: 
PT = 3 MW 
D = 2 m 
σ = Varies based on target (explained in greater detail below) 
λ = Varies based on frequency (3 GHz and 20 GHz frequencies studied) 
k = 1.38 x 10-23 J/K 
T = 300 K 
B = 100 MHz 
F = 1 
CNR = 200 (23 dB) 
Before calculating the range at which microwave radar might detect the various future 
representative threats, the RCS for each target had to be calculated.  The RCS of the various 
threats is dependent on the target’s shape, size, reflectivity, and for certain observed angles, the 
wavelength of the radar used against it.  As mentioned earlier, two target angles (0o (nose-on) 
and 90o (broadside)) were considered for each threat input to the radar model, and the resulting 
target RCSs (listed in Table V-5) were calculated using Equations (1) through (6). 
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• ASCM-1/2/3, SAM-1/2, DW-1/2/3, SB-1 
Equation (2)  σ  = 
2
2 2( )(cos ) (sin )rlr π ρπ ρ λ
⎡ ⎤Θ + Θ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 where: 
ρ = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
λ = Wavelength ( )mµ (Based on 3 GHz and 20 GHz radar frequencies) 
 
• ACFT-1 




4 2( )(cos ) (sin )A rlrπ ρ π ρπ ρλ λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Θ + Θ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 where: 
ρ = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
λ = Wavelength ( )mµ (Based on 3 GHz and 20 GHz radar frequencies) 
A = Target Surface Area of Rotor Blades (m2) (See Threat Document 
       for Dimensions) 
 
• ACFT-2 




4 42(cos ) (sin )A Arlrπ ρ π ρπ ρπ ρλ λ λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Θ + + Θ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 where:  
ρ = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
λ = Wavelength ( )mµ (Based on 3 GHz and 20 GHz radar frequencies) 
A1 = Target Surface Area of Wings (m2) (See Threat Document for 
         Dimensions) 
A2 = Target Surface Area of Tail (m2) (See Threat Document for 
         Dimensions) 
 
• ACFT-3, UAV/UCAV-1 




4 2(cos ) (sin )A rlrπ ρ π ρπ ρλ λ




ρ = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
λ = Wavelength ( )mµ (Based on 3 GHz and 20 GHz radar frequencies) 
A1 = Target Surface Area of Wings (m2) (See Threat Document for 
         Dimensions) 
 
• SB-2, SB-3 
Equation (6) σ = 
2 22 2 2 2
3 31 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
4 44 4 4 4(cos ) (sin )A AA A A Aπ ρ π ρπ ρ π ρ π ρ π ρλ λ λ λ λ λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + Θ + + + Θ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
where:  ρ = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
λ = Wavelength ( )mµ (Based on 3 GHz and 20 GHz radar 
        frequencies) 
A1 = Target Surface Area of Freeboard (m2) (See Threat 
         Document for Dimensions) 
A2 = Target Surface Area of Superstructure (m2) (See Threat 
         Document for Dimensions) 
A3 = Target Surface Area of Mast (m2) (See Threat 
         Document for Dimensions) 
 
Threat RCS (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 3 GHz 
RCS (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 20 GHz 
RCS (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 3 GHz 
RCS (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 20 GHz 
ASCM-1 .0138 .0138 18.5 124 
ASCM-2 .0352 .0352 167 1110 
ASCM-3 .0664 .0664 389 2590 
SAM-1 .0159 .0159 69.2 462 
SAM-2 .000785 .000785 .707 4.71 
ACFT-1 92.3 4050 2920 22900 
ACFT-2 165 7260 4920 51800 
ACFT-3 .0847 3.71 4.92 32.8 
UAV-1 .065 2.88 .402 2.68 
DW-1 .00405 .00405 11.4 76 
DW-2 .000879 .000879 .00141 .00938 
DW-3 .0000319 .0000319 .000255 .0017 
SB-1 .0583 .0583 17.8 119 
SB-2 2630 117000 11100 494000 
SB-3 5490 244000 40400 1790000 
Table V-5 Calculated Threat Radar Cross Sections 
Using the radar cross sections listed in Table V-5, maximum radar detection ranges were 
then calculated by using the radar range equation (Equation (1)).  However, the performance 
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based radar detection ranges calculated from the radar range equation are not the actual ranges 
that could always be expected.  These ranges represent the maximum performance range of the 
radar and does not account for horizon limitations.  Therefore, in order to obtain more realistic 
radar detection ranges, this study determined the horizon limit for each target based on target 
height or assumed target altitude, with an assumed radar sensor height of 10 meters.  The set of 
equations used to determine the radar horizon are as follows: 
Equation (7)  4 .1 2 2 ( )O b sL H= where: 
LObs = Radar Line of Sight (km) 
H = Sensor Height of Eye (m) 
Equation (8)  T o ta l T g t O b sL L L= + where: 
LTotal = Total Line of Sight (km) 
LTgt = Target Line of Sight (km) 
LObs = Radar Line of Sight (km) 
These ranges were then compared to the maximum performance ranges calculated using 








Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 3 GHz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 20 GHz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 3 GHz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 20 GHz 
Horizon Limit (km)
10 m height 
ASCM-1 
(3 m) 
14.1 36.4 85.3 353.8 20.2 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
17.8 45.6 147.6 612.5 22.3 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
20.9 53.9 182.5 757 651.6 
SAM-1 
5000 m 
14.6 37.7 118.5 491.8 304.5 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
6.9 17.8 37.7 156.3 304.5 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
127.4 846.3 302 1305 26.1 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
147.3 979.3 344.1 1600 304.5 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
22.2 147.3 61.2 253.9 26.1 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
20.7 138.2 32.7 135.8 26.1 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
10.4 26.8 75.5 313.3 197.4 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
7.1 18.3 7.9 33 17.2 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
3.1 7.9 5.2 21.5 17.2 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
20.2 52.1 84.4 350 13 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
294.4 1962.5 421.9 2812.9 13 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
353.7 2357.9 582.5 3883.4 13 
Table V-6 Radar Detection Ranges 
It can be seen that broadside target angles and higher frequency radars present a much 
larger radar cross section for many targets and therefore allow for greater detection ranges.  
However, it is also important to note that, in many cases, the radar will be limited by its line of 
sight to the target.  By elevating the radar, in many circumstances larger radar cross-sections, and 
thus longer detection ranges, can be obtained.  By elevating the radar, it now has the ability to 
see (in most cases) more of the target due to the change in geometry.  Figure V-2 displays this 
basic concept.  Increased elevation of the radar increases the look angle, the radar horizon, and in 
many cases, the targets’ RCS. 
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Figure V-2 Sensor Change in Elevation and Resulting Difference in Target Aspect 
However, if the greater height of eye is achieved through the use of an aircraft, aerostat, 
or satellite, two key attributes⎯power and antenna size⎯of a conceptual radar system will most 
likely change as well.  An airborne radar will most likely have a reduced capacity for power 
generation and a reduced antenna size.  Taking this into account, the following assumptions were 
made with respect to the power output and antenna diameter of a conceptual airborne sensor: 
PT = 500 kW 
D = 1 m 
Substituting these values for the original assumed values and recalculating radar 
detection ranges and radar horizon limits based on the same target RCSs, and a sensor height of 





see more of the target.








Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 3 GHz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 20 GHz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 3 GHz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 20 GHz 
Horizon Limit (km)
5000 m height 
ASCM-1 
(3 m) 
4.5 11.6 27.2 113 298.6 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
5.7 14.7 47.2 195.7 300.7 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
6.7 17.2 58.3 241.8 930 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
4.7 12 37.9 157.1 582.9 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
2.2 5.7 12 49.9 582.9 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
40.7 270.4 96.5 416.9 304.5 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
47 312.9 109.9 511.3 582.9 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
7.1 47.1 19.5 81.1 304.5 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
6.6 44.1 10.5 43.4 304.5 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
3.3 8.5 24.1 100.1 475.8 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
2.3 5.8 2.5 10.6 295.6 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1 2.5 1.7 6.9 295.6 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
6.5 16.7 27 111.8 291.5 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
94 627 134.8 898.7 291.5 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
113 753.3 186.1 1240.6 291.5 
Table V-7 Airborne Radar Detection Ranges 
b. Lidar 
This study determined the range at which a lidar sensor could detect a threat through an 
assumed CNR requirement.  A 10 dB CNR was assumed to be the required level a typical lidar 
sensor would need in order to achieve reasonable probability of detection levels.  The lidar 
system modeled for this study was based on a heterodyne system and not a direct detection 
system.  (Note:  Probability of detection levels will be discussed further in the Search Analysis.)  
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where: 
CNR = Required Carrier to Noise Ratio 
η  = Quantum Efficiency 
m  = Heterodyne Mixing Efficiency 
Tε = Transmit Optical Efficiency 
Rε = Receive Optical Efficiency 
P = Transmitter Laser Power (W) 
λ = Laser Wavelength (m) 
h = Planck’s Constant (J-s) 
v = Laser Frequency (Hz) 
B = Noise Bandwidth (Hz) 
0w = Laser Beam Waist (m) 
M = Aperture-Beam Waist Matching Factor 
D = Transceiver Aperture Diameter (m) 
α = Atmospheric Extinction Coefficient (km-1) 
Tr = Effective Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document) 
ρ = Target Diffuse Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
σ = Target Cross Section (m2) (Explained in greater detail below) 
R = Target Detection Range (km) 
β = Correction Factor 
All of the variables within the lidar CNR equation can be changed, with the exception of 
Planck’s Constant.  The atmospheric extinction coefficient (α ) and the associated correction 
factor ( β ) were obtained using the R384 meteorological database and are representative of the 
95th percentile.  Basically, the lidar sensor modeled by this study should be capable of operating 
at least 95% of the time anywhere in the world’s maritime environment (Harney, 2002, Vol. I, 
Part I, 93).  These figures were deemed conservative, reasonable, and appropriate for use by this 
study and its stakeholders.  Through careful research, this study made the following assumptions 
with regards to the values for the variables associated with the lidar CNR equation: 
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CNR = 10 (10 dB) 
η  = .7 
m = .9 
Tε  = .8 
Rε = .4 
P = 3 MW 
λ = 10 µm 
h = 6.62607876-34 J-s 
v = 3x1013 Hz 
     B = 100,000 Hz 
           0w  = .894 m 
      M = 5 
      D = 2 m 
            α = .72255 (km-1) 
Tr = Varies based on target (m) (See Threat Document for 
       Dimensions) 
ρ = Target Diffuse Reflectivity (See Table V-4, same as used in 
       radar section) 
σ = Target Cross Section (m2) (Calculated using the same target 
        cross section formulas used in the radar section.) 
β = .92409 
 
As with radar, this study first had to determine target cross sectional areas prior to 
determining the ranges at which a lidar might detect the various future representative threats.  
Again, target angles of 0o (nose-on) and 90o (broadside) were considered.  Using the above 
assumptions, and the same equations (Equations (2-6)) used to determine RCS in the radar 




Threat Cross Section (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 30 THz 
Cross Section (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 30 THz 
ASCM-1 .0138 1.85x105 
ASCM-2 .0352 1.67x106 
ASCM-3 .0664 3.89x106 
SAM-1 .0159 6.92x105 
SAM-2 .00785 7060 
ACFT-1 9.11x109 9.13x109 
ACFT-2 1.63x1010 5.03x1010 
ACFT-3 8.35x106 55,800 
UAV-1 6.47x106 9170 
DW-1 .00405 1.14x105 
DW-2 .000879 14.1 
DW-3 .0000319 2.55 
SB-1 .0583 1.78x105 
SB-2 2.63x1011 1.11x1012 
SB-3 5.49x1011 4.04x1012 
Table V-8 Lidar Threat Cross Sections 
Using the calculated lidar threat cross sections listed in Table V-8, maximum lidar 
detection ranges were then calculated by using the lidar CNR equation (Equation (9)).  Again, as 
in radar, lidar detection ranges calculated from Equation (9) indicate lidar’s maximum 
performance range, and do not take into account horizon effects on the system.  In order to 
obtain more realistic lidar detection ranges, the horizon limit was determined for each target 
based on target height or assumed target altitude, with an assumed radar sensor height of  
10 meters, and used the following set of equations to determine the lidar horizon: 
Equation (10)  3 .8 3 9 ( )O b sL H=  where: 
LObs = Radar Line of Sight (km) 
H = Sensor Height of Eye (m) 
Equation (11)  T o ta l T g t O b sL L L= + where: 
LTotal = Total Radar Line of Sight (km) 
LTgt = Target Line of Sight (km) 
LObs = L = Radar Line of Sight (km) 
These ranges were then compared to the maximum performance ranges calculated using 







Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 30 THz 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 30 THz 
Horizon Limit (km) 
10 m height 
ASCM-1 
3 m 
9.8 9.8 18.8 
ASCM-2 
5 m 
9.8 9.8 20.7 
ASCM-3 
24 km 
9.8 9.8 606.9 
SAM-1 
5000 m 
9.8 9.8 283.6 
SAM-2 
5000 m 
9.7 9.8 283.6 
ACFT-1 
10 m 
9.8 9.8 24.3 
ACFT-2 
5000 m 
9.8 9.8 283.6 
ACFT-3 
10 m 
4.9 4.9 24.3 
UAV-1 
10 m 
4.9 4.9 24.3 
DW-1 
2000 m 
9.8 9.8 183.8 
DW-2 
1 m 
10.2 11.2 16 
DW-3 
1 m 
8.2 11.2 16 
SB-1 
0 m 
9.8 9.8 12.1 
SB-2 
0 m 
9.8 9.8 12.1 
SB-3 
0 m 
9.8 9.8 12.1 
Table V-9 Lidar Detection Ranges 
The results demonstrate that lidar does not provide very good detection ranges.  Because 
of its small wavelength, even larger target aspects are fundamentally irrelevant in determining 
the detection range.  Furthermore, lidar is largely affected by target reflectivity and shows a 
much reduced detection range capability against targets with low reflectivity (i.e., low 
observable targets).  The poor detection ranges can also be largely attributed to atmospheric 
attenuation.  Lidar, however, has proven effective in determining the chemical composition or 
concentration of remote targets (i.e., target exhaust) at extended ranges, but because of the 
unclassified nature of this study this option was not explored.  Therefore, it was reasoned if lidar 
were to be used as an area detection sensor, it should be employed as a part of an extensive 




An infrared sensor is passive, and detects and locates targets through the collection and 
processing of thermal radiation.  Because it is a passive sensor, IR uses a target’s emissive 
properties, rather than a target's reflective properties, to determine detection ranges.  Therefore, a 
target’s projected area (analogous to RCS in radar and target cross section in lidar) is not 
dependent on system wavelength.  However, as in the radar and lidar cases, the projected area is 
affected by target angle.  Once again, target angles of 0o (nose-on) and 90o (broadside) were 
used.  The future representative threat’s projected areas were calculated using the following 
equations and are listed in Table V-10. 
• ASCM-1/2/3, SAM-1/2, DW-1/2/3, SB-1 
Equation (12)  ProjA  = 
2( )(cos ) ( )(sin )r rlπ ε π εΘ + Θ  where: 
ProjA = IR Projected Area (m
2) 
ε = Target Emissivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 
• ACFT-1 
Equation (13)  ProjA = 
2( ) ( )(cos ) ( )(sin )A r rlε π ε π ε+ Θ + Θ  where: 
ProjA = IR Projected Area (m
2) 
ε = Target Emissivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
A = Target Surface Area of Rotor Blades (m2) (See Threat Document 





Equation (14)  ProjA = 
2
1 2( )(cos ) ( )(sin )A r rl Aε π ε π ε ε+ Θ + + Θ  where: 
ProjA = IR Projected Area (m
2) 
ε = Target Emissivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
A1 = Target Surface Area of Wings (m2) (See Threat Document for 
         Dimensions) 
A2 = Target Surface Area of Tail (m2) (See Threat Document for 
         Dimensions) 
 
• ACFT-3, UAV/UCAV-1 
Equation (15)  ProjA = 
2
1( )(cos ) ( )(sin )A r rlε π ε π ε+ Θ + Θ  where: 
ProjA = IR Projected Area (m
2) 
ε = Target Emissivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
 r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
 l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document for Dimensions) 
A1 = Target Surface Area of Wings (m2) (See Threat Document for 
         Dimensions) 
 
• SB-2, SB-3 
Equation (16)  ProjA = 1 2 3 1 2 3( )(cos ) ( )(sin )A A A A A Aε ε ε ε ε ε+ + Θ + + + Θ where: 
ProjA = IR Projected Area (m
2) 
ε = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
A1 = Target Surface Area of Freeboard (m2) (See Threat 
         Document for Dimensions) 
A2 = Target Surface Area of Superstructure (m2) (See Threat 
         Document for Dimensions) 
A3 = Target Surface Area of Mast (m2) (See Threat 




Threat IR Projected Area (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
IR Projected Area (m2) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
ASCM-1 .1246 2.2256 
ASCM-2 .3171 8.426 
ASCM-3 .598 15.08 
SAM-1 .1431 4.4511 
SAM-2 .0071 .212 
ACFT-1 11.9565 85.4415 
ACFT-2 16.5966 118.5042 
ACFT-3 11.9992 121.1072 
UAV-1 3.6546 25.1204 
DW-1 .0364 1.283 
DW-2 .0004 .0008 
DW-3 .00001 .0001 
SB-1 .6689 5.2514 
SB-2 18.8755 79.665 
SB-3 39.3293 289.3956 
Table V-10 Threat IR Projected Areas 
Using the IR projected areas listed in Table V-10; detection ranges were determined by 
calculating target incidance (M), target exitance (E), and noise equivalent power (NEP).  The 
following equations to determine these variables: 









⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  and 
Equation (18)  T = 2(1 0.2( ) )ambientT MachNumber+ where: 
M = Target Exitance (W/m2- mµ ) 
c = Speed of Light (m/s) 
λ = Wavelength ( )mµ  
h = Planck’s Constant (J-s) 
k = Boltzmann’s Constant (J/K) 
T = Target Body Temperature (K) 
Tambient = Ambient Temperature (K) 
MachNumber = Threat Mach Number Derived from Maximum 




Equation (19)  2





=  where: 
E = Target Incidance (W/m2) 
ProjA = IR Projected Area (m
2) 
M = Target Exitance (W/m2- mµ ) 
R = Target Range (m) 
α = Atmospheric Extinction Coefficient (km-1) 
β = Correction Factor 
 
Equation (20)  *
DA BN E P
D λ
=  where: 
NEP = Noise Equivalent Power (W) 
DA = Sensor Element Size ( )mµ  
B = Sensor Bandwidth (Hz)  
*D λ = Specific Detectivity ( / )cm Hz W  
 
All of the variables in the above equations can be changed, with the exception of  
Planck’s Constant and Boltzmann’s Constant.  Through careful research, this study made the 
following assumptions with regards to the values for the variables associated with the target 
exitance, target incidance, and noise equivalent power equations: 
c = 3 x 108 m/s 
λ = 3-5 µm, 8-12 µm 
h = 6.62607876-34 J-s 
k = 1.380650x10-23 J/K 
Tambient = 300 K 
ProjA = Varies with the threat (m
2) (See Table V-10) 
M = Varies with the threat and wavelengths studied (W/m2- mµ ) 
        (See below for further explanation) 
α = .98757 km-1 (for 3-5 mµ band) and 
        .72255 km-1 (for 8-12 mµ band) 
β = .69721 km-1 (for 3-5 mµ band) and 
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        .92409 km-1 (for 8-12 mµ band) 
*D λ = 9x10
10 /cm Hz W (for 3-5 mµ band) and 
           2.5x1010 /cm Hz W  (for 8-12 mµ band) 
B = 10,000 Hz 
DA = 20 mµ  (for 3-5 mµ band) and  
            30 mµ  (for 8-12 mµ band) 
Wavelength bands of 3-5 µm and 8-12 µm were chosen because the IR sensor data 
available is largely limited to these two major atmospheric windows.  The atmospheric extinction 
coefficient (α ) and the associated correction factor ( β ) were obtained through R384 
meteorological data and are representative of the 95th percentile.  Mercury cadmium telluride 
(HgCdTe(PV)) cooled to 77 K was chosen as the infrared detector material to be used in this IR 
sensor due to its higher specific detectivity qualities when compared to other detection materials 
such as Lead Sulfide (PbS), Lead Selenium (PbSe), or Indium Antimonide (InSb).  The specific 
detectivity ( *D λ ) values were obtained from the HgCdTe(PV) detectivity curves displayed in 
Professor Harney’s text. 
The NEP values were calculated to be: 2.222 x 10-12 W for the 3-5 µm band, and  
1.2 x 10-11 W for the 8-12 µm band.  The required target flux in order to obtain reasonable 
probabilities of detection was assumed to be 10 times greater than the calculated NEP.  Next, the 
required target flux was compared with the total target exitance in order to determine the range at 
which the future representative threats could be detected.  The target exitance was determined for 
each wavelength based on assumed target speeds or nominal operating temperatures of certain 
targets.  Through the use of trapezoidal integration, the total target exitance was determined over 
the studied wavelength bands (3-5 µm and 8-12 µm).  Just as in the radar and lidar cases, IR is 
also limited by the visual horizon.  The set of equations used for determining the IR horizon are 
the same as those used to determine the lidar visual horizon (Equation (10) and Equation (11)).  
In order to obtain more realistic IR detection ranges, the horizon limit for each target was 
determined based on target height or assumed target altitude, with an assumed IR sensor height 
of 10 meters.  The horizon limits for each target were then compared to the maximum 







Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ  = 3-5µm 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
λ  = 8-12µm 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
λ  = 3-5µm 
Range (km) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
λ  = 8-12µm 
Horizon Limit (km) 
10 m height 
ASCM-1 
(3 m) 
8 7.6 13.4 11.4 18.8 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
20.1 11.6 29.7 16.4 20.7 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
32.9 15.2 44.4 20.1 606.9 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
29.5 13.4 41.3 18.6 283.6 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10.8 6.6 18.4 10.9 283.6 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
13.9 12.8 18.5 15.6 24.3 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
15.5 13.5 20.4 16.4 283.6 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
14.7 13 20.5 16.4 24.3 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
11.4 11.1 15.5 13.8 24.3 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
24.1 11.2 35.5 16.3 183.8 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
1.7 2.1 2.1 2.6 16 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
2.7 1.5 5 3 16 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
8.2 8.9 12 11.6 12.1 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
14.9 13.4 18.4 15.5 12.1 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
16.6 14.5 21.8 17.5 12.1 
Table V-11 IR Detection Ranges 
These results indicate that IR systems do not perform, as well as radar when considering 
target detection range; however, IR is a passive sensor and therefore greatly reduces the chance 
of counter-detection by the enemy.  IR systems might be used as a cueing sensor for active 
systems and can themselves be used for ranging and tracking applications through triangulation.  
Viewing the targets from broadside, as in the radar and lidar cases, gives the IR system a much 
greater projected area and associated greater detection range.  The height of eye limitations are 
not as great as those associated with the radar systems, but a slightly greater height of eye would 
prove beneficial against some of the threats.  For these reasons, IR systems should be considered 
for use as part of a distributed sensor network. 
105 
 
d. Active Sonar 
This study used the following active sonar CNR equation, and associated equations to 
determine target detection ranges: 
Equation (21)  DT = SL – 2TL + TS – (NL – DI) where: 
DT = Detection Threshold (dB) 
SL = Source Level (dB) 
TL = Transmission Loss (dB) 
TS = Target Strength (dBsm) 
NL = Noise Level (dB) 
DI = Directivity Index (dB) 
 
Equation (22)  SL = 171.5 + 10 log P where: 
P = Source Power (W) 
 
Equation (23)  TL = 20 log R + α R x 10-3 where: 
α = Total Absorption Coefficient (dB/kyd) 
R = Range (yds) 
 
Equation (24)  TS = 10 log σ  where: 
σ = Effective Target Size (m2) 
 
Equation (25)  Directivity Index (DI) = 10 log N 
N = Number of Sonar elements 
 
Before calculating sonar detection ranges, assumptions regarding seawater temperature 
(T), salinity (S), and noise levels at the various sonar frequencies were made.  This study 
assumed the following values for each: 
T = 25 C 
S = 34 ppt 
   NL 1kHz = 80 dB 
   NL 25kHz = 50 dB 




Using these assumed values, along with varying sonar frequencies (three were studied,  
1 kHz, 25 kHz, and 56 kHz), and the depth (d) at which the threats operate (see  
Threat Document), the speed of sound in water was calculated using the following equation: 
Equation (26) VSound = 1402.06 + 1.34 (S) - 0.01025 (S)(T) + 4.95 (T) - 0.05304 (T2) + 
2.374 x 10-4 (T3) + 0.0163 (d) +1.675 x 10-7 (d2) - 7.139 x 10-13 (T)(d3) 
Next, the effective target size was calculated using the following equation: 
Equation (27)  σ  = 
2 22(cos ) (sin )
4 4
r rlπρ λ π
⎡ ⎤Θ + Θ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 where: 
σ = Effective Target Size (m2) 
ρ = Target Reflectivity (See Table V-4) 
r = Target Radius (m) (See Threat Document) 
l = Target Length (m) (See Threat Document) 
Θ = Target Angle (radians) (0o and 90o) 
λ = Sonar Wavelength (m) 
Sonar TS of the various threats were then calculated using Equation (24) and the 
previously calculated effective target size, and are listed in Table V-12. 
 
Threat TS* (dBsm) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
 
TS (dBsm) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 1 kHz 
TS (dBsm) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 25 kHz 
TS (dBsm) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 56 kHz 
SUB-1 -2.82 29.04 43.02 46.52 
SUB-2 -1.24 33.36 47.35 50.84 
SUB-3 -15.46 11.51 25.49 28.99 
SB-1 -2.34 10.64 24.62 28.13 
SB-2 7.98 34.08 48.06 51.56 
SB-3 14 44.39 58.37 61.87 
Mine-1 -22.82 -25.06 -11.08 -7.58 
Mine-2 -26.34 -15.54 -1.56 1.94 
Mine-3 -20.32 -16.46 -2.48 1.02 
Mine-4 -28.84 -15.35 -1.37 2.14 
Torp-1 -27.5 -2.63 11.35 14.86 
Torp-2 -27.5 -2.63 11.35 14.86 
Torp-3 -35.88 -12.84 1.14 4.64 
*TS values for nose-on aspect are not sensor wavelength dependent. 
Table V-12 Threat Target Strengths 
In order to determine the TL, the total absorption coefficient (α ) was then calculated 
using the following formulas: 
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Equation (28)  fT  = 
1 5 2 0
6 2 7 32 1 .9 1 0 T
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠×  where: 
fT = Temperature Dependent Relaxation Frequency (kHz) 
T = Seawater Temperature (C) 
 
Equation (29)  0α = 
2 2
2 2





− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤× + ×⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 where: 
0α = Environmental Absorption Coefficient (dB/kyd) 
S = Salinity (ppt) 
f = Sonar Frequency (kHz) 
fT  = Temperature Dependent Relaxation Frequency (kHz) 
 
Equation (30)  α  = 0α (1 – 1.93 x 10-5 d) where: 
α = Total Absorption Coefficient (dB/kyd) 
0α = Environmental Absorption Coefficient (dB/kyd) 
d = Target Depth (ft) 
This study then used the 14 dB sonar receiver operating characteristics curve to 
determine the desired detection threshold (DT) for active sonar (see Equation (31)).  A  
10-second integration time was assumed to be reasonable if the sonar system employed a 
matched filter receiver and with a known transmitted signal. 
Equation (31)  DT = 25.1188610log
2( )t
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  where: 
t = Sensor Integration Time (s) 
 
The following assumptions regarding the remaining variables pertaining to the active 
sonar CNR equation, source power (P) and number of sonar elements (N), were made: 
   P = 1000 W 
N = 256 
All of the variables associated with the active sonar CNR equation can be changed.  
Utilizing the results from the above equations, future representative threat detection ranges were 







Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 1 kHz 
Range (yds) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 25 kHz 
Range (yds) 
Tgt Angle:  0 o 
f = 56 kHz 
Range (yds) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o
f = 1 kHz 
Range (yds) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o 
f = 25 kHz 
Range (yds) 
Tgt Angle:  90 o
f = 56 kHz 
SUB-1 3496 4585 2304 21674 10330 3918 
SUB-2 3829 4756 2353 27695 10932 4066 
SUB-3 1690 3316 1922 7956 7970 3327 
SB-1 3595 5128 2577 7577 8876 3695 
SB-2 6502 6475 2946 28931 12604 4602 
SB-3 9185 7315 3166 51845 14339 5009 
Mine-1 1107 2880 1884 973 4092 2395 
Mine-2 904 2562 1771 1683 5228 2731 
Mine-3 1278 3122 1967 1596 5117 2700 
Mine-4 783 2352 1696 1702 5262 2744 
Torp-1 846 2461 1734 3536 6942 3199 
Torp-2 846 2462 1734 3536 6944 3200 
Torp-3 522 1810 1478 1965 5575 2830 
Table V-13 Active Sonar Detection Ranges 
Lower frequencies tend to propagate with less attenuation at extended ranges and are 
therefore more effective at detecting larger targets at longer ranges.  Because of the small 
effective target sizes of many future representative threats, coupled with small target angles, 
higher sonar frequencies appear to be more effective at target detection at short ranges.  Above 
25 kHz, however, greater attenuation appears to overcome the benefits of the increased target 
strength associated with greater frequencies.  Because lower frequency systems obtain greater 
detection ranges due to the wider beam spread of the active signal (see Search Analysis), it can 
reasonably be assumed that if low frequency active sonar systems could be employed in a 
distributed fashion, the likelihood of greater detection ranges would increase. 
e. Passive Sonar 
This study used the following passive sonar CNR equation, and associated equations to 
determine target detection ranges: 
Equation (32)  DT = SL – TL – (NL – DI) where: 
DT = Detection Threshold (dB) 
SL = Source Level (dB) 
TL = Transmission Loss (dB) 
NL = Noise Level (dB) 
DI = Directivity Index (dB) 
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Equation (33)  SL* Small Boat = 60 log K + 9 log T – 20 log F – 20 log D + 35 where: 
K = Boat Speed (kts) (See Threat Document) 
T = Boat Displacement (ltons) (See Threat Document) 
F = Frequency (kHz) 
D = Distance (yds) 
*SL for Small Boat assumed at 1 kHz. 
 
Equation (34)  TL = 20 log R + α R x 10-3 where: 
α = Total Absorption Coefficient (dB/kyd) 
R = Range (yds) 
 
Equation (35)  Directivity Index (DI) = 10 log N where: 
N = Number of Sonar elements 
 
Similar to the active sonar case, before passive sonar detection ranges could be 
calculated, assumptions regarding seawater temperature (T), salinity (S), NL, and various 
threats’ SL were made.  This study assumed the following values for each: 
T = 25 C 
S = 34 ppt 
   NL Light Shipping Area = 30 dB 
 NL Medium Shipping Area = 50 dB 
   NL Heavy Shipping Area = 80 dB 
   SL SUB-1/2 = 100 dB (Assumed at 1 kHz) 
   SL SUB-3 = 90 dB (Assumed at 1 kHz) 
   SL Torp-1 = 135 dB (Assumed at 25 kHz) 
   SL Torp-2 = 285 dB (Assumed at 25 kHz) 
   SL Torp-3 = 125 dB (Assumed at 25 kHz) 
The speed of sound in water calculations, as well as the TL calculations, was developed 
in the same manner as described above in the active sonar section.  This study again relied on the 
14 dB sonar receiver operating characteristics curve to determine the desired detection threshold 
(DT).  The equation used to determine that level is slightly different though due to the nature of 
passive sonar (see Equation (36)).  A 10-second integration time was assumed to be reasonable if 
the passive sonar system employed a broadband (1000 Hz) receiver and was prosecuting an 
unknown threat signal.  The passive sonar was also assumed to possess the same number of 
sonar elements as in the active sonar case (N = 256). 
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Equation (36)  DT = 1000(25.11886)5log
t
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  where: 
t = Sensor Integration Time (s) 
As in the active sonar case, all variables within the passive sonar CNR equation can be 
changed as well.  To reiterate, SUB-1/2/3 and SB-1/2/3 were modeled at 1 kHz frequency and 
TORP-1/2/3 were modeled at 25 kHz.  Utilizing the results from the above equations, future 
representative threat detection ranges were calculated and are listed in Table V-14. 
Threat SL (dB) 
 
Range (yds) 
NL = 80 dB 
Range (yds) 
NL = 50 dB 
Range (yds) 
NL = 30 dB 
SUB-1 100 23 714 7119 
SUB-2 100 23 714 7119 
SUB-3 90 7 226 2257 
SB-1 (40 kts) 127 500 15721 148358 
SB-2 (50 kts) 152 8906 253133 1480579 
SB-3 (10 kts) 117 160 5063 49650 
Torp-1 (50 kts) 135 1271 40144 397352 
Torp-2 (200 kts) 285 187449730 292526296 365186081 
Torp-3 (40 kts) 125 402 12705 126632 
Table V-14 Threat Source Levels and Detection Ranges 
The results show that passive sonar may not be a particularly effective detection sensor 
against several of the threats when used in an area of heavy shipping.  Furthermore, passive 
sonar does not provide good detection results against submarines or slower moving vessels when 
used in an area of moderate shipping.  Because it is a passive sensor, two or more must be used 
in conjunction and achieve detection in order to determine the target’s range.  For these reasons, 
passive sonar may be used with greater results when distributed throughout the operating area. 
5. Conclusion 
Detecting threats is the critical first step in defending the Sea Base and its transport 
assets.  If the force cannot “see” the enemy, it cannot defend against it.  This study attempted to 
bound the force protection problem at hand by taking a realistic look at threat-sensor pairings.  
Though not all encompassing, with regards to the number or type of sensors available, or the 
tactics and techniques in which the ones mentioned above might be employed, several basic 
initial insights from the mathematical models developed can be drawn.  First, in all cases, a 
sensor can detect threats at greater ranges if it is relatively positioned so the threat presents a 90o 
(broadside) target angle.  Second, the visual horizon, the environment, or both may limit many of 
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the sensors’ performance levels.  Third, some sensors, such as lidar, are better suited for certain 
applications over others after considering the first two insights mentioned.  Finally, if sensors 
were to be employed with varying tactics, friendly forces might be better served with regards to 
force protection.  The distribution of sensors offers greater detection ranges by extending the 
sensors’ horizons and by achieving greater target aspects.  The benefits of a distributed sensor 
network throughout the battle space are readily apparent from the results, as the potential for a 
favorable target angle on a future representative threats increases.  The next step is to take the 
results obtained in this document and apply them to a search detection model based on area or 
volume covered, and beam spread or field of view for each sensor to determine probabilities of 
detection for each threat-sensor pair. 
C. SEARCH ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The Sensor Analysis addressed the capability of various sensors (radar, lidar, IR, and 
sonar) to detect future representative threats as the critical first step in defending the Sea Base 
and its transport assets.  Various threat-sensor pairs were developed, studied, and analyzed in 
order to determine potential detection ranges of the various threats by an associated sensor.  
From the initial sensor analyses, lidar and passive sonar were discounted as options for further 
study because of their relatively poor detection ranges.  For the remaining sensors, detection 
ranges alone, though useful, do not tell a complete story with regard to system performance.  For 
this reason, first principle probability-of-detection equations were applied to facilitate developing 
an unclassified discussion and to garner further insight into what type of sensor architecture 
might best protect the Sea Base.  This chapter will outline the preliminary analysis completed 
regarding the probabilities of detection and associated reaction times that were derived from the 
threat-sensor pairings, the methodology employed, and the equations used to derive the values 
displayed in the Search Analysis. 
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2. Preliminary Analysis 
a. Overview 
Preliminary analysis of the search models demonstrates that several threats are able to 
approach very close to the defended assets if a point sensor is utilized.  The maximum weapons 
release range for several of the threat platforms is 300 km (maximum effective range of ASCM-
2).  Therefore, a future sensor should be able to detect the threat platform well before the 
maximum weapons release range and allow time for defensive weapons to prevent the release of 
the enemy’s weapons.  This capability gap drives the need for a sensor that is able to detect 
threat platforms at longer ranges and with ample time to counter them before they can reach their 
weapons’ maximum effective ranges.  These requirements drive the need for a distributed sensor 
network. 
b. Conventional Radar 
Following the Sensor Analysis, this study again focused on two frequencies (3 GHz and 
20 GHz) when modeling the conventional microwave radar.  Both radar variations were then 
modeled as either a point or distributed sensor.  Additionally, each radar variation was employed 
on one of three platforms, a ship (10 m height of eye), a UAV (10 km height of eye), or an 
aerostat (50 km height of eye) in order to determine the effects on sensor probability of 
detection.  It is readily apparent that the use of the shipboard 3 GHz Radar with the cylinder 
search is the best of the search designs considered for the point system.  While this design may 
not provide the best reaction times when compared to some of the threats using the 20 GHz 
system, it is able to detect every threat with a 0.95 probability of detection prior to weapons 
impact.  The reason for this is the 3 GHz system’s reduced search frame time, which may be 
attributed to its greater beam spread.  This factor, together with the severe limitations to the point 
sensor’s line of sight, makes the 3 GHz system superior to the 20 GHz system for a full volume 
search. 
When the 20 GHz radar is mounted on the aerostat, it is superior to that of the 3 GHz 
radar.  While the 20 GHz system has a much longer search frame time, it has a much greater 
detection range when compared to the 3 GHz system and does not face the line of sight 
limitations that impaired its performance in the point sensor platform.  As a result, not all, but 
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many of the threat platforms are detected before their maximum weapons release ranges.  The 
use of a UAV with the 20 GHz system onboard provides a nice complement to the aerostat and 
point sensor systems as it “bridges the gap” between fixed overhead and point sensor systems by 
increasing detection ranges, and thus reaction times, against threats that were not readily detected 
by either the point or overhead systems. 
c. IR 
This study’s model of the IR sensor system followed the same methodology as the radar 
system.  It was determined that an IR system observing the 3-5 µm spectrum typically provides 
enhanced detection ranges and reaction times when compared to the 8-12 µm system.  When 
compared to the optimal point radar system (3 GHz Cylinder), the 3-5 µm IR system provides 
better detection ranges against three of five high-speed future representative threats.  The 
relatively large radar cross sections presented to the point sensor seem to overcome the 
emissivity of the two threats not detected by the IR system allowing radar for these cases to 
attain greater detection ranges and more reaction time.  Likewise, the minimal cross sections 
presented to the point sensor by the high-speed, low-reflective threats makes IR the better of the 
two for detecting the remaining three threats.  An aerostat operating at 50 km altitude does not 
appear to be a good choice as a platform for the IR sensor.  The 3-5 µm system is capable of 
providing an extra two seconds of reaction time against one threat; however, it is not capable of 
detecting any of the other remaining threats.  The IR UAV system using the 3-5 µm spectrum, 
much like the 20 GHz UAV radar system, seems to “bridge the gap” between the point and 
overhead sensor systems. 
d. Active Sonar 
The last sensor modeled by this study was active sonar.  The only difference between the 
approach taken with sonar and the one taken with radar and IR was the platform on which the 
sensor was mounted.  This study chose either a ship, a USV, or a UUV with a maximum depth of 
300 m.  Based on results from the radar section, the more efficient search geometry, cylindrical, 
was also applied for sonar.  By modeling an active sonar system searching equal volumes using  
1 kHz and 25 kHz frequencies it was determined that the 25 kHz option is impractical due to the 
long search time required to achieve a 0.95 probability of detection.  Furthermore, the use of the 
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25 kHz frequency does not give detection ranges as long as the 1 kHz system.  This shows that 
the higher frequency sonar systems (25 kHz and 56 kHz) will require more narrowly defined 
search volumes in order to be used effectively.  For these reasons, the higher frequency sonar is 
better suited for searching very slow or non-moving objects such as mines in a restricted volume.  
Also of note, many of the future representative threats are able to approach very close to the 
defended assets if the defenders use the point sonar system.  Just as in the radar and IR cases, by 
distributing a sonar sensor network onboard USVs or UUVs, an effective tripwire can be 
established against every surface or subsurface threat to the Sea Base.  The distributed sensors, 
when compared to the point system, achieve improved detection ranges and reaction times. 
3. Methodology 
In order to begin examination of sensor probability of detection, this study first had to 
determine what detection law should govern how each sensor is analyzed.  Three detection laws 
were considered: coverage factor, inverse cube, and random search.  A variation of the random 
search model was chosen to model a sensor system’s probabilities of detection because it is 
generally considered a conservative estimate and is often used to represent the lower bound of 
the detection probability in a well-conducted search.  This concept is illustrated in Figure V-3.  
As with any analytical model, certain assumptions apply.  The following assumptions were made 
with regards to the random search model: 
• The search volume is fixed 
• The possible location of the target is uniformly distributed at all times during the 
search within a fixed volume 
• The target is moving 
• The sensor platform or sensor itself is moving and searching randomly 




Figure V-3 Comparison of Detection Laws 
Once the detection model was selected, this study was then able to incorporate and build 
upon previous conclusions derived in the Threat and Sensor Analysis in order to focus its efforts 
even further.  Three variables, sensor elevation (or depth), sensor search geometry, and sensor 
configuration, were studied with the purpose of determining how changes in those variables 
might affect a sensor system’s ability to achieve a 0.95 probability of detection of a given future 
representative threat.  As concluded in the Sensor Analysis, an elevated (or off-axis) sensor 
could, in many circumstances, obtain a greater aspect angle against the target while 
simultaneously extending the sensor horizon.  This study continued with this line of thought and 
focused on placing a conventional microwave radar, IR, or sonar system on differing platforms at 
varying elevations (or depths) to determine how an increased height of eye might affect the 
sensor’s probability of detecting a given target.  Radar, IR, and active sonar were modeled on 
various platforms including ships, UAVs, USVs, UUVs, and aerostats.  For shipboard sensors, a 
10 m height of eye was chosen for radar and IR.  The operating altitudes or depths of the  
“off board” platforms were chosen based on various threat characteristics obtained from the 
Threat Document.  For example, the highest operating altitude of the future representative threats 
above the water was 24 km, while the deepest operating threat below the water was 300 m.  
 












Various sensor platforms and their respective operating altitudes or depths were then researched 
and analyzed in an effort to achieve sufficient off-axis angles and produce higher probabilities of 
detection against the threats. 
Through open source research, this study determined that the creation and subsequent use 
of high altitude aerostats and aerodynes have been recognized as critical future capabilities by 
several governments including China, the U.S., and many in Europe.  Systematic studies in many 
of these countries have the goal of placing high altitude platform stations at altitudes of 20-50 km 
above a fixed point relative to the earth.  For these platforms, the higher altitudes offer a greater 
coverage area and long free-space signal propagation paths with reduced latency, attenuation, 
and multi-path distortions.  These operating altitudes may furthermore minimize an airborne 
platforms’ susceptibility to enemy weapons.  As a result of this research and with respect to the 
threats’ operating altitudes/depths, an aerostat operating at 50 km, UAVs operating at 10 km, and 
USV/UUVs operating from 0-300 m were chosen to provide the necessary off-axis angles to 
achieve the desired 0.95 probability of detection. 
Delving deeper into the random search model, this study then had to decide on what area 
or volume of space should be considered when trying to detect a future representative threat.  It 
readily became apparent that an area search did not provide sufficient results when compared to 
a volume search.  The volume search also presented a more realistic representation of how a 
sensor would operate in a three-dimensional threat environment.  Three search geometries were 
chosen to represent a sensor’s three-dimensional battle space:  cylinder, hemisphere, and cone.  
Figure V-4 illustrates these geometries. 
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Figure V-4 Search Geometries 
Next, two sensor configurations, point and distributed, were developed in order to further 
bolster previous conclusions drawn in the Sensor Analysis that postulated that a distributed 
sensor network may provide enhanced detection capabilities to a future expeditionary warfare 
force.  Figure V-5 illustrates how a point sensor configuration was modeled.  R represents the 
radius of the area concerned (R = 370 km); r represents the sensor distance from the “center” of 
the force being protected; and r′ represents the radius of the sensor coverage.  A point sensor 
occurs when r << R.  From the height of eye limitations addressed in the Sensor Analysis, it is 
apparent that a point sensor alone cannot provide the necessary coverage for an extended search 
volume.  Figure V-6 illustrates how a distributed sensor configuration was modeled.  In this case, 
R represents the radius of the area concerned; r represents the sensor distance from the “center” 
of the force being protected; and r′ represents the radius of the sensor coverage.  A distributed 
sensor occurs when r ≈ R.  Basically, a network of sensors can provide the necessary coverage of 












Figure V-5 Point Sensor Configuration 




Where  r << R
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Sensor distance from force center
r' = Radius of sensor coverage




R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Sensor distance from force center
r' = Radius of sensor coverage





Table V-15 and Table V-16 highlight the assumptions made with regard to the point and 
distributed sensor configurations. 
SENSOR RADAR IR (DIRECT DETECTION) SONAR 
Target Aspect Nose-on (0o)* Nose-on (0o)* Nose-on (0o) 
Target Disposition Inbound Inbound Inbound 
Sensor Characteristics Ship-based Ship-based Ship-based 
          Height of Eye  10 m 10 m 0 m 
          Power  3 MW N/A** 1 kW 
5 m (1 kHz)           Aperture Diameter  2 m .1 m 
2.5 m (25 kHz) 
Threat Area 360o 360o 360o 
Search Geometry Hemisphere 
Cylinder 
Hemisphere Cylinder 
Desired Search Radius 370 km (Hemisphere) 
370 km x 24 km (Cylinder) 
N/A** 48 km x 300 m (1 kHz Cylinder) 
1 km x 100 m (25 kHz Cylinder) 
Miscellaneous N/A** ACFT-1 Velocity Mach .25 
UAV-1 Velocity Mach .25 
ACFT-2 Velocity Mach .5 
ACFT-3 Velocity Mach .5 
360o Scan takes 1 second 
Speed of Sound in H2O = 1525 m/s 
*Except for SAM: Broadside (90o). 
**Not applicable. 
Table V-15 Point Sensor Assumptions 
 
SENSOR RADAR IR (DIRECT DETECTION) SONAR 
Target Aspect Broadside (90o) Broadside (90o) Broadside (90o) 
Target Disposition Inbound Inbound Inbound 
Sensor Characteristics Aerostat or UAV Aerostat or UAV USV or UUV 
          Height of Eye  50 km (Aerostat) 
10 km (UAV) 
50 km (Aerostat) 
10 km (UAV) 
0 m (USV) 
300 m (UUV) 
          Power  500 kW (Aerostat) 
2.5 kW (UAV) 
N/A* 1 kW 
          Aperture Diameter  1 m .1 m 5 m (1 kHz) 
Threat Area 360o 360o 360o 
Search Geometry Cone Hemisphere Cylinder 
Desired Search Radius 370 km (Aerostat) 
18 km (UAV) 
N/A* 370 km x 300 m (1 kHz Cylinder)  
Miscellaneous N/A* ACFT-1 Velocity Mach .25 
UAV-1 Velocity Mach .25 
ACFT-2 Velocity Mach .5 
ACFT-3 Velocity Mach .5 
360o Scan takes 1 second 
Speed of Sound in H2O = 1525 m/s 
*Not applicable. 
Table V-16 Distributed Sensor Assumptions 
Finally, a review was conducted to determine how the detection ranges were calculated 
for the various threat-sensor pairs in the Sensor Analysis.  It was assumed that certain CNRs had 
to be achieved in order to detect a given future representative threat by an associated sensor.  
120 
 
While the CNR chosen from the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve for these particular 
sensors carried with them associated probabilities of detection, these probabilities of detection 
represent single glimpses at the target; furthermore, they assume that a target is present.  For 
each CNR chosen, the associated single-pulse probability of detection was 0.9.  This CNR 
probability of detection was assumed to hold true for all ranges.  The probability of detection 
increases with an increase in search time.  For radar, the various detection ranges and CNR 
single-pulse probabilities of detection were then applied to the random search theory model 
chosen by this study in order to determine the volume search frame times and cumulative 
probabilities of detection for each threat-sensor pair.  For IR sensors, the pulse-dependent 
probability of detection was used to determine search frame times as well.  Active Sonar is very 
similar to radar from the search detection standpoint, and this study used the same model to 
calculate probabilities of detection and their associated search frame times. 
Analysis showed that radar was the best of the sensors considered for the detection of 
threats operating above or on the surface of the water.  It is highly resistant to the environment in 
comparison to either IR or lidar and is not as sensitive to easily controlled target properties  
(i.e., target speed) for detection.  While the addition of lidar to any conceptual network will most 
likely enhance the overall probability of detection against many targets, the limited resources and 
time available made only an in-depth study of radar and IR practical for the search detection 
study of threats operating on or above the surface of the water.  Active sonar, while highly 
dependent on the environment, is not as sensitive to controllable target properties when 
compared to passive sonar.  From the Sensor Analysis, passive sonar demonstrated poor 
detection performance against many threats in noisy environments (areas of medium to heavy 
shipping).  For these reasons, and the fact that each of these sensors had relatively poor detection 
ranges, passive sonar and lidar were eliminated as options for further study in this document. 
The following sections will describe the governing equations used to calculate the 




4. Modeling Equations and Results 
a. Random Search Model 
The variation of the random search model chosen by this study is represented by: 
Equation (37)  PD = 1
nwvt
Ae
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠− where: 
PD = Probability of Detection 
n = Number of Sensors 
w = Sweep Volume (m3) 
v = Search Speed (Hz) 
t = Search Time (s) 
A = Volume to be Searched (m3) 
In this random search model, w is the volume covered by one dwell or one pulse due to 
beam spread.  The formula for calculating beam spread is: 





π λ  where: 
AD = Dwell Area (m2) 
R = Range to be Searched (m) 
λ  = Wavelength (m) 
D = Antenna Diameter (m) 
The volume covered by one dwell (w) is thus calculated: 
Equation (39)  w = AD (1/3) (R) where: 
w = Sweep Volume (m3) 
AD = Dwell Area (m2) 
R = Range to be Searched (m) 
The search speed, v, in this model, is analogous to the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of 
the sensor for a given range.  The formula for PRF is: 
122 
 
Equation (40)  PRF = c/2R where: 
PRF = Pulse Repetition Frequency (Hz) 
c = Speed of Light in Air or Speed of Sound in Water Depending 
on Sensor (m/s) 
R = Range to be Searched (m) 
As mentioned earlier, the search volume is assumed to take one of three forms based on 
the sensor platform, the sensor characteristics, and the search requirements of the expeditionary 
force.  The three shapes used to approximate the volumes searched are a hemisphere, a cylinder, 
and a cone.  The formulas for calculating each volume are: 




Equation (42)  VCylinder = 2 cylinderR hπ  
Equation (43)  VCone = 2
1
3 cone
R hπ  where: 
VHemisphere = Volume of a Hemisphere (m3) 
VCylinder = Volume of a Cylinder (m3) 
VCone = Volume of a Cone (m3) 
R = Desired Search Range (m) 
hcylinder = Search Altitude or Depth Depending on Sensor (m) 
hcone = Sensor Altitude 
From the results of the random search model, the calculated probability of detection was 
applied to the pulse-dependent probability of detection to determine the total probability of 
detection.  The formula for calculating pulse-dependent probability of detection is: 
Equation (44)  PD (N)  = 1-(1- PD (1))N where: 
PD (N) = Pulse-Dependent Probability of Detection 
N = Number of Pulses as a Ratio of the Volume Searched to 
Desired Search Volume 
PD (1) = Single-Pulse Probability of Detection = .9 
N is represented by the ratio of the volume searched to the desired search volume.  If a 
single-pulse model is used, this ratio is simply represented by the exponent from the random 
search model (nwvt/A) from Equation (37). 
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Equation (37) and Equation (44), taken together, allow for the calculation of the total 
probability of detection for a given target by a given sensor.  The total probability of detection is 
thus: 
Equation (45)  PD(Total) = (1-e(-nwvt/A))( 1-(1- PD (1))N) 
For each sensor, this study, with stakeholder concurrence, assumed that a .95 total 
probability of detection should serve as the desired threshold for valid target detection.  Based on 
this assumption and the number of sensors conducting the search, search times were calculated.  
Associated Time To Go until Impact (TTGI), and Distance To Go until Impact (DTGI) figures 
were calculated as well.  TTGI and DTGI are based on the assumption that the impact point of a 
given threat is the central point of the expeditionary warfare force (see Figure V-7). 
Figure V-7 DTGI / TTGI Pictorial 
The DTGI represents the distance at which a given threat was detected, with a 0.95 
probability of detection, from the expeditionary force center.  The TTGI figure is calculated by 
dividing the DTGI figure by the threat’s velocity.  Threat velocities and threat performance 
limitations (i.e., maximum effective range) were drawn from the Threat Document.  The  
Sensor Analysis provided sensor performance limitations and height of eye limitations.  These 
Distance / Time To Go Until Impact
DTGI
= Distance target detected @ PD = .95
= Notional high value unit





threat and sensor characteristics were used to calculate and analyze the DTGI and TTGI figures.  
The following sections will display the DTGI and TTGI results and will provide additional 
insights into what those numbers mean with regard to protecting the Sea Base and its assets. 




f = 3 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 
Search Time 
(s) 
n = 1 
Search Time 
(s) 







14.1 300 24 4 12.9 43 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
17.8 825 24 4 14.5 17.6 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
20.9* 1650 24 4 14.3 8.7 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
118.5 1852 24 4 111.1 60 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10 825 24 4 6.7 8.1 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
26.1 95 24 4 25.7 270.7 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
147.3 825 24 4 144 174.5 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
22.2 300 24 4 21 70 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
20.7 284 24 4 19.6 68.9 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
10.4 1650 24 4 3.8 2.3 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
3 240 24 4 2 8.5 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1.1 800 24 4 0** 0** 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
13 20.6 24 4 12.9 627.1 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
13 25.6 24 4 12.9 503.8 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
13 15.4 24 4 12.9 840.2 
*ASCM-3 has begun its 30o dive and is at an altitude of 10.5 km. 
**Zero indicates that these threats could only be detected at a .95 probability of detection after they passed or 
impacted the central point of the expeditionary force. 








f = 20 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 
Search Time 
(s) 
n = 1 
Search Time 
(s) 







20.2 300 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
22.3 825 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
53.9 1650 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
200 1852 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10 825 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
26.1 95 1057.5 176.3 9.4 98.4 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
304.5 825 1057.5 176.3 159.1 192.8 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
26.1 300 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
26.1 284 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
26.8 1650 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
3 240 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1.1 800 1057.5 176.3 0* 0* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
13 20.6 1057.5 176.3 9.4 454.8 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
13 25.6 1057.5 176.3 8.5 331.5 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
13 15.4 1057.5 176.3 10.3 667.9 
*Zero indicates that these threats could only be detected at a .95 probability of detection after they passed or impacted 
the central point of the expeditionary force. 








f =3 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 
Search Time
 (s) 
n = 1 
Search Time
 (s) 







14.1 300 2.31 .39 14 46.6 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
17.8 825 2.31 .39 17.5 21.2 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
20.9* 1650 2.31 .39 20.3 12.3 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
118.5 1852 2.31 .39 117.8 63.6 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10 825 2.31 .39 9.7 11.7 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
26.1 95 2.31 .39 26 274.3 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
147.3 825 2.31 .39 147 178.2 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
22.2 300 2.31 .39 22.1 73.6 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
20.7 284 2.31 .39 20.6 72.5 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
10.4 1650 2.31 .39 9.8 5.9 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
3 240 2.31 .39 2.9 12.1 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1.1 800 2.31 .39 .8 1 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
13 20.6 2.31 .39 12.99 630.7 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
13 25.6 2.31 .39 12.99 507.4 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
13 15.4 2.31 .39 12.99 843.8 
*ASCM-3 has begun its 30o dive and is at an altitude of 10.5 km. 








f = 20 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 
Search Time 
(s) 
n = 1 
Search Time  
(s) 







20.2 300 102.6 17.1 15.1 50.3 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
22.3 825 102.6 17.1 8.2 10 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
53.9 1650 102.6 17.1 25.7 15.6 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
200 1852 102.6 17.1 168.4 91 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10 825 102.6 17.1 0* 0* 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
26.1 95 102.6 17.1 24.5 257.7 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
304.5 825 102.6 17.1 290.4 352 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
26.1 300 102.6 17.1 21 69.9 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
26.1 284 102.6 17.1 21.2 74.8 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
26.8 1650 102.6 17.1 0* 0* 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
3 240 102.6 17.1 0* 0* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1.1 800 102.6 17.1 0* 0* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
13 20.6 102.6 17.1 12.6 614 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
13 25.6 102.6 17.1 12.6 490.7 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
13 15.4 102.6 17.1 12.7 827.1 
*Zero indicates that these threats could only be detected at a .95 probability of detection after they passed or impacted 
the central point of the expeditionary force. 
Table V-20 Ship-Based 20 GHz Radar — Cylinder Search Geometry 
The ship-based 3 GHz radar with cylinder search is the best of the search designs 
considered for the point system.  While this design may not provide the best reaction times when 
compared to some of the threats using the 20 GHz system, it is able to detect every threat with a 
.95 probability of detection prior to impact.  The reason for this is the 3 GHz system’s reduced 
search frame time, which can be attributed to its greater beam spread (as calculated using 
Equation (38)).  This factor, together with the severe limitations to the point sensor’s line of 
sight, makes the 3 GHz system superior to the 20 GHz system for a full volume search.  A major 
disadvantage of the point system however, largely due to its limited line of sight, is its inability 
to detect several threat platforms prior to their maximum weapons release ranges.  The maximum 
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weapons release range for many of the threat platforms is 300 km (maximum effective range of 
ASCM-2).  Therefore, a future sensor should be able to detect the threat platform well before the 
maximum weapons release range and allow time for defensive weapons to prevent the release of 
the enemy’s weapons.  This capability gap drives the need for a sensor that is able to detect 
threat platforms at longer ranges and with ample time to counter them before they can reach their 
weapons’ maximum effective ranges.  These requirements drive the need for a distributed sensor 
network. 





f = 20 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








113 300 131 62 206.8 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
195.7 825 131 81.1 98.3 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
241.8 1650 131 34.1 20.7 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
157.1 1852 131 0* 0* 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
49.9 825 131 0* 0* 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
373.4 95 131 357.6 3763.8 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
335.9 825 131 224.8 272.5 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
81.1 300 131 24.6 81.9 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
43.4 284 131 No detect** No detect** 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
100.1 1650 131 0* 0* 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
10.6 240 131 No detect** No detect** 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
6.9 800 131 No detect** No detect** 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
111.8 20.6 131 97.3 4723.2 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
373.4 25.6 131 366.6 14322 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
373.4 15.4 131 368 23895 
*Zero indicates that these threats could only be detected at a .95 probability of detection after they passed or impacted 
the central point of the expeditionary force. 
**No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 








F = 3 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








27.2 300 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
47.2 825 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
58.3 1650 2.95 53 32.2 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
37.9 1852 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
12 825 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
96.5 95 2.95 82.3 866 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
109.9 825 2.95 98 118.7 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
19.5 300 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
10.5 284 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
24.1 1650 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
2.5 240 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1.7 800 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
27 20.6 2.95 No detect* No detect* 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
134.8 25.6 2.95 125.7 4887 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
186.1 15.4 2.95 179.2 11637 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 
Table V-22 Aerostat 3 GHz Radar ⎯ Cone Search Geometry 
The aerostat 20 GHz radar, for an overhead sensor, is superior to that of the 3 GHz radar.  
While the 20 GHz system has a much higher search frame time, it has a much greater detection 
range when compared to the 3 GHz system and does not face the line of sight limitations that 
impaired its performance from the point sensor platform.  As a result, some threat platforms 
(ACFT-1, SB-1, SB-2, and SB-3) are detected before their maximum weapons release ranges.  
However, several key problems exist with using the overhead sensor only.  Several threats 
(SAM-1, SAM-2, ACFT-2, ACFT-3, DW-1, and UAV-1) are not detected or are detected late 
(i.e. after entering potential weapons release range or after intercept).  Two options for achieving 
detections before the maximum weapons release range for many of the threat platforms are: one, 
increase the power output of the sensor system; or two, place the sensor system further away 
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from the force center of the protected assets.  However, with regard to option one, the power for 
sensor platforms has been assumed to remain constant as future power generation capabilities 
may not be able to provide sufficient power to make the desired detection ranges possible.  
Therefore, the option to distribute a network of sensors around the expeditionary warfare force at 
sufficient ranges to detect and counter future threats could allow the force to detect many of the 
threats farther away, while giving it more time to react to the incoming threat. 
This study assumed that the expeditionary force would desire 360o sensor coverage out to 
a range of 370 km.  In order to provide the necessary 360o coverage and cover a desired radius of 
370 km around the expeditionary warfare force, a UAV sensor network should be distributed 
according to the following formula: 
Equation (46)  RN
r
π= where: 
N = Number of UAV 
R = Radius of Deployment Around the Expeditionary Warfare Force (m) 
r = Radius of Each Sensor’s Coverage (m) 
The shortest detection range of the threat platform drives the radius of each sensor’s 
coverage for this formula.  For example, 20.5 km is the shortest detection range against UAV-1.  
Using simple geometry, this translates to a horizontal detection distance of 18 km.  The radius of 
deployment (R) is simply the horizontal detection distance subtracted from the desired search 
radius (370 km) or 352 km.  Using these inputs, N equals 61.4 UAV.  This means that 62 UAV 
must be used for the conceptual UAV network.  This excessively large number of required 
sensors is the drawback to using the distributed network of smaller sensors over a large area.  
Smaller numbers, however, are possible if a smaller radius of deployment is desired or if larger 
and inherently more capable platforms are used.  The first of these two alternative courses of 
action, however, would result in reduced distances to the protected assets and corresponding 








f = 20 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








20.6 300 5.63 368.3 1227.8 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
20.6 825 5.63 365.4 442.9 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
No detect* No detect* No detect* No detect* No detect* 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
10.3 1852 5.63 350.6 189.3 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10.3 825 5.63 356.4 432 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
20.6 95 5.63 369.5 3889.2 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
10.3 825 5.63 356.4 432 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
20.6 300 5.63 368.3 1227.7 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
20.5 284 5.63 368.3 1296.8 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
16.5 1650 5.63 357.1 216.4 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
5 240 5.63 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
3.3 800 5.63 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
20.6 20.6 5.63 369.9 17955.5 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
20.6 25.6 5.63 369.9 14447.5 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
20.6 15.4 5.63 369.9 24020 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 








f = 3 GHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








12.9 300 .13 360.1 1200.4 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
20.6 825 .13 369.9 448.4 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
No detect* No detect* No detect* No detect* No detect* 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
10.3 1852 .13 360.8 194.8 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
5.7 825 .13 354.7 429.9 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
20.6 95 .13 369.9 3894.7 
ACFT-2 
(5000 m) 
10.3 825 .13 360.9 437.5 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
9.2 300 .13 No detect* No detect* 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
4.9 284 .13 No detect* No detect* 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
11.4 1650 .13 359.9 218.1 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
1.2 240 .13 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
.8 800 .13 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
20.6 20.6 .13 369.9 17961 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
20.6 25.6 .13 369.9 14453 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
20.6 15.4 .13 369.9 24025 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 
Table V-24 UAV 3 GHz ⎯ Cone Search Geometry 
The UAV with the 20 GHz system provides a nice complement to the overhead and point 
sensor systems.  With the exception of ASCM-3, the UAV sensor network would be able to act 
as an effective tripwire against every threat to the Sea Base.  It provides particularly good 
detection ranges and reaction times against the stealth threats (ACFT-3 and UAV-1).  If cued 
acquisition is used from another sensor platform, an uninterrupted track of these threats is 
possible throughout the battle space.  Without the use of cued acquisition, the distributed 
network is still able to reduce the uncertainty of threat positions and narrow the scope of 
subsequent reacquisition searches. 
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Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ = 3-5 µm 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 







8 300 1.31 7.6 25.4 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
20.1 825 1.31 19 23.1 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
32.9* 1650 1.31 30.7 18.6 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
41.3 1852 1.31 38.6 20.8 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10.8 825 1.31 7.6 9.2 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
13.9 95 1.31 13.8 145 
ACFT-2 
(10 m) 
15.5 825 1.31 14.4 17.5 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
14.7 300 1.31 14.3 47.7 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
11.4 284 1.31 11 38.8 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
24.1 1650 1.31 21.9 13.3 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
1.7 240 1.31 1.4 5.8 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
2.7 800 1.31 .05 .06 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
8.2 20.6 1.31 8.2 396.7 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
12.1 25.6 1.31 12.1 471.3 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
12.1 15.4 1.31 12.1 784.4 
*ASCM-3 has begun its 30° dive and is at an altitude of 16.5 km. 








Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ = 8-12 µm 
Threat Speed 









7.6 300 1.31 7.2 24 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
11.6 825 1.31 10.5 12.8 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
15.2* 1650 1.31 13 7.9 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
18.6 1852 1.31 15.5 8.4 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10 825 1.31 7.6 9.2 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
12.8 95 1.31 12.7 133.4 
ACFT-2 
(10 m) 
13.5 825 1.31 12.4 15.1 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
13 300 1.31 12.6 42 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
11.1 284 1.31 10.7 37.8 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
11.2 1650 1.31 9 5.5 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
2.1 240 1.31 1.8 7.4 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
1.1 800 1.31 .05 .06 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
8.9 20.6 1.31 8.9 430.7 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
12.1 25.6 1.31 12.1 471.3 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
12.1 15.4 1.31 12.1 784.4 
*ASCM-3 has begun its 30° dive and is at an altitude of 7.6 km. 
Table V-26 Ship-Based 8-12 µm IR Sensor — Hemisphere Search Geometry 
 
The IR system using the 3-5 µm spectrum provides better detection ranges and reaction 
times when compared to the 8-12 µm system.  The only exception to this comparison is DW-2, 
which has a maximum effective range of 3 km.  When compared to the optimal point radar 
system (3 GHz-Cylinder), the 3-5 µm IR system provides better detection ranges against several 
of the high-speed threats including ASCM-2, ASCM-3, and DW-1.  Notable exceptions to this 
list of high-speed threats are SAM-1 and SAM-2.  The relatively large radar cross sections 
presented to the point sensor seem to overcome the emissivity of the SAMs, allowing radar for 
these cases to attain greater detection ranges and more reaction time.  Likewise, the minimal 
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cross sections presented to the point sensor by the high-speed, low-reflective threats make IR the 
better of the two for detecting ASCM-2, ASCM-3, and DW-1. 





Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ = 3-5 µm 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 







(3 m) 13.4 300 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 29.7 825 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 44.4 1650 1.31 33.8 20.5 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 41.3 1852 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 18.4 825 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 18.5 95 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-2 
(10 m) 20.4 825 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 20.5 300 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 15.5 284 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 35.5 1650 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-2 
(1 m) 2.1 240 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 5 800 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 12 20.6 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-2 
(0 m) 18.4 25.6 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-3 
(0 m) 21.8 15.4 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 








Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ = 8-12 µm 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








11.4 300 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
16.4 825 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
20.1 1650 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
18.6 1852 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10.9 825 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
15.6 95 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-2 
(10 m) 
16.4 825 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
16.4 300 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
13.8 284 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 





240 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
3 800 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
11.6 20.6 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
15.5 25.6 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
17.5 15.4 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 
Table V-28 Aerostat 8-12 µm IR Sensor — Hemisphere Search Geometry 
An aerostat operating at 50 km altitude is not a good choice as a platform for the IR 
sensor.  The 3-5 µm system is capable of providing an extra two seconds of reaction time against 








Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ = 3-5 µm 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








13.4 300 1.31 360.5 1201.8 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
29.7 825 1.31 378.9 459.3 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
44.4 1650 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
41.3 1852 1.31 390.6 210.9 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
18.4 825 1.31 368.6 446.8 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
18.5 95 1.31 367.4 3867.9 
ACFT-2 
(10 m) 
20.4 825 1.31 368.7 446.9 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
20.5 300 1.31 369.5 1231.7 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
15.5 284 1.31 363.5 1279.9 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 
35.5 1650 1.31 384.4 233 
DW-2 
(1 m) 
2.1 240 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
5 800 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
12 20.6 1.31 358.6 17408 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
18.4 25.6 1.31 367.4 14352 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
21.8 15.4 1.31 371.4 24113.7 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 








Tgt Angle:  0o 
λ = 8-12 µm 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 








11.4 300 1.31 357.1 1190.3 
ASCM-2 
(5 m) 
16.4 825 1.31 363.9 441.1 
ASCM-3 
(24 km) 
20.1 1650 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SAM-1 
(5000 m) 
18.6 1852 1.31 367.5 198.4 
SAM-2 
(5000 m) 
10.9 825 1.31 360.6 437.1 
ACFT-1 
(10 m) 
15.6 95 1.31 363.9 3830 
ACFT-2 
(10 m) 
16.4 825 1.31 363.9 441.1 
ACFT-3 
(10 m) 
16.4 300 1.31 364.6 1215.4 
UAV-1 
(10 m) 
13.8 284 1.31 361.1 1271.7 
DW-1 
(2000 m) 





240 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
DW-3 
(1 m) 
3 800 1.31 No detect* No detect* 
SB-1 
(0 m) 
11.6 20.6 1.31 357.9 17371.5 
SB-2 
(0 m) 
15.5 25.6 1.31 363.8 14211.3 
SB-3 
(0 m) 
17.5 15.4 1.31 366.3 23788.4 
*No detect indicates that the sensor operating at the given altitude is incapable of detecting the given threat. 
Table V-30 UAV 8-12 µm IR Sensor — Hemisphere Search Geometry 
The IR UAV system observing the 3-5 µm spectrum provides better detection ranges and 
reaction times when compared to the 8-12 µm system.  Furthermore, the IR UAV system 
provides better detection ranges and reaction times against ASCM-2, SAM-1, SAM-2, ACFT-3, 
DW-1, and SB-3 when compared to the UAV 20 GHz radar system. 
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f = 1 kHz 
Threat Speed 
(m / s) 
Search Time 
(s) 
n = 1 
Search Time 
(s) 





SUB-1 3.2 5.1 152.92 25.49 3.1 601.3 
SUB-2 3.5 5.1 152.92 25.49 3.4 661 
SUB-3 1.5 5.1 152.92 25.49 1.4 277.5 
SB-1 3.3 20.6 152.92 25.49 2.8 134.1 
SB-2 5.9 25.6 152.92 25.49 5.3 206.8 
SB-3 8.4 15.4 152.92 25.49 8 519.9 
Mine-1 1 0 152.92 25.49 1 N/A* 
Mine-2 .8 0 152.92 25.49 .8 N/A* 
Mine-3 1.2 0 152.92 25.49 1.2 N/A* 
Mine-4 .7 0 152.92 25.49 .7 N/A* 
Torp-1 .8 25.6 152.92 25.49 .1 4.7 
Torp-2 .8 102.9 152.92 25.49 0** 0** 
Torp-3 .5 20.6 152.92 25.49 0** 0** 
*Not applicable because the threat is not moving. 
**Zero indicates that these threats could only be detected at a .95 probability of detection after they passed or 
impacted the central point of the expeditionary force. 
Table V-31 1 kHz ⎯ Cylinder Search Geometry (.95 PD) 
These results show that several threats are able to approach very close to the defended 
assets if a point system is utilized.  The maximum weapons release range for several of the threat 
platforms is 300 km (maximum effective range of ASCM-2).  Therefore, a future sensor should 
be able to detect the threat platform well before the maximum weapons release range and allow 
time for defensive weapons to prevent the release of the enemy’s weapons.  This capability gap 
drives the need for a sensor that is able to detect threat platforms at longer ranges and with ample 
time to counter them before they can reach their weapons’ maximum effective ranges.  These 
requirements drive the need for a distributed sensor network. 
The results of searching the same volume with the 25 kHz active sonar demonstrated its 
impracticality.  The search time was 15,929 seconds, or 4 hours 26 minutes.  Furthermore, the 
use of this frequency does not give sufficient detection ranges to search out as far as the 1 kHz 
system.  This shows that the higher frequency sonar (25 kHz and 56 kHz) will require more 
narrowly defined search volumes in order to be used effectively.  For these reasons, the higher 
frequency sonar is better suited for searching very slow or non-moving objects such as mines in a 
restricted volume.  The volume chosen to model the 25 kHz sonar is a 1 km x 100 m cylinder.  








f = 25 kHz 
Search Time 
(s) 
n = 1 
Search Time  
(s) 
n = 6 
Mine-1 1 7890 1315 
Mine-2 1 7890 1315 
Mine-3 1 7890 1315 
Mine-4 1 7890 1315 
Table V-32 25 kHz ⎯ Cylinder Search Geometry (.95 PD) 
To put this table into perspective, with six point searchers, it would take approximately 
22 minutes to search the volume to a 95 % probability.  With one searcher, the search would take 
2 hours and 12 minutes.  In some cases, the time required to search to this probability may be 





f = 25 kHz 
Search time 
(s) 
n = 1 
Search time  
(s) 
n = 6 
Mine-1 1 4440 740 
Mine-2 1 4440 740 
Mine-3 1 4440 740 
Mine-4 1 4440 740 
Table V-33 25 kHz ⎯ Cylinder Search Geometry (.80 PD) 
With an 80 % probability of detection, six searchers would require approximately  
12 minutes to sweep the volume.  One searcher would require approximately 72 minutes to 
search the same volume.  These tables show that deepwater mine hunting will be very  
time-consuming or platform intensive work with respect to other threat sensor pairings. 
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f = 1 kHz 
Threat Speed 







SUB-1 7 5.1 153 369.2 72396 
SUB-2 7 5.1 153 369.2 72396 
SUB-3 7 5.1 153 369.2 72396 
SB-1 6.9 20.6 153 366.8 17803 
SB-2 7 25.6 153 366.1 14300 
SB-3 7 15.4 153 367.6 23873 
Mine-1 .9 0 153 363.9 N/A* 
Mine-2 1.5 0 153 364.5 N/A* 
Mine-3 1.5 0 153 364.5 N/A* 
Mine-4 1.6 0 153 364.6 N/A* 
Torp-1 3.2 25.6 153 362.3 14152 
Torp-2 3.2 102.9 153 350.5 3406 
Torp-3 1.8 20.6 153 361.6 17556 
*Not applicable because the threat is not moving. 
Table V-34 1 kHz ⎯ Cylinder Search Geometry (.95 PD) 
Just as described in the radar distributed sensor configuration section, in order to provide 
the necessary 360o coverage and cover a desired search radius of 370 km around the 
expeditionary warfare force, the number of USV or UUV required to populate a distributed 
sensor network could be calculated using Equation (46).  In the sonar example, the shortest 
detection range occurs at 7 km against SUB-3.  The resulting radius of deployment around the 
expeditionary warfare force (R) is 363 km.  Using these inputs, the number of USV or UUV 
required to fill the sensor network (N) is 163.  Once again, this excessively large number 
demonstrates the drawbacks of a distributed network that employs smaller sensors over a large 
area. 
The conceptual USV/UUV sensor network, however, would be able to act as an effective 
tripwire against every surface or subsurface threat to the Sea Base.  It provides particularly good 
detection ranges and reaction times against the submarines when compared to the point system.  
Once again, if cued acquisition is used from another sensor platform, an uninterrupted track of 
these threats is possible throughout the battle space.  Without the use of cued acquisition, the 
distributed network is still able to reduce the uncertainty of threat positions and narrow the scope 




An interesting sensor system relationship (see Figure V-8) emerged from the search 
detection study.  Each search system for a given sensor type is a trade-off of the number of 
search platforms, the search time, and the probability of detection in a defined volume.  The 
goals of the system are to minimize the search time, minimize the number of search platforms 
required, and maximize the probability of detection.  Any two of these goals may be satisfied to 
the detriment of the third.  The relationship between these variables follows the probability of 
detection formulas identified for each sensor. 
Figure V-8 Sensor System Relationship 
The benefits of a distributed sensor network throughout the battle space are readily 
apparent from the results obtained.  The point and distributed sensor configurations compliment 
each other very well.  By employing a mix of point and distributed sensor systems, an effective 
tripwire against every threat to the Sea Base could be achieved.  Furthermore, a distributed 
sensor network offers the benefits of greater detection ranges and more reaction time by 
extending the sensors’ horizons and by achieving greater target cross sections against a variety of 
the threats.  For example, the point sensor, assumed to be a ship, provides an early warning 










sensors, assumed to be on UAV or UUV/USV, provide early warning for the point assets against 
many of the other threats.  Cued acquisition from various sensor platforms might be able to 
provide uninterrupted track data throughout the battle-space.  Even without the use of cued 
acquisition, a distributed sensor network could reduce the uncertainty of threat positions and 
narrow the scope of subsequent reacquisition searches, thus providing a more robust force 
protection capability to the expeditionary force.  Point-only sensor systems (radar, IR, or sonar), 
or overhead-only sensor systems (radar or IR), display weaknesses in their inability to achieve a 
0.95 probability of detection for several threat platforms prior to maximum weapons release 
ranges.  This capability gap drives the need for a sensor system that is able to detect threat 
platforms at longer ranges and with ample time to counter them before they can reach their 
weapons’ maximum effective ranges.  The use of the IR and radar systems further allows the 
expeditionary warfare force to exploit attempted enemy trade-offs in reflectivity and emissivity.  
For these reasons, a mixed distributed and point sensor network system composed of IR, radar, 
and active sonar systems are recommended for implementation in future force structures. 
A necessary next step in defeating the threat platforms is to develop weapons systems 
capable of destroying the targets prior to their weapons release points. 
D. ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The Threat Analysis identified certain “baseline” future representative threats that the  
Sea Base might encounter in the 2016 timeframe.  The Sensor Analysis identified the capability 
of various sensors (radar, lidar, IR, and sonar) to detect those threats by analyzing various  
threat-sensor pairings.  The Search Analysis then addressed how differing sensor architectures 
might best detect those threats by calculating and analyzing the search time required to obtain a 
0.95 probability of detection.  Sensors were placed on various platforms in order to determine 
what mix of sensor-platform pairings would provide the most robust threat detection capability 
to the Sea Base.  Given that the future representative threats were detected, a necessary next step 
in defending the Sea Base is a means of countering them.  The method of defending the Sea Base 
analyzed in this chapter is through the employment of weapons capable of destroying the 
postulated threats identified in the Threat Analysis.  The defensive weapons chosen by this study 
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reflect current capabilities or capabilities that are thought to be attainable and deployable by 
2016.  All weapons information was obtained through the use of unclassified, and open-source 
material. 
This chapter will outline the preliminary analysis completed regarding the effects and 
interactions of sensor range, weapon range, and weapon speed by analyzing various weapons and 
force protection architectures and those systems’ associated probabilities of kill.  Furthermore, 
the effects of reaction time on force survivability will be analyzed in order to illuminate certain 
advantages that differing weapon system architectures may have on the overall survivability of 
the expeditionary force. 
2. Preliminary Analysis 
a. Point Weapons 
The greatest factor for attaining higher probabilities of kill against high-speed short 
notice threats is the ability to detect the threats at a greater range.  For all of the point weapons 
analyzed, the ability to detect the threats at greater ranges resulted in more available reaction 
time, which generated more engagement opportunities.  The increased engagement opportunities 
lead to increases in the probabilities of kill.  For high-speed, short-notice threats, the weapons’ 
minimum engagement ranges and speeds were also important secondary factors.  The weapons’ 
maximum engagement ranges however, were largely irrelevant.  For these reasons, primary 
consideration for achieving higher probabilities of kill should be given to the sensor system’s 
detection range and search speed.  This leads to the conclusion that a distributed sensor network 
similar in design to that discussed in the Search Analysis should be used with a point weapon 
system.  Furthermore, the weapons themselves should possess greater speeds and reduced 
minimum intercept ranges. 
b. Distributed Weapons 
For the distributed weapons, maximum range and speed were the primary factors for 
attaining greater reaction times and corresponding probabilities of kill.  Because the sensor 
architecture for the distributed weapons is held constant and because the number of shots 
available to a distributed platform is limited in comparison to the number available from a point 
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weapons platform, the ability of the weapon to generate more reaction time was the primary 
consideration.  For these reasons, interceptors with higher speeds and longer ranges should be 
used with distributed platforms. 
3. Methodology 
This study first considered how a Sea Base in the 2016 timeframe would most likely 
mitigate future representative threats.  Upon initial analysis, only physical defensive weapons 
were considered in mitigating those threats (e.g., missiles, guns, torpedoes, and lasers).  
However, further analysis revealed that other methods, such as electronic warfare could also 
effectively mitigate enemy threats.  The SEA-4 Team employed the Systems Engineering 
Process to break down defensive weapons into two categories, hard kill and soft kill, as seen in 
Figure V-9. 
Figure V-9 Defensive Weapons 
Building from these two methods, the next step was to determine what defensive 
weapons could reasonably intercept, or mitigate, each threat platform or weapon.  For specific 
weapons considerations, each Sea Base platform and associated threat was evaluated and a list of 
possible defensive weapons was determined.  Brainstorming, functional decomposition, and 
expert opinion were some of the tools used to develop the following threat-weapon pairings 
















PLATFORM THREAT DEFENSIVE WEAPON* 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile HK- Missile, Gun, Directed Energy Weapon 
SK- Threat Warning, Jamming, Deception, Decoys 
Aircraft / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle HK – Missile, Gun, Directed Energy Weapon 
SK – Threat Warning, Deception, Decoy 
Small Boat  HK – Missile, Gun, Directed Energy Weapon, Torpedo 
SK – Deception  
Torpedo  HK – Torpedo 
SK – Deception, Decoy  
ExWar Ship 
Mine  HK – Gun, Directed Energy Weapon 
SK – Deception, Decoy 
Small Boat  HK – Gun  
SK – None 
Torpedo HK – None 
SK – None 
Mine HK – None 
SK – None 
AAAV 
Unguided Weapon HK – None 
SK – None 
Small Boat  HK – Gun 
SK – None 
Torpedo  HK – None 
SK – None 
Mine  HK – None 
SK – None 
HLCAC 
Unguided Weapon HK – None 
SK – None 
Small Boat HK – Gun 
SK – None 
Torpedo  HK – None 
SK – None 
Mine  HK – None 
SK – None 
LCU(R) 
Unguided Weapon  HK – None 
SK – None 
Surface-to-Air Missile  HK – None 
SK – Threat Warning, Jamming, Deception, Decoy 
Aircraft / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  HK – None 
SK – None MV-22 
Unguided Weapon  HK – None 
SK – None 
Surface-to-Air Missile  HK – None 
SK – Threat Warning, Jamming, Deception, Decoy 
Aircraft / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  HK – None 
SK – None HLAC 
Unguided Weapon  HK – None 
SK – None 
Surface-to-Air Missile  HK – Missile  
SK – Threat Warning, Jamming, Deception, Decoy 
Aircraft / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  HK – Missile  
SK – None AH-1Z 
Unguided Weapon  HK – None 
SK – None 
Surface-to-Air Missile  HK – None  
SK – Threat Warning, Jamming, Deception, Decoy 
Aircraft/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  HK – None 
SK – None UH-1Y 
Unguided Weapon  HK – None 
SK – None 
*Hard and Soft Kill are abbreviated as HK and SK, respectively. 
Table V-35 Platforms, Threats, and Defensive Weapons Pairings 
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For purposes of clarity, as in the threat analysis, the defensive weapons terms are defined 
below.  The following definitions for hard kill defense weapons were adapted from the threat 
analysis and used in this section to facilitate an understanding of all weapons considerations. 
• Gun – A system capable of firing an unguided projectile that follows a ballistic 
trajectory with no in-flight control. 
• Missile – An unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use 
of aerodynamic lift. 
• Directed Energy Weapon – Uses the energy carried by radiation 
(electromagnetic, acoustic, or nuclear particle) collimated into directional beams 
to damage or destroy targets. 
• Torpedo – A steerable, self-propelled, underwater projectile filled with an 
explosive charge used for destroying ships or submarines. 
• Mine – An explosive device laid in the water with the intention of damaging or 
sinking ships or surface transport assets. 
Electronic warfare is defined as military action using electromagnetic energy to control 
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.  Electronic warfare is composed of three 
components:  electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.  Electronic 
warfare support is the act of searching, intercepting, identifying, and locating sources of radiated 
electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition or exploiting the 
enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Electronic attack is the use of electromagnetic or 
directed energy to attack the enemy (personnel, facilities, and equipment) with the intent of 
degrading, neutralizing, or destroying their combat capability.  The intent of electronic attack is 
to degrade or deny the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Electronic protection is 
action taken to protect friendly forces from enemy employment of electronic warfare that would 
degrade or destroy combat capability.  The following definitions for soft kill defensive weapons 
were adapted from electronic warfare principles and used in this section to summarize soft kill 
weapons capabilities. 
• Threat Warning – Electronic warfare support system that provides the platform 
with unambiguous, real time, threat information that can be analyzed and used in 
developing an appropriate response to the given threat. 
• Jamming – Electronic attack system that introduces noise into a sensor system as 
interference so that desired signals cannot be reliably detected. 
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• Deception – Electronic attack system that introduces signals into a sensor system 
that the sensor system will mistake for the desired signals and initiate incorrect 
actions. 
• Decoys – Electronic protection system that is designed to imitate the signature 
characteristics of the intended target to draw a threat away from that target or to 
otherwise deceive the enemy as to the true status of the intended target. 
Analysis of platform/weapon pairings enabled the team to determine the most effective 
weapon to use in the defense of Sea Base platforms.  These conclusions were used to assign 
attributes to these particular platforms in the modeling process.  In each case where there was no 
associated weapon to use for defense against a particular threat, it was determined that tactics 
(avoidance, evasion, etc.) and/or escorts would be used to provide a means of defense for that 
platform.  Additionally, it was determined that most air assets would have to rely primarily on 
soft kill weapons for self-defense.  This also reinforces the fact that these platforms should be 
designed and built with survivability as the paramount feature. 
As described in the value system design section of Chapter IV, this study focused its 
efforts on the “defeat attacks” subfunction of susceptibility due to the limited resources and time 
available.  By concentrating on the hard kill aspect of susceptibility, the SEA-4 Team felt it 
could better affect the overall survivability of the expeditionary force.  The “preventing attacks” 
subfunction and the soft kill aspect of susceptibility was not addressed in this section, but was 
considered in the final proposed architecture through the use of the supporting studies section. 
From these initial hard kill pairings, and by incorporating the results and conclusions 
from the Sensor and Search Analysis, this study was able to begin the weapons-modeling phase.  
Certain characteristics of the weapon systems, to include various system delay times, such as 
detect-to-track, track-to-launch, and mechanical delays, were then considered and used as inputs 
into mathematical spreadsheet models for each weapon.  By adding these characteristics and 
making further assumptions regarding tactics, such as shoot-shoot-look-shoot-shoot (SS-L-SS) or 
shoot-shoot-look (SS-L), and future capabilities, such as common operational picture (COP), or 
cooperative engagement strategy (CES), these models were able to provide a more detailed look 
at the function of engagement.  A COP will provide shared detection and track data from any 
sensor to all friendly platforms, essentially allowing all platforms to see the same battle space at 
the same time.  CES will allow any platform to engage enemy threats based on the track data 
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provided by any sensor.  Table V-36 summarizes the assumptions made for the engagement 
analysis model. 
 




System detect-to-track delay (s) 1 1 
System track-to-launch delay (s) 2 2 
System engagement analysis delay after intercept (s) 2 N/A* 
Delay between any two shots from same platform (s) 2 2 
Common operational picture capability Yes Yes 
Cooperative engagement strategy capability Yes Yes 
Probability of track given a detection 1 1 
Interceptor probability of kill  0.8 0.8 
Firing doctrine SS-L-SS SS-L 
*Not applicable—distributed platform employs only two weapons. 
Table V-36 Engagement Analysis Model Assumptions 
In order to study these tactics and capabilities, differing weapons configurations were 
established to determine their respective effects on force protection of the Sea Base. 
The first weapon configuration modeled assumed that the defensive weapon analyzed 
originated from an asset located near the high-value force center.  This architecture is referred to 
as the point weapons system and is similar in design to the point sensor system.  In this case, r 
represents the weapon’s distance from force center, r′ represents the weapon’s range, and R is the 
radius of the area concerned.  A point weapon configuration occurs when r << R.  Figure V-10 
graphically represents the point weapon architecture. 
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Figure V-10 Point Weapons Architecture 
The second weapon configuration modeled assumed that the weapons were deployed 
from the force center and placed onboard various assets (UAV, UUV, or USV) in a manner 
consistent with the distributed sensor architecture.  This architecture is referred to as the 
distributed weapons system.  In this system, the defensive weapon analyzed originates from a 
distributed asset not located near the force center.  Again, R represents the radius of the area of 
concern, r′ represents the weapon’s range, and r represents the weapon’s distance from the force 
center.  The distributed weapon architecture occurs when r ≈ R.  Figure V-11 graphically 




Where  r << R
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Weapon distance from force center
r' = Weapon range




Figure V-11 Distributed Weapons Architecture 
The next appropriate step is to employ some sort of weapon from these differing 
architectures in order to mitigate the various future representative threats.  As mentioned earlier, 
missiles, torpedoes, and lasers were considered as possible weapons to be employed from point 
and distributed assets.  Current and conceptual weapons were developed from open source 
information in order to provide a generic capability that exits either now, or could reasonably 
assumed to be available in the 2016 timeframe.  Table V-37 shows the various characteristics of 
the current and conceptual weapons that were modeled in the engagement analysis. 
Distributed Weapon Configuration
r
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Weapon distance from force center
r' = Weapon range







(m / s) 




Interceptor 1 (INT-1) 
(Current) 
Surface-to-air missile 825 130 5 
Interceptor 2 (INT-2) 
(Conceptual) 
Surface-to-air missile 1650 370 5 
Interceptor 3 (INT-3) 
(Current) 
Air-to-air missile 1320 56 2 
Interceptor 4 (INT-4) 
(Conceptual) 
Air-to-air missile 1980 93 2 
Free Electron Laser (FEL) Directed energy 3x108 10 1 
Torpedo 1 (T-1) (Current) Surface- or  
subsurface-launched torpedo 
20.6 7.3 .1 
Torpedo 2 (T-2) 
(Conceptual) 
Surface- or  
subsurface-launched torpedo 
25.7 11 .1 
Table V-37 Modeled Current and Conceptual Weapon Characteristics 
Reverting back to the Sensor Analysis, the detection ranges calculated in that section 
were transformed into DTGI values in the Search Analysis by applying first principle probability 
of detection equations, and by introducing the concept of the time required to detect those threats 
with a 0.95 probability of detection.  The DTGI values were then converted into TTGI values 
based on threat speed.  These numbers (DTGI and TTGI) served as the starting point for the 
Engagement Analysis.  An engagement model was then developed in order to determine the 
maximum number of engagements that could be made against any threat.  This model was based 
on the assumptions and weapons listed in Table V-36 and Table V-37, respectively, the 
architectures illustrated in Figure V-10 and Figure V-11, and the DTGI and TTGI values 
calculated in the Search Analysis.  An example of this model is demonstrated in Figure V-12.  
The x-axis represents the TTGI.  Time zero begins when the threat is detected by the sensor 
architecture at its DTGI range from the Search Analysis.  The y-axis represents the DTGI.  The 
maximum intercept range is set by the defensive weapon’s maximum effective range, conversely 
the minimum range at which the defensive weapon can effectively engage the threat sets the 
minimum intercept range.  The time delays mentioned in the assumptions (Table V-36) are 
visibly represented along the x-axis.  As an increase in time occurs, a corresponding decrease in 





Figure V-12 Engagement Analysis Model Example 
As seen in this example, one engagement with two shots was made on the single 
incoming threat.  The speed of the incoming threat, coupled with the system delays and 
engagement analysis delay, prevented the system from conducting a second engagement prior to 
the threat reaching the minimum intercept range. 
This model was then applied to each sensor-weapon pairing and tested against each 
future representative threat.  The following sections outline those results. 
4. Modeling Equations and Results 
a. Point Weapons System 
From the Search Analysis, ASCM-3 presented the lowest TTGI values for the point and 
distributed sensor systems and therefore was chosen as the “baseline” threat analyzed for the 
point weapons engagement analysis models.  From the assumed system delay times, the 
available reaction delays and subsequent number of engagements can be computed for each of 
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Engagement Analysis models for the Interceptor-1 weapon system using point sensors against 
ASCM-3. 
Figure V-13 INT-1 vs. ASCM-3 (0 sec delay) 
In order for the given system to achieve an intercept, the reaction delay available to the 
operator cannot be more than one second beyond the system delay time.  If the operator’s 
reaction delay is more than one second, the second shot in the salvo will not achieve an intercept 
before the minimum intercept range, and therefore will not intercept the threat.  The next two 
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Figure V-14 INT-1 vs. ASCM-3 (1-sec delay) 
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The Engagement Analysis models were applied to each point weapon with both point and 
distributed sensor systems against ASCM-3.  Using these models and the calculated reaction 
delay times, the number of interceptions that are possible can be calculated for each point 
weapons system.  The results of the total number of possible interceptions, or shots, for each 
system versus reaction delays for the point weapons-point sensor architecture and the point 
weapons-distributed sensor architecture are displayed in Figure V-16 and Figure V-17, 
respectively. 
Figure V-16 Point Weapons-Point Sensors Reaction Time Analysis 
Figure V-16 demonstrates that in a point weapons-point sensor architecture, the FEL 
dominates with an additional four seconds of reaction delay available when compared to 
Interceptor 2 and an additional seven seconds of reaction delay available when compared to 
Interceptor 1.  The longer available reaction delays can be used to generate additional 
engagement opportunities. 
# Interceptions vs. Reaction Delay
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Figure V-17 Point Weapons-Distributed Sensors Reaction Time Analysis 
Figure V-17 demonstrates that in a point weapon-distributed sensor architecture, the FEL 
not only provides an additional four seconds of reaction delay when compared to Interceptor 2 
and an additional seven seconds when compared to Interceptor 1, as in the previous example, but 
the distributed sensors provide an additional reaction delay of eight seconds to all of the weapons 
systems.  Again, these longer available reaction delays can be used to generate more engagement 
opportunities. 
From the reaction delay analysis, it may be reasonably concluded that for high-speed, 
short-notice threats, the use of the distributed sensor is the primary factor in the ability of the 
system to generate more available reaction delay and therefore more engagements for a given 
weapon system.  While clearly secondary factors, the models also demonstrate that a defensive 
weapon’s speed and minimum engagement range may be more important than its maximum 
engagement range when defending against the high-speed, short-notice threats.  Furthermore, by 
determining the number of interceptions that are possible against a given target, the total 
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If each interceptor or shot has a 0.80 Pk against ASCM-3, then the resulting total Pk 
versus ASCM-3 may be found by the formula: 
Equation (47)  Total Pk = 1-(1-(Pk))N  where,  
Total Pk = Sensor-Weapon Architecture Total Probability of Kill 
Pk = Interceptor Probability of Kill 
N = Number of Interceptors Fired at Threat 
 
The resulting total probabilities of kill versus reaction delays for the point weapons-point sensor 
architecture and the point weapons-distributed sensor architecture are displayed in Figure V-18 
and Figure V-19, respectively. 
Figure V-18 Point Weapons-Point Sensors Probability of Kill Analysis 
From the engagement analysis models, the FEL is able to provide the operator with more 
available reaction delay and can therefore provide more engagement opportunities.  As displayed 
in Figure V-18, the increased engagement opportunities generate higher probabilities of kill for 
the FEL system compared to Interceptor 1 or Interceptor 2 for the point weapons used with the 
point sensor systems. 
Pk vs. Reaction Delay 
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Figure V-19 Point Weapons-Distributed Sensor Probability of Kill Analysis 
From the engagement analysis models, the distributed sensors are able to provide the 
operator with more available reaction delay when compared to the point sensor system, and 
subsequently provide more engagement opportunities.  As displayed in Figure V-19, the 
increased engagement opportunities generate higher probabilities of kill for all of the weapons 
systems analyzed.  Again, the FEL system, when compared to Interceptor 1 or Interceptor 2, is 
able to achieve greater reaction delays and higher probabilities of kill for the point weapons used 
in conjunction with the distributed sensor system. 
Pk vs. Reaction Delay 
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Figure V-20 FEL Probability of Kill 
Figure V-20 provides a comparison of FEL used with the point and distributed sensor 
systems.  This graph reveals that the distributed sensor affords the operator an additional  
eight seconds of possible reaction delay.  This eight-second increase in available time was found 
to hold constant for the threat-weapons pairs (ASCM-3 vs. Int 1, Int 2, FEL) modeled using the 
point and distributed sensor architectures. 
The analysis of the above figures shows that the reaction delay is the most critical factor 
for determining the probability of kill against high-speed, short-notice threats (ASCM-3).  An 
increase in the reaction delay generates fewer firing opportunities with a corresponding decrease 
in the total probability of kill.  If only the above hard kill options are considered, and if the 
ASCM is assumed to function properly, then the probability that a high value unit is hit is 
represented by the following equation: 
FEL Pk Comparison 
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Equation (48)  Ph=1- (Total Pk) where: 
Ph = Probability of High Value Unit Being Hit 
Total Pk = Sensor/Weapon Architecture Total Probability of Kill 
 
The biggest factor then in reducing the probability of hit, thereby improving the force 
survivability, is the ability to generate more interceptions by increasing the possible reaction 
delay.  The distributed sensor architecture provides this capability by detecting the threat further 
away from the high-value units.  From the graphs, greater weapon speed and reduced minimum 
intercept range are secondary factors, but do appear to enhance the probability of kill if longer 
reaction delays are desired against high-speed, short-notice threats. 
For undersea threats, the timeline analysis revealed that the ability to detect the threat 
platform is the key to its defeat.  The response times from detection were very large when 
compared to the surface and air threats.  From the Search Analysis, the point sensor model was 
unable to detect the threats, particularly the submarines, at sufficient ranges to prevent  
short-notice weapons release.  The result was an inability to effectively counter the threat 
torpedoes.  This leads to the conclusion that the submarine threat must be detected far enough 
from the protected assets to prevent unmitigated torpedo launches.  Because of the point sensor 
system’s limited detection ranges and the threat torpedoes’ long range, the means of achieving 
this goal might be reached through the distributed sensor architecture modeled in the  
Search Analysis. 
b. Distributed Weapons System 
Engagement analysis and reaction delay models similar to the ones used for the point 
weapons system were used to determine the probability of kill that could be attained against any 
threat based on the threat assumptions and the distributed weapons assumptions, as well as the 
time required to obtain a 0.95 probability of detection from the Search Analysis.  From the 
Search Analysis, ACFT-2 presented the lowest TTGIs for the UAV platforms of the distributed 
sensor system and therefore was chosen as the “baseline” threat analyzed in the distributed 




Figure V-21 Distributed Weapons Probability of Kill 
For both Interceptor 3 and Interceptor 4, the UAV’s distributed sensor provides the initial 
detection.  The UAV can only carry two interceptors, which limits the maximum probability of 
kill to 0.96; however, it is readily apparent that the superior speed and range of Interceptor 4 are 
desirable if longer reaction times are required. 
5. Conclusions 
From the models, it is readily apparent that the ability to detect a threat at a longer range 
leads to a greater probability of kill for a given weapon system.  The models prove that a 
weapon’s range is largely irrelevant if the sensor’s range is limited in comparison.  The weapon’s 
speed, however, is a desirable attribute, particularly if longer reaction times are required; but it is 
clearly secondary to the sensor’s search speed and range.  This rationale is predicated on the 
assumption that you cannot shoot what you cannot see.  Therefore, the ability to expand the 
sensor coverage and improve the sensor search speed will allow the force to capitalize on a 
defensive weapon’s potential speed and range advantages, which, in turn, will create more 
engagement opportunities, thereby increasing the probability of kill against the postulated 
threats. 
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E. SUPPORTING STUDIES 
1. Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project 
a. Purpose 
In April 2002, OPNAV N75, the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Expeditionary Warfare tasked the Wayne Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering to conduct an 
expeditionary warfare study.  The Institute then charged Systems Engineering Integration Team 
Three (SEI-3) to engineer an overarching set of system requirements for a system of systems to 
conduct expeditionary operations in littoral regions and to explore interfaces and system 
interactions.  The team then had to compare current, proposed, and conceptual sea-based 
platforms against the identified requirements.  SEI-3 was also tasked to examine the effects of 
speed, reduced footprint ashore, Sea Basing, modularity of design and reduced manning. 
b. Methodology 
The SEI-3 group applied elements of the Systems Engineering Management Process 
(SEMP).  They first developed an architecture that clearly defined all the requirements of 
expeditionary warfare.  The SEI-3 group then conducted a functional decomposition of 
expeditionary warfare and determined required capabilities.  The required capabilities were then 
evaluated and compared to the capabilities expected from programs of record in the Department 
of Defense (DOD). 
SEI-3 developed and compared three expeditionary architectures:  current, proposed, and 
conceptual.  SEI-3 generated requirements for the Aeronautical Engineering Design Group,  
Total Ship System Engineering (TSSE) Design Group, and a Space Operations Design Group for 
the design of platforms for the conceptual architecture.  Furthermore, SEI-3 developed models to 
compare the three architectures. 
Two of the SEI-3 modeling efforts were of particular importance to the SEA-4 study for 
the following reasons.  One of the models was developed to analyze Sea Base supporting 
operations.  The supporting operations analysis focused on developing platform requirements for 
force protection.  The second model developed by SEI-3 focused on modeling the entire 
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expeditionary process.  The expeditionary process model was SEI-3’s primary tool for 
comparing the current, proposed, and conceptual architectures. 
SEI-3 used the Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Toolkit (EINSTein) in the 
supporting operations analysis study to examine force protection concepts against various 
surface threats.  EINSTein is a beta-version, agent-based simulation where entities are given 
“attributes” to describe mission, capabilities, and aggressiveness.  Agents are represented as 
individual combat units from troops, to aircraft, to capital ships.  Entities, such as ships, are free 
to move, act, engage, and disengage opposing forces according to these attributes.  Agents move 
using a stochastic time-step simulation.  EINSTein was originally designed to model small unit 
ground combat, but is now used as an artificial-life model to explore self-organized emergent 
behavior in land or maritime combat. 
The supporting operation analysis explored the survivability of the Sea Base against 
ASCM attacks.  A baseline defensive escort force of one CG, one DDG, and one FFG for each of 
the ExWar architectures (current, planned, and conceptual) was implemented against a baseline 
enemy force of 10 patrol craft and eight frigates.  The supporting operation analysis also 
explored the use of the littoral combat ship (LCS) as an escort.  From the baseline, escorts were 
added until the set goal of “80% of task force ships alive” was achieved. 
SEI-3 utilized EXTEND to model the expeditionary warfare logistics process.  EXTEND 
is a discrete event simulation tool that uses components, or blocks, and interconnections to model 
complex processes.  Creating block diagrams where each block describes a part of a process, 
allows users to create a series of simple block definitions to describe complex processes. 
The SEI-3 conceptual expeditionary model replaced the Iron Mountain with a Sea Base 
to host the logistics depot.  In the model, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-sized force 
was built at an assembly area before proceeding as a task force (TF) to the launching area.  Once 
the TF arrived at the launching area, forces were deployed in scheduled waves to the objective.  
Once all scheduled waves were launched, logistic ships stationed at the assembly area began 
their logistic sustainment operation.  The entire operation continued for a 90-day period. 
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Numerous factors and variables were included in the expeditionary process model.  The 
design factors for the model were:  architecture (current, planned, conceptual), replenishment 
means (high-speed vessels or existing large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) 
replenishment ships), and ship to objective proximity.  The model also accounted for 
environmental effects, mine threats, attrition/casualty of troops, and reliability/serviceability of 
vehicles. 
c. Findings 
The supporting operations analysis with EINSTein found that the conceptual architecture 
with the baseline escort force was no better than the current or planned architectures in terms of 
survivability.  The number of amphibious ships in the conceptual architecture was less than the 
number of ships in the planned or current architectures due to the introduction of the larger 
conceptual amphibious ship design (ExWar ship).  The more concentrated conceptual force made 
the Sea Base more susceptible to enemy actions.  For the conceptual architecture, the  
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) to have more than 80% of the task force unharmed was 
achieved by a combined force of three CGs, three DDGs, and three FFGs.  An excursion on the 
substitution of escort ships with LCSs for the conceptual architecture provided a rough order of 
equal capability of one CG, one DDG, and one FFG to equal about six LCS. 
The expeditionary process model using EXTEND found that the conceptual architecture 
projected 80% of the MEB ashore faster than the planned and current architectures.  This was 
due to the newly designed ExWar ships that had an increased number of aircraft and surface craft 
that, in turn, increased lift capability.  The conceptual architecture possessed an air-heavy 
replenishment system that was less affected by adverse weather conditions than surface craft.  
The Sea Base functioned better, with the respect to force replenishment, through the use of  
High-Speed Vessels (HSVs) operating from the Offshore Base.  Although proximity to the 
objective did not significantly affect the time to build up the forces ashore, closeness to the 
objective provided more stable resource levels at the objective.  This indicated that launching 
forces from far offshore can occur without acute delays, but the process of sustaining the forces 




The SEI-3 Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project is the foundation for the SEA-4 
study.  The SEI-3 study established the conceptual expeditionary force architecture.  The 
architecture dictates the number of ExWar ships and the number of air and surface transport 
assets to be protected. 
The SEA-4 Team examined SEI-3’s conceptual model to assess the feasibility of using 
the model to answer force protection related issues.  Since the model uses inputted attrition rates 
for troops, air, land, and sea vehicles, the model does not allow investigation of the effects of 
specific threats to the conceptual expeditionary force.  Additionally, the model does not provide 
a means to add force protection assets such as CGs, DDGs, FFGs, or LCSs.  Due to the logistics 
nature of the SEI-3 expeditionary process model, the SEA Team deemed it best to create a new 
model focused on force protection. 
The SEI-3 supporting operations study provided a baseline for determining the number of 
escorts for the Sea Base.  Although the study primarily focused on an ASCM threat from surface 
combatants, the SEA-4 Team felt that the multi-warfare capabilities of escort ships such as CGs, 
DDGs, FFGs, and LCSs provides a sufficient baseline to protect against the generic threats 
identified in the Threat Analysis. 
2. Exploratory Analysis of Littoral Combat Ships’ Ability to Protect Expeditionary 
Strike Groups 
a. Purpose 
The SEA-4 Team conducted a mini-study exploring various conceptual capabilities that 
might be given to a LCS augmenting defenses of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  The 
LCS capabilities explored included:  speed, stealth, common operational picture, an organic 
helicopter, and a high volume of close-in fires.  The mini-study revealed that the combination of 
stealth and an organic helicopter provided the most consistent protection for the force.  However, 
the team felt that the quick nature of the mini-study required validation from other means. The 
team compared and validated their results to the thesis of LT Efimba, USN, and “An Exploratory 
Analysis of Littoral Combat Ships’ Ability to Protect Expeditionary Strike Groups.” 
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LT Efimba’s thesis explored the LCS’s ability to help defend an ESG in an anti-access 
scenario against a high-density small boat attack.  The thesis investigated the employment 
various ships including cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and LCS’s.  Additionally, the thesis 
explored capabilities such as speed, stealth, common operational picture, helicopters or 
unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and firepower. 
b. Methodology 
LT Efimba used EINSTein as the modeling and simulation tool for the LCS study.  The 
study focused on a high-density surface threat of 30 high-speed, small boats.  The small boat 
threat possessed characteristics similar to small boat three (SB-3) described in the  
Threat Analysis.  The force structure for the ESG included three amphibious ships and three 
cruiser/destroyer (CRUDES) ships.  This became the baseline ship architecture for the blue 
force.  From the baseline, CRUDES ships were varied in number from zero to two and were 
combined with one to seven LCSs.  In addition to varying the force structure, LT Efimba’s 
design of experiments tested the design characteristics of the LCS (helicopter/UCAV, stealth, 
speed, firepower).  The MOE for the experiment was the number of amphibious ship survivors 
and amphibious ships damaged.  Other MOEs related to CRUDES survival, LCS survival, and 
helicopter/UCAV survival.  LT Efimba ran 50 replications of 16 run-sets and examined 19 ship 
combinations. 
c. Findings 
The presence of aircraft was the single most influential factor to force effectiveness.  For 
example, in Figure V-22 a comparison of stealth (r2) to stealth + helicopter/UCAV (r3) showed 
that aircraft have a beneficial effect on preventing ship loss.  For r3, there were zero ship losses 
with approximately three LCSs or more, while r2 performed consistently worse by two ship 
losses.  LT Efimba’s thesis may be referenced for further details regarding subsequent runs or 
differing designs of experiments. 
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Figure V-22 2 CRUDES + X LCS, Ship Loss vs. Number of LCS, r2 and r3 
The second most influential factor in preventing ship losses was stealth.  The 
combination of helicopter/UCAV with stealth is the next most influential term, having both 
aircraft and stealth makes an ESG well protected.  LT Efimba assumed all factors cost the same 
and only two could be implemented onboard the LCS.  The combination of helicopter/UCAVs 
and stealth proved to be the best choice.  Firepower ranked fourth in LCS characteristics 
beneficial to the ESG. 
Simulation runs with the characteristic of speed produced interesting results.  Runs 
utilizing speed as a factor showed speed had a potentially detrimental effect.  The speed factor 
caused the LCS to charge ahead of the CRUDES ships.  The aggressive LCS dispersed the 
ESG’s protection and allowed the threat to engage the blue force piecemeal. 
d. Conclusions 
EINSTein provided a conceptual-level analysis of the employment for the LCS playing a 
role in force protection of the Sea Base.  LT Efimba’s thesis concluded, “Being able to control 
aircraft is the most influential factor for minimizing ship losses.”  An LCS with a hangar to 
support helicopters or UCAVs would be ideal.  However, since the combination of stealth with 


























helicopters/UCAVs was highly effective in reducing ship losses, a hangar may reduce the stealth 
of a ship hull.  With such trade offs in mind, the SEA-4 Team generated requirements for the 
TSSE group. 
The requirements for the LCS design were general in nature and left the decision to 
include a hanger on the ship up to the TSSE Team.  TSSE conducted a trade analysis of LCS 
capabilities that were required and decided to include a hangar in the final ship design.  Details 
of the TSSE ship design can be found in Appendix B. 
3. Cooperative Radar Network (CRANK):  Concept Exploration for Defending the 
Sea Base 
a. Purpose 
The Combat Systems Science and Technology Sensor Team conducted a study to 
propose a suitable sensor system to protect the Sea Base against airborne attacks by threats such 
as low-flying UAVs and cruise missiles.  The fundamental issue identified by the Sensor Team 
was to detect, identify, and track the cruise missiles or UAVs upon entry into the sensor envelope 
of coverage and throughout their flights.  From the Expeditionary Warfare requirements, the 
system’s sensor envelope of coverage was chosen to be a radius of 200 nautical miles (nm) 
around the Sea Base. 
b. Methodology 
The Sensor Team identified three main categories of sensors available for the detection of 
the UAV and cruise missile threats.  The three categories identified were radar, electro-optical, 
and acoustic.  Based on the operational requirement to provide up to 200 nm of coverage, radar 
was selected as the most suitable candidate.  The reasons for this were twofold: 
• Radar is the least affected of the three categories by weather 
• Radar has the best detection range against airborne targets 
Furthermore, the Sensor Team recognized two inherent limitations to radar’s ability to 
detect targets: 
• Atmospheric refraction (sensor height of eye) 
• Advances in low observable technologies particularly stealth 
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The sensor height of eye determines the radar’s horizon range and therefore the 
maximum range at which a given target could be seen.  The Sensor Team concluded that a 
conceptual radar should have a greater height of eye in order to extend its horizon against  
low-flying threats. 
A common misconception identified by the Sensor Team with respect to stealth is that 
stealth aircraft are completely invisible.  In truth, however, stealth aircraft are primarily designed 
to minimize the frontal radar cross section (RCS).  The contouring of stealth aircraft is further 
designed to avoid reflecting a radar signal directly back in the direction of the radar transmitter.  
These factors lead the Sensor team to choose a target RCS of .01 square meters for use in their 
modeling.  To overcome the stealth features of the conceptual target, the Sensor Team concluded 
that a bi-static or multi-static radar system would greatly increase the odds that at least one 
receiver would detect a reflected signal. 
c. Findings 
From the preceding information, the Sensor Team concluded that a multi-static system 
should be able to provide 360o coverage for the Sea Base assets.  The Sensor Team also 
determined that the radar sensors should not be static as in a classic bi-static system, but should 
be able to change in order to support the force protection requirements of the Sea Base. 
The sensor system could achieve the detection range required in one of two ways:  either 
increasing the transmitter power, or reducing the range between the receiver and the target.  The 
Sensor Team also considered trade-offs between sea-borne and airborne platforms.  The airborne 
sensors were determined to have the advantage of quick set-up and redeployment necessary to 
meet the operational requirements of changes in network configuration.  Furthermore, airborne 
sensors were determined to be able to achieve a greater radar horizon range and were judged as 
less cumbersome logistically when compared to seaborne platforms. 
The airborne transmitter and receiver system designed by the Sensor Team is the 
CRANK.  The system uses a Single-Transmitter and Multiple Receiver Radar Arrangement 
(STAMRA) (see Figure V-23).  For STAMRA to provide long-range and 360o coverage will 
require sufficient power to be transmitted in all directions.  This is necessary in order that the 
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strength of the return signal, or signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), will be above the minimum threshold 
for the maximum desired detection range.  The SNR determined by the Sensor Team was  
0 decibels (dB).  The minimum number of receivers required based on geometry was determined 
to be π R/r.  In this formula, R is the deployment range of the receivers from the transmitter, and 
r is the radius of each individual receiver’s sensor coverage. 
Figure V-23 Single-Transmitter and Multiple Receiver Radar Arrangement (STAMRA) 
A main weakness of the STAMRA concept is that the single transmitter can become a 
single point failure of the whole system.  If the transmitter does not work, the whole system will 
fail.  To address this problem, the individual CRANK receivers would possess monostatic radars 
to operate in a degraded, or secondary, mode.  The setback of the degraded mode is that the 
detection range is likely to be shorter since the airborne receiver platform would likely be 
smaller and have more limited transmitter power. 
From the requirements set forth by the Sensor Team, each receiver should be capable of a 
detection range of 50 nm (r = 50) against a .01 square meter target.  If the deployment range is 










radar, the power requirement for a .01 square meter target is 1640 megawatts.  Other frequency 
and power requirements are listed in Table V-38. 
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3.0 0.01 200 50 1640 
3.0 0.1 200 50 164 
3.0 0.01 100 25 35.2 
3.0 0.1 100 25 3.52 
10.0 0.01 200 50 428 
10.0 0.1 200 50 42.8 
10.0 0.01 100 25 5.4 
10.0 0.1 100 25 0.54 
Table V-38 Bi-static Frequency and Power Requirements 
d. Conclusions 
The transmitter power required to detect a .01 square meter target at 200 nm using a  
3 GHz or 10 GHz multi-static system is too great to be realized by current technology for 
airborne platforms.  One way to reduce this power requirement may be through the use of pulse 
compression.  Pulse compression would permit the power requirement to be greatly reduced; 
however, it is not known if pulse compression has been studied or implemented in a multi-static 
radar system. 
CRANK offers a viable option for a distributed sensor network that may allow future 
threats to be detected at greater ranges from the Sea Base and therefore afford greater reaction 
times to the force protection assets.  Employing the UAV sensor network in the degraded, or 
secondary, mode will permit the use of existing mono-static radar capabilities and may still 
prove able to provide long-range detection of low-flying cruise missiles or UAVs.  The 
implementation of this sensor system will also facilitate the future use of bi-static or multi-static 
capabilities if pulse compression or future power generation capabilities prove able to make the 
primary mode a reality. 
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4. Quantifying SSGN Contributions to a Complex Joint Warfare Environment 
a. Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to determine potential SSGN’s contributions to a complex 
joint warfare environment using simple circulation model (see Figure V-24).  Two related  
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) were used as measures of the SSGN’s contributions.  The 
two MOEs used were:  additional missions per unit, and force multiplying factor. 
Figure V-24 Simple Circulation Model 
b. Methodology 
The SSGN study assumed that in future conflicts an SSGN would be used to prepare the 
battle space through cruise missile strikes and special operations activities.  Preparation of the 
battle space, in turn, implied reduced enemy lethality and greater probabilities of survival for 
friendly forces. 
c. Findings 
The SSGN study used a simple circulation model to convert the improved survivability 
due to SSGN battlespace preparation into mathematical equations capable of being used in both 
MOEs.  On each leg of the mission there is a half-mission survivability of q.  If X is the number 
of missions that a friendly unit completes, then E[X] is the expected number of completed 
missions given in Equation (49). 







The first MOE, additional missions per unit, simply compares E[X] with and without 
SSGN battle space preparation.  The mathematical representation of this MOE is: 
Equation (50)  Number of Additional Missions = E[XwithSSGN] – E[XwithoutSSGN] 
If qwithoutSSGN and qwithSSGN are substituted into Equation (50), the result is: 
Equation (51) Number of Additional Missions = qwithSSGN /(1- q2withSSGN) - qwithoutSSGN / 
(1- q2withSSGN) 
Table V-39 represents various combinations of Equation (51).  The table’s values 
represent the expected number of additional missions made possible through SSGN battlespace 
preparation. 
Table V-39 Mission Gain through SSGN Battlespace Preparation Spreadsheet 
To put Table V-39 values into perspective, consider the example of an aircraft carrier 
(CV) or airwing with 24 aircraft conducting strike operations.  If qwithoutSSGN is .95 and qwithSSGN is 
.98, each aircraft could be expected to complete an additional 16 missions because of the 
SSGN’s battle space preparation.  This would equate to 384 additional missions for the  
24 aircraft in question. 





























































0.995 0 -50 -66 -75 -80 -83 -85 -87 -88 -90 -90 -91 -92 -92 -93 -93 -94 -94 -94 -95
0.990 51 0 -16 -25 -30 -33 -35 -37 -38 -40 -40 -41 -42 -42 -43 -43 -44 -44 -44 -45
0.985 67 17 0 -8 -13 -16 -19 -20 -22 -23 -24 -25 -25 -26 -26 -27 -27 -27 -28 -28
0.980 76 26 9 0 -5 -8 -10 -12 -13 -15 -15 -16 -17 -17 -18 -18 -19 -19 -19 -20
0.975 81 31 14 6 0 -3 -5 -7 -8 -10 -10 -11 -12 -12 -13 -13 -14 -14 -14 -15
0.970 84 34 17 9 4 0 -2 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -8 -9 -10 -10 -10 -11 -11 -11
0.965 86 36 20 11 6 3 0 -1 -3 -4 -5 -5 -6 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8 -9 -9
0.960 88 38 21 13 8 5 2 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 -7 -7
0.955 89 39 23 14 9 6 4 2 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -4 -4 -5 -5 -5 -6
0.950 91 41 24 16 11 7 5 3 2 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -4 -4 -4 -5
0.945 91 41 25 16 11 8 6 4 3 1 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -4
0.940 92 42 26 17 12 9 6 5 3 2 1 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3
0.935 93 43 26 18 13 9 7 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2
0.930 93 43 27 18 13 10 8 6 4 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -2
0.925 94 44 27 19 14 11 8 6 5 4 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1
0.920 94 44 28 19 14 11 9 7 5 4 3 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1
0.915 95 45 28 20 15 11 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
0.910 95 45 28 20 15 12 9 7 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0
0.905 95 45 29 20 15 12 10 8 6 5 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0
























The second MOE, the force-multiplying factor, is the expected number of completed 
missions with SSGN battle space preparation, divided by the expected number without. 
Equation (52)  Force Multiplying Factor = E[XwithSSGN]/E[XwithoutSSGN] 
If qwithoutSSGN and qwithSSGN are substituted into Equation (52), the result is: 
Equation (53) Force Multiplying Factor = qwithSSGN /(1- q2withSSGN) / qwithoutSSGN / 
(1- q2withSSGN) 
Table V-40 represents various combinations of Equation (53).  The table’s values 
represent the force-multiplying factor of SSGN battlespace preparation. 
Table V-40 Force Multiplication thru SSGN Battlespace Preparation Spreadsheet 
For example, if qwithoutSSGN is .96 and qwithSSGN is .98, the force-multiplying factor is 2.02.  
This means that the CV or airwing with SSGN battlespace preparation is equivalent to 2.02 CVs 
or airwings without battlespace preparation. 
d. Conclusions 
The simple circulation model provides a simple way to quantify an SSGN’s contributions 
to improved mission completion and force multiplication.  For both MOEs, the benefits of SSGN 
With Battlespace Preparation by the SSGN
0.995 0.990 0.985 0.980 0.975 0.970 0.965 0.960 0.955 0.950 0.945 0.940 0.935 0.930 0.925 0.920 0.915 0.910 0.905 0.900
0.995 0.00 -50.00 -66.00 -75.00 -80.00 -83.00 -85.00 -87.00 -88.00 -90.00 -90.00 -91.00 -92.00 -92.00 -93.00 -93.00 -94.00 -94.00 -94.00 -95.00
0.990 2.01 1.00 0.66 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
0.985 3.02 1.50 1.00 0.75 0.60 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14
0.980 4.03 2.01 1.34 1.00 0.80 0.66 0.57 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19
0.975 5.05 2.52 1.68 1.25 1.00 0.83 0.71 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24
0.970 6.08 3.03 2.02 1.51 1.20 1.00 0.85 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.29
0.965 7.11 3.55 2.36 1.76 1.41 1.17 1.00 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.34
0.960 8.15 4.06 2.70 2.02 1.61 1.34 1.15 1.00 0.89 0.80 0.72 0.66 0.61 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.39
0.955 9.19 4.58 3.05 2.28 1.82 1.51 1.29 1.13 1.00 0.90 0.81 0.74 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.44
0.950 10.24 5.11 3.40 2.54 2.03 1.68 1.44 1.26 1.11 1.00 0.91 0.83 0.76 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.51 0.49
0.945 11.29 5.63 3.74 2.80 2.24 1.86 1.59 1.39 1.23 1.10 1.00 0.91 0.84 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.54
0.940 12.35 6.16 4.10 3.06 2.45 2.03 1.74 1.52 1.34 1.21 1.09 1.00 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.59
0.935 13.42 6.69 4.45 3.33 2.66 2.21 1.89 1.65 1.46 1.31 1.19 1.09 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.64
0.930 14.49 7.23 4.81 3.60 2.87 2.38 2.04 1.78 1.58 1.42 1.28 1.17 1.08 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.69
0.925 15.57 7.76 5.16 3.86 3.08 2.56 2.19 1.91 1.69 1.52 1.38 1.26 1.16 1.07 1.00 0.93 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.74
0.920 16.65 8.31 5.52 4.13 3.30 2.74 2.34 2.04 1.81 1.63 1.47 1.35 1.24 1.15 1.07 1.00 0.94 0.88 0.83 0.79
0.915 17.75 8.85 5.89 4.40 3.51 2.92 2.50 2.18 1.93 1.73 1.57 1.44 1.32 1.22 1.14 1.07 1.00 0.94 0.89 0.84
0.910 18.84 9.40 6.25 4.67 3.73 3.10 2.65 2.31 2.05 1.84 1.67 1.53 1.40 1.30 1.21 1.13 1.06 1.00 0.94 0.89
0.905 19.95 9.95 6.62 4.95 3.95 3.28 2.81 2.45 2.17 1.95 1.77 1.61 1.49 1.38 1.28 1.20 1.12 1.06 1.00 0.95
























preparation of the battlespace are clearly evident.  For the Sea Base, the SSGN provides a means 
of reducing enemy lethality and contributes to an increased survivability for the expeditionary 
warfare assets. 
5. Defending Multiple High-Value Units (HVUs) Against High Density Threats 
(HDTs) 
a. Purpose 
The purpose of this supporting study done by an Operations Research (OR) group was to 
analyze force posture and force composition of assets associated with protecting HVUs, such as 
ExWar ships in a Sea Base.  The OR group felt that defense of the HVUs in a Sea Base was 
different from the defense of a Carrier Battle Group due to the number of HVUs that need 
protection and the relative proximity to shore.  The relative proximity to shore presents an 
increased chance of being overwhelmed by HDTs. 
b. Methodology 
The OR group developed analytical models and simulation models to gain insight into the 
process of defending the Sea Base.  The analytical model was used to prescribe the distance at 
which a defender should be placed from a HVU, and to calculate a threat sector that could be 
defended with a .90 probability of success.  Outputs from the analytical model were utilized in 
the simulation model.  The results from both models were compared to validate their design. 
The analytical model addressed the issue of defending multiple HVUs against HDTs.  
Specifically, the model determined how HVU positioning and defender positioning affects the 
quality of force protection, with respect to various targets.  The model was generically designed 
to allow users to input parameters based on the user’s defined scenario.  The parameters of the 
analytical model include:  target velocity, defender velocity, defender fire rate, defender weapons 
range, detection range, single shot probability of kill given an engagement, and target sector.  
The following were assumptions made for the analytical model: 
• HVUs are stationary 
• Targets head directly for HVUs 
• Target speeds are greater than defender speeds 
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• Changes in velocity are instantaneous 
• Identification of enemy is instantaneous 
• Perfect battle damage assessment 
The analytical model was systematically developed in three phases.  The first phase 
investigated the interactions of one HVU, one defender, and one target.  The second phase 
explored the effects of multiple HVUs, one defender, and one target.  The third phase included 
multiple HVUs, one defender, and multiple targets representing a HDT attack. 
The OR group then developed a simulation model to verify the analytical model.  The 
purpose of the simulation model was to simulate enemy forces attacking the Sea Base to 
determine the optimal positioning of defending forces relative to the HVUs.  The agent-based 
simulation EINSTein was selected as the tool for the simulation model due its ease of use and the 
speed of its stochastic runs. 
The design factors for the simulation model include LCSs, high-speed boats (HSB), 
UCAV, and HDT tactics.  In the simulation model, the LCS represented the defender.  The 
number of LCSs was 1 or 4.  The threat types consisted of either HSBs or UCAVs.  The number 
of HSBs or UCAVs was 20 or 40 to represent HDTs.  The HDTs employed one of two tactics.  
Tactic 1 was a concentrated attack on a single location.  Tactic 2 was a multi-axis attack from 
two separate perpendicular axes. 
c. Findings 
Various applications of the analytical model provided the OR group with numerous 
insights and conclusions.  One application of the analytical model was to determine the 
maximum threat sector and number of defenders required to protect a HVU.  Given a target with 
a speed of 500 kts and a defender with the following characteristics:  30 kts speed, 200 nm 
detection range, and 30 nm weapons range, the effective threat sector was found to be 
approximately 28o.  The minimum number of defenders required for 360o coverage, without 
overlap, is approximately 13.  The analytical model also allowed investigation of the effect of 
detection range on maximum threat sector.  By increasing the radar detection range by  
50 nm⎯from 200 nm to 250 nm⎯the resulting maximum threat coverage sector by a single 
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defender changed to 38.56o.  This resulted in a decrease from 13 defenders to only 10 defenders 
required for 360o coverage. 
The simulation model provided insight into HVU survivability.  The design of 
experiments included 30 runs for each category for a total of 960 trials.  Table V-41 shows the 
probability that all HVUs survive. 
Table V-41 Probability All HVUs Survive 
An estimated probability of mission achievement for the LCS was then calculated by 
dividing the number of cases where no HVU was destroyed by the total number of runs (30).  
HVUs identified as “Injured” by EINSTein were considered alive in the analysis. 
The probability of HVU survival is much higher for HDT-UCAV compared to  
HDT-HSB across all parameters.  This finding was explained by the fact that the UCAVs had 
few opportunities to target LCS, due to their high speed and their attribute to primarily engage 
the HVUs.  Conversely, the LCS’ were able to engage the slower HSBs and therefore placed 
themselves within the HSB engagement range longer.  This finding demonstrates that the LCS 
should use its sensor and weapons range advantages when engaging threats. 
d. Conclusion 
The OR study provides insight into the optimal placement of defenders with respect to 




defender weapon ranges.  With inputs from a scenario, design factors such as weapons range, 
probability of kill, and radar detection range can be investigated to see their affects on Sea Base 
defenses. 
Findings from both the analytical and simulation models are applicable to this study.  The 
analytical model recommends the use of 10-13 defenders.  Although the analytical model 
assumes that HVUs are stationary, it is likely that the HVU would continue to “make way” to 
conduct air operations and landing craft operations, while keeping mobile in order to mitigate the 
enemy.  For this study’s simulation purposes, the 10-13 defenders would have to keep a relative 
station within a given sector around HVUs.  Insight from the OR simulation model recommends 
that defenders employ sensors and weapons at their maximum range. 
6. Information Assurance Plan for the Protection of the Sea Base Information 
Systems (IS) 
a. Purpose 
The purpose of the Information Assurance Team study is to focus on establishing an 
Information Assurance (IA) plan to protect and defend the information and information systems 
of the Sea Base.  IA is a process that involves the ability to protect information and IS, detect 
events that may interfere with information or IS, and properly react to situations where 
information or IS may have been compromised.  The IA plan would help to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems. 
b. Methodology 
The IA Team conducted their study in three stages.  The first stage identified potential 
challenges for the Sea Base in implementing the current Department of the Navy IA policy.  The 
second stage of the IA study investigated technologies (current and future) that may be employed 
in an IA defense-in-depth strategy.  The third stage applied the Information Assurance Analysis 
Model (IAAM) to technologies from the second stage of the study to evaluate the relative costs 




The Department of the Navy policy “Introduction to Information Assurance Publication, 
May 2000” promotes a layered defense.  The IA Team used the policy as the baseline policy for 
the Sea Base and identified several implementation challenges.  The following are the 
implementation challenges identified by the IA Team: 
• Risk Management - Determining the frequency of threat and vulnerability 
reviews for high-value information systems. 
• Documentation - Documenting updates to deployed systems. 
• Updating Policy, Standards, and Procedures - Updating written standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). 
• Software Development - Ensuring unintentional errors and malicious software 
are avoided during data operations when using commercial over the shelf 
(COTS). 
• Communications - Preventing unauthorized backdoor entry into a secured 
network. 
• Legacy Systems - Safeguarding vulnerable legacy systems. 
• Configuration Management - Insuring compatibility and interoperability of new 
software to the network. 
• National Information Infrastructure - Protecting systems that connect directly 
to the Internet. 
• Email Addresses - Avoiding exploitation of user accounts through email address 
source codes. 
The second stage of the study identified nine technologies that could be used as part of 
the Department of the Navy defense-in-depth requirement.  The technologies’ relevance to the 
Sea Base information systems varies from concepts to systems.  The IA Team identified the 
following technologies: 
• E-Bomb - Electromagnetic Bomb with a warhead designed to damage targets 
with a very intense pulse of electromagnetic energy. 
• Physical Access Control-Biometrics - Devices that allow authorized personnel 
to enter specific sites by verifying a person’s identity by unique, unalterable 
physical characteristics, such as hand dimensions, eye features and/or 
measurements, fingerprints, or voice. 
• Laser Communications - Wireless communication means that provides a higher 
bandwidth and limits the accessibility to eavesdropping. 
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• Secure Tunnels - A private connection between two machines or networks over a 
shared public network. 
• Intrusion Prevention Systems - A perimeter defense against network-based 
attacks that recognizes unusual behavior and blocks it in real-time before the 
intrusion can execute. 
• Intelligent Software Decoy - Employing deception techniques to deceive the 
attacker into believing the software decoy is the object it intended to attack and 
reveals the presence of the attacker with the appropriate response. 
• System Redundancy - Improving the self-sufficiency and survivability of 
systems through back-up systems. 
• Security through Obscurity - Enhancement of system security through the use 
of encryption algorithms, security hardware, and network configuration. 
• Sim Security - Security education and training through the use of simulations. 
The third stage of the IA study found that the IAAM provided a means of comparing 
differences in IA strategies and highlights the impact of information assurance on system 
operational capabilities and resource costs.  The IAAM is composed of three separate value 
hierarchies:  IA, Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on 
Resource Costs (IRC).  Each of the value hierarchies is given weights by the user.  The user is 
then able to compare information system technologies based on the given weights. 
d. Conclusion 
The SEA-4 threat analysis primarily focused on physical threats.  The IA study, however, 
forms the basis for defense of the Sea Base in terms of Information Systems.  The “technology 
look ahead” conducted by the IA Team provides a template of what is possible in the realm of 
protecting information systems.  Additionally, the study provides an example of how to analyze 
the impact of IA systems on operational capabilities and resource costs through the use of the 
IAAM.  With the growing reliance of technology in networking combat systems, protecting the 
Sea Base information systems cannot be overlooked. 
7. A Sensory Perspective to the Protection of the Sea Base 
a. Purpose 
The purpose of this study conducted by the Electrical Computer Engineering (ECE) 
Team was to propose ways to create a more responsive and robust sensor architecture that 
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processes information faster than the enemy’s architecture.  The ECE Team looked at ways a 
sensor network could effectively fuse data from multiple sensors to enhance target classification 
and engagement.  Sensors needed to detect and track low radar cross-sections and fast targets 
using advance signal processing methods. 
b. Methodology 
The ECE Team identified threats to the Sea Base as high-speed, sea-skimming threats.  
The detection of these targets would be difficult for shipboard sensors due to the inherent low 
signatures and interference from surface clutter and multi-path effects.  Through research, the 
ECE Team identified different ways to improve Sea Base defenses by improving data fusion, 
sensor collaboration, and communications. 
c. Findings 
Three ways to fuse data are through centralized fusion, autonomous fusion, and hybrid 
fusion.  The data fusion method would depend on the various types of resources available, 
communication bandwidth, and degree of preciseness.  Centralized fusion shows all sensors 
transferring raw observational data to a centralized node for classification.  Centralized fusion 
represents the most accurate method to fuse data.  With autonomous fusion, the tracking and 
classification process are executed at the individual sensor.  This means that each sensor 
determines the target’s velocity and position before sending information to a data fusion.  In 
general, autonomous fusion is not as accurate as data level fusion due to some information loss.  
Hybrid fusion combines centralized fusion and autonomous fusion.  When more accuracy is 
needed, data level fusion is executed.  Though flexibility is one advantage for hybrid fusion over 
the other two methods, hybrid fusion also represents more time to examine and to decide which 
fusion method to utilize.  The challenge with data fusion was to decide what to filter, what to 
relay, and what to transmit.  Varying computational capacity of each sensor added to the 
complexity.  Over or under filtering was found to produce delays and misinformation that could 
possibly lead to tactical decision-making errors. 
Collaborating a large number of sensors would also pose a challenge for the Sea Base 
sensor architecture.  Dealing with a massive network spawns issues relating to command and 
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control, power consumption, interoperability, sensing algorithms, and levels of interdependence.  
The ECE Team found that relation based processing might facilitate collaboration of sensors.  A 
collaborative sensor system adopting a relation-based sensing algorithm would promote a high 
level of comprehensive awareness, support efficient decision-making, and allow for efficient 
local and global updates. 
With regard to communications, the ECE Team explored ways to maximize the data rate 
transfer between platforms with minimal energy and resources.  Two possible solutions were the 
Mobile Ad Hoc Wireless Sensor Network and the Smart Antenna System. 
Ad hoc networks are network architectures that could be rapidly deployed without the 
need of pre-existing infrastructures.  Mobile ad hoc wireless sensor architectures provide ease of 
deployment, low cost and maintenance, improved engagement quality, and increased battle space 
awareness.  The Smart Antenna System could provide a secure data link between platforms of 
the Sea Base by minimizing the ability of the enemy to exploit radiation signatures.  The  
Smart Antenna System could be employed onboard UAVs as part of an airborne sensor network 
providing secure connectivity between ExWar ships and units on land. 
d. Conclusions 
The sensor study conducted by the ECE Team revealed that one way to enhance the force 
protection architecture of the Sea Base is to build a scalable, robust and mobile sensor network.  
As technological advances allow significant increases in throughput and capacity, well-designed 
communications architectures will be needed to manage and support the large amount of data 
residing in C4ISR systems.  The insight gained from the ECE study will be used in developing 
concepts for a distributed sensor architecture for the SEA-4 study. 
8. Exploratory Study of the Flapping Wing Micro-Air Vehicle (MAV) 
a. Purpose 
The Mechanical Engineering (weapons) Team conducted a study to propose a means to 
enhance the forward line of defense for the Sea Base through the concept of  “See First, 
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Understand First, and Strike First” (Chan, 2003).  The study involved detailed analysis of threats 
to the Sea Base and research into the use of MAV in surveillance operations. 
b. Methodology 
The Mechanical Engineering (weapons) Team used a Systems Engineering approach in 
their development of a MAV.  The group conducted a threat analysis to identify a key threat and 
possible technologies that could be employed against the threat.  Following the threat analysis, 
the team completed a requirements analysis that included an analysis of alternatives between a 
flapping wing MAV and a fixed wing MAV.  The analysis of alternatives led to the selection of 
the flapping wing MAV.  The group then identified desired operational capabilities and 
investigated design concepts for the flapping wing MAV.  Areas examined included 
aerodynamic characteristics, structures, materials, power supplies, cameras, navigation, and 
flight control. 
c. Findings 
The Mechanical Engineering (weapons) Team identified the key threat to the ExWar ship 
as precision-controlled, supersonic, cruise missiles.  The flapping wing MAV design was 
selected to fulfill the requirements for a low-altitude, close-proximity, surveillance vehicle in 
support of the concept of “See First, Understand First, and Strike First” for the first line of 
defense.  A flapping wing MAV designed at the Naval Postgraduate School exhibited flight 
stability, maneuverability, and good obstacle avoidance capability.  All of these characteristics 
made the MAV an excellent platform for surveillance missions.  Hundreds of MAVs could be 
deployed from a larger UAV to locate enemy units in obstacle-filled environments, such as 
forests or jungle. 
However, due to size, weight, and power requirements, the fielding of the flapping wing 
MAV was not achievable using COTS items and current technologies.  Customization of 
components would increase the performance of the MAV at the expense of cost.  The trend in the 
advancement of miniaturization technologies showed that the fielding of the flapping wing MAV 




The MAV offers a viable option as part of a distributed sensor system to include in the 
overall system of systems to protect the Sea Base.  The Mechanical Engineering (weapons) study 
highlights the importance of battle space preparation in expeditionary warfare operations.  The 
MAV could provide a means to locate enemy weapon systems and a means to obtain intelligence 
on the objective.  The use of MAVs offers a means of saving lives and money by reducing the 
need for special operations units and the need of larger, more costly surveillance systems. 
9. Littoral Combat Ship Anti-Air Warfare Self Defense Combat System Concept 
a. Purpose 
The students of the Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) Cohort 1 at  
Port Hueneme conducted a study to propose a suitable system to provide an Anti-Air Warfare 
(AAW) self-defense combat system for the LCS.  Their study involved detailed analyses of 
sensors, sensor integration, command and control, weapons, and manning.  The weapons 
analysis was of particular interest in terms of Sea Base force protection.  The MSSE Team 
explored missiles and missile launchers, gun systems, electronic warfare (EW) and decoys, and 
weapons layered defense. 
b. Methodology 
The MSSE group was comprised of several Integrated Project Teams (IPT); each with a 
specific task.  The hard kill IPT was tasked to perform a parametric analysis and assess candidate 
missile and gun weapon system options.  The hard kill IPT considered several weapon suites of 
missile and gun system configurations optimized to provide self-defense for the LCS from  
anti-ship missiles (ASM) launched from the land, sea, or air.  In their analysis, the team used 
combination of Probability of Kill (Pk), maximum effective Range (Rmax), minimum effective 
Range (Rmin), missile guidance type, velocity, availability and origin, size, and weight as factors 
in selecting a preferred weapon concept.  The soft kill IPT was tasked to develop an EW weapon 
system solution for protection on the LCS.  Their overarching requirement was to meet a 
probability of raid annihilation of 0.95.  In their analysis, the team used weight, space, manning, 
and engagement timelines as factors in developing an optimal EW system. 
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The methodology involving the selection of the gun system was unique because several 
additional operational and logistical factors had to be taken into account.  As with the missile 
system, the gun system had to reliably demonstrate threat lethality and equipment modularity 
with a very high operational availability.  The design of the gun system would require  
multi-mission capabilities needed to respond to various threats including defeat of  
“swarm attacks” by high-speed, armed, small boats in both symmetric and asymmetric warfare 
environments.  Multi-mission requirements are essential for most weapon systems deployed in 
the U.S. military; however, the MSSE study focused primarily on the self-defense AAW mission 
capabilities that such gun systems would provide.  Requirements dictated that the gun system be 
capable of quick installation and removal and impose a small modular equipment suite design 
with no deck penetration.  Reduced LCS manning requirements added the constraint of an 
unmanned automatic gun system operation with manual back-up capabilities and minimum 
maintenance requirements to keep the gun system fully operational.  Therefore, major factors in 
selecting a gun system were simple design and few moving parts.  Additionally, the types of gun 
system rounds available vary widely and had to be matched with the capabilities of the gun 
system and the missions it was expected to perform.  Therefore, the projectile was considered as 
part of the gun system and several projectiles with various capabilities were considered as well. 
At the completion of the analysis, the hard kill IPT selected a missile system (missile and 
missile launcher), and a gun system (gun and projectile) from several candidate systems.  The 
soft kill IPT developed a design for an EW/decoy system optimized for LCS self defense. 
c. Findings 
The conceptual weapons systems were divided into the missile system, the gun system, 





HARD KILL CONCEPTUAL REQUIREMENTS 
Missile 
RF / IR guidance 
1-9.4 km range 




35mm revolving cannon 
0.2-3 km range 
1000 rounds / minute 
500-round magazine 
Airburst with sub-munitions 
2 mounts required for 360° coverage 
SOFT KILL CONCEPTUAL REQUIREMENTS 
EW 
2-18 GHz frequency coverage 
81 dBm power, mono-pulse DF arrays 
24-track capacity 
Automatic 16 target simultaneous engagement capacity 
370 km maximum range 
Seduction 210 round chaff magazine 2 rounds of active decoys 
Active stealth Water Camouflage Automatically controlled salt water spray of superstructure 
Table V-42 MSSE Weapons System Conceptual Requirements 
(1) Missile System 
The missile system selected by the MSSE hard kill IPT was designed to provide surface 
ships with an effective, low-cost, lightweight, self-defense system that provided an improved 
capability to engage and defeat incoming ASMs.  The system consisted of a smaller diameter 
airframe and dual mode, passive radio frequency/infrared (RF/IR) guidance.  Initial homing 
consisted of RF, using an ASM’s RF seeker emissions.  If the ASM’s IR radiation was acquired, 
the system transitioned to IR guidance.  The design incorporated cueing as provided by the ship’s 
EW suite or radar.  The missile also had IR “all-the-way” homing guidance mode to improve 
performance against evolving passive and active ASMs.  Two IR guidance modes were 
available:  IR-only and IR Dual Mode Enable (IRDM).  The IR-only mode guided on the IR 
signature of the ASM.  The IRDM guided on the IR signature of the ASM, while retaining the 
capability of using RF guidance if the ASM RF signature became adequate.  The magazine was 
designed to hold 21 rounds, and the system used a trainable launcher, which would affect the 
ship’s radar cross section.  Maximum range of missile was approximately 9 km, and minimum 




Probability of System Availability (Reliability, Maintainability 
&Availability (RM&A)) 
0.9 
Probability of Availability (2007 Initial Operating Capability (IOC)) Yes 
System Size / Weight Estimate 9 tons 
Probability of Kill, Single Shot 0.9 
Maximum Range 9.4 km 
Minimum Range 1 km 
Active / Semi / Passive Radio Frequency Homing (RFH) / Infrared Homing (IRH)
Launcher Type (fixed / trainable) Trainable 
Coverage (full azimuth / elevation with min # of launchers) 2 
Magazine Size 21 
All-Weather Performance  No 
Guidance  RF/IR 
Weapon Rate of Fire Single or multi salvo 3 secs / rd 
Signature (Radar Cross Section (RCS) / Infrared (IR)) Contribution Significant 
Velocity Mach 2+ 
Illuminator Required (yes / no) No 
taccel 0.91 sec 
Table V-43 MSSE Missile System Parameters 
(2) Gun System 
The gun system selected by the MSSE Hard kill IPT was a 35mm, 1000 round per minute 
revolver cannon.  The use of airburst munitions in this gun system made it capable of defeating 
guided missiles at ranges exceeding 1.2 km.  The firepower provided by this gun system 
provided self-defense capability in the following areas: 
° Cost to kill and flexible firepower—fewer rounds required on target due to 
higher hit and kill probabilities 
° Higher stowed engagement capacity (>200) without reload 
° Shorter reaction in swarm attack scenarios 
° Very effective air target defeat including against anti-ship missiles; a  
cost-effective means to achieve a viable measure of ship self-defense 
capability at an affordable cost 
° Growth potential in key rate of fire and ammunition payload areas 
compatible with newly built warship life cycles due to power and size of 
the 35mm caliber 
189 
 
Additionally, the selected gun system could perform in a multi-mission environment and 
could provide the following engagement functions: 
° Anti-Air Warfare 
• Engagement of anti-ship missiles 
• Engagement of aircraft, helicopters and UAVs 
° Anti-Surface Warfare 
• Engagement of fast, small boats 
• Policing engagements 
° Naval Gunfire Support 
Selected gun system parameters are shown in Table V-44. 
PARAMETER GUN SYSTEM 
Probability of System Availability (RM&A) 0.9 
Probability of Availability (2007 IOC) Yes 
System Size / Weight Estimate 4 tons 
Launcher Type (fixed / trainable) Single barrel 
Coverage (full azimuth / elevation with min # of launchers) 2 
All-Weather Performance  Sensor Dependent 
Guidance  Any Sensor 
Signature (RCS/IR) Contribution Minimal 
Illuminator Required (yes / no) Yes 
Weapon Reaction Time (assign to engage) 1.1 sec 
Weapon Rate of Fire 1000 rounds / min 
Magazine Size 500 rounds 
Munitions Type Airburst (pre-fragmented) 
Probability of Kill, Burst 0.8 (0.95 advertised) 
Probability of Kill, Round 0.139 
Maximum Range 3.0 km 
Minimum Range 0.2 km 
Round Velocity 1.0 km / sec 
Gun Burst Period 1.2 sec 
Time Between Bursts (kill eval, etc.) 1.1 sec 
# Rounds in Burst 20 rounds 
Round Acceleration 1.0 x 106 m / sec2 
Table V-44 MSSE Gun System Parameters 
As previously stated, the gun system was considered as a whole with a specific projectile.  
The projectile selected for the gun system was matched to the overall mission capabilities of the 
LCS.  The selected projectile was a Kinetic Explosive Timed Fuse (KETF) type of ammunition.  
The projectile used a time fuse along with a pre-fragmented projectile.  Ideally, the round would 
be fired toward the point of impact so that, at a distance between 10 and 40 m in front of the 
target, a small charge would detonate the projectile and cause the dispersion of sub-projectiles to 
be released.  This cloud of sub-projectiles would fly toward the approaching target, and penetrate 
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the target body to destroy missile control surfaces, seeker, and other vital components.  Due to 
their high kinetic energy, the sub-projectiles would cause massive damage to the missile.  The 
pre-fragmented payload consisted of 152 cylindrical, tungsten alloy sub-projectiles each 
weighing 3.3 grams.  The sub-projectiles were released by detonation of a small ejection charge 
of less than 1.0 gram so that their dispersion pattern was well formed just in front of the target 
pass-through point.  Pre-fragmentation of the projectile enabled individual sub-projectiles to be 
spin-stabilized and to form a lethal cone of fragments, which significantly increased hit 
probability, particularly at extended ranges.  An illustration is shown in Figure V-25. 
V-25 Gun System Projectile 
This airburst projectile was also assessed to be effective against small, fast, swarming 
surface targets.  Additionally, other types of ammunition such as high mass armor piercing 
discarding sabot (APDS), high explosive timed fuse (HETF), and practice rounds with inert 
projectiles could be fired from the gun.  For the purposes of the MSSE study, only KETF rounds 
were considered. 
(3) Soft Kill Suite 
The soft kill suite designed by the MSSE Team uses EW and decoys as a complement to 
the LCS self-defense system.  EW can be used to provide counter-targeting and  
counter-surveillance by means of long-range target detection and identification, denying ability 
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to locate and target friendly forces, measuring target motion, confirming target identification, 
and denying ability to hit friendly forces.  Ideally, the use the soft kill suite would conserve 
costly hard kill weapons for threats that leaked through the soft kill defenses. 
The EW system was composed of electronic attack (EA), active decoys, and active 
stealth.  It was designed as a modular system that would automatically identify and jam threat 
emitters.  The jammer would be capable of handling 16 different threats simultaneously.  The 
MSSE soft kill IPT broke down the EW System into three distinct functional elements:  EW 
(EA, Electronic Protection (EP)), seduction (active decoy, passive decoy), and active stealth.  
The team derived the soft kill suite requirements by using the LCS mission scenarios.  The 
system was designed with an overarching requirement to meet a Probability of Raid Annihilation 
(Pra) of 0.95.  In addition, other requirements included weight, space, manning, and engagement 
timelines. 
The selected EW system was a modular, 2-18 GHz system intended to counter most 
known radar threats.  An automated system was used to identify and jam threat emitters.  One 
important capability was the subsystem that handled multiple simultaneous threats.  It was 
composed of two transmitters stabilized in pitch and roll to maximize jamming strength.  
Selected EW system parameters are shown in Table V-45. 
PARAMETER EW SYSTEM 
Probability of System Availability (RM&A) 0.9 
Probability of Availability (2007 IOC) Yes 
Size / Weight Estimate 200 kg 
Probability of Correct Emitter ID 0.9 
Probability of Soft kill, Single Engagement 0.4 
Probability of Correct Technique-Automated Doctrine 0.5 
Weapon Prep / Deploy Time 10 sec 
Magazine Size 210 rounds 
Max Range 370 km 
Min R 2 km 
Salvo Size Track 24; Engage16 tgts 
All-Weather Performance Yes 
Signature (RCS / IR) Contribution RCS 
Table V-45 MSSE EW System Parameters 
The seduction system consisted of both passive and active decoys.  The active decoy 
system selected was a system capable of hovering in the vicinity of the ship.  Once launched, the 
active decoy would radiate a large, ship-like radar cross section, while flying a trajectory that 
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would seduce incoming ASMs away from the ship.  The decoy would be an autonomous flight 
vehicle, capable of operating over a wide range of environments and of positioning with a high 
level of accuracy.  The decoy was required to counter a wide variety of present and future radar 
ASM guided threats by radiating a large radar cross section signal, while traversing a ship-like 
trajectory to permit decoying multiple threats.  Once launched, the decoy would operate 
autonomously and follow a programmed flight path, thus presenting a more attractive target to 
incoming missiles.  Active decoy system capabilities included: 
° Rapid reaction time with minimal threat data 
° Effective in all weather 
° Fully integrated with other shipboard EW elements 
° Performance independent of ship maneuver 
° System capable of fully automatic operation 
° Capable of decoying multiple anti-ship missiles simultaneously 
° Capable of producing RF responses while moving away from ship 
The passive decoy system uses chaff as a radar countermeasure against anti-radiation 
missiles and flares as an IR countermeasure against IR-seeking missiles.  Chaff and flares remain 
common forms of passive decoys used to lure threats away from any ship.  They were still 
judged to be inexpensive and very effective on some threats for the given time period.  Passive 
decoy system capabilities required: 
° Shipboard management of expendable chaff cartridges via a  
computer-controlled countermeasure system used with deck-mounted 
launchers 
° The chaff system must be highly effective for managing anti-ship decoy 
tactics 
° System must be fully integrated with EW element, as well as shipboard 
wind and navigation sensors 
° System must provide and implement automated tactics for every scenario 




SEDUCTION ELEMENT PARAMETER ACTIVE DECOY CHAFF 
Probability of System Availability (RM&A) 0.85 0.95 
Probability of Availability (Yes / No) Yes Yes 
Size / Weight Estimate 4607 kg 207 kg unloaded 
Probability of Correct Emitter ID 0.9 N/A* 
Probability of Soft kill, Single Engagement 0.5 0.4 
Probability of Correct Technique-Automated Doctrine N/A N/A* 
Weapon Prep / Deploy Time 6 s 
30-60 s for warning 
1-2 s for chaff to bloom to 
10 times ship RCS 
Hovering Time 5 s N/A* 
Magazine Size 2 rounds 210 rounds 
Max Range 5 km 22 km 
Min Range 50 m 2 km 
Salvo Size 1 round 12 salvo / 2 launchers 
All-Weather Performance (Yes / No) Yes Yes 
Signature (RCS / IR) Contribution RCS RCS 
*Not Applicable. 
Table V-46 MSSE Seduction System Parameters 
The active stealth component of the soft kill suite was designed to manage the ship’s IR 
signature.  The radar signature is inherent to the design of the ship and thus contributes to the 
passive stealth system.  A ship’s IR signature is composed of two main components: internally 
generated and externally generated. Internally generated signature sources include rejected heat 
from engines and other equipment, exhaust products from engines, waste air from ventilation 
systems, and heat losses from heated internal spaces.  The main ship’s internal source results 
from the engines and generators.  External sources result from the ship absorbing and/or 
reflecting radiation received from the sun, sky radiance, and sea radiance.  The soft kill IPT only 
explored active stealth options that would reduce the IR signature of the platform.  The goals of 
signature management were to: 
° Prevent or delay detection of the ship by hostile forces 
° Prevent, confuse, or delay accurate identification 
° Prevent lock-on of missile seekers 
° Reduce lock-on distance of missile seekers 
° Increase effective engagement range of EW 
° Increase seduction effectiveness of all types of decoys 
° Decrease decoy mass required to mask the ship 
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The proposed active stealth technique consisted of actively monitoring and cooling the 
heated parts of the ship’s surface with seawater.  To attain full effect, the level of the signatures 
must be reduced to be about the same as, or lower than, the environmental background noise. 
The design goal would be achieved when the signatures are so low that even if the ship were 
detected, identification and engagement would be extremely difficult.  Active stealth technology 
was assessed to be a critical technology area related to the survivability of weapon platforms.  
Active signature control makes detection by an adversary more difficult through concealment 
from sensor systems. 
The selected Water Camouflage (WC) system was designed to be capable of reducing 
sources of self-generated IR emissions and reducing solar heating from ship surfaces.  The 
objective of the WC system was to blend the ship into its background.  This system had a series 
of water spray nozzles carefully located around the ship in order to effectively water cool the 
heated surfaces.  The nozzles would be grouped into many sections that had their temperatures 
continually monitored with a control system.  Each section was individually controlled in order 
to achieve constant temperature throughout the external ship surface.  The WC system would be 
integrated with the soft kill weapon suite and the overall self-defense system, providing 
automatic IR signature monitoring and control. 
d. Conclusions 
Review of the MSSE report yields the following conclusions from the hard kill and  
soft kill IPTs: 
• A robust gun system can perform in both AAW and SUW roles. 
• Combined with LCS’ speed of 30-50 knots, decoys were viable soft kill weapons 
for this class of ship. 
• LCS was designed to operate in the littoral environment.  When LCS operates 
close to land, it must be recognized that the battle space is limited.  The reaction 
time to counter the threats must be accomplished in limited time due to the 
constrained battle space created by land.  Shore-based ASMs can travel short 
distances when LCS is close to land.  This factor forces a new requirement to 
automate many functions now performed manually, in order for the detection, 
identification, track, and engage sequence to be effective.  The LCS soft kill suite 
was designed to be fully automatic with no human in the loop.  Command and 




• The use of hard kill weapons only is not the best choice in order to achieve the 
desired probability of kill.  The use of both hard kill and soft kill mechanisms in a 
layered defense scheme will be far more effective in achieving the required Pra of 
0.95 for an incoming ASM. 
• Signature management is the LCS’ first line of defense with respect to breaking 
the threat kill chain.  Signature management reduces LCS emissions that enemy 
aircraft and missiles use for fire control solutions in order to home on LCS.  
Various ASMs with limited range, typically used in the littorals, employ IR 
guidance.  In an attempt to reduce the IR signature of LCS, innovative techniques 
such as the employment of a WC system (active stealth) to cool the surface of 
LCS is used. 
It should be noted that the critical performance parameters and detail analysis information 
of electronic warfare technology is a highly classified subject.  The scope of the MSSE project 
was limited to open source material or using first principle calculations with stipulated 
assumptions.  The probability of kill and the engagement timeline for the soft kill elements were 
derived either from open source material or by using academic principles. 
The missile system, gun system, and soft kill suite conceptualized by the MSSE Team 
offer a viable option for systems to include in the overall system of systems to protect the  
Sea Base.  The missile and the gun system were designed to be compact, lightweight, and highly 
automated.  These could also be viable candidate weapon systems for the TSSE-designed LCS.  
A lightweight, low-cost, self-defense missile system and gun system selected for the LCS could 
also be adapted for use on other Sea Base platforms.  The conclusions regarding the need for 
hard kill systems to be complemented by a soft kill suite were particularly important.  The  
MSSE Team’s design for a soft kill suite would be an ideal model to use as a basis for soft kill 
suites on all Sea Base ships and escorts. 
F. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURES 
This section consolidates findings from the Sensor, Search, and Engagement Analyses to 
propose force protection capabilities for the Sea Base.  The Sensor Analysis, Search Analysis, 
Engagement Analysis, and supporting studies of Chapter V represent the feasibility screening of 
the concepts identified through alternatives generation.  The alternatives generation identified 
five functions associated with force protection: detect, defeat, prevent, withstand, and deploy.  
Through careful research during the feasibility screening, the SEA-4 Team decided to focus their 
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efforts on the functions of detect, defeat, and deploy.  Since many of the platforms have already 
been designed, the capabilities of platforms in the force protection composition address the 
functions prevent and withstand.  Keeping in line with these functions, the SEA-4 Team 
proposed the following categories as a framework for examining force protection capabilities: 
• Sensor architecture 
• Weapon architecture 
• Force composition 
Each of these categories addresses the functions of detect, defeat, and deploy.  The sensor 
category is related to the detect function.  Analytical modeling of radar, lidar, IR, and sonar 
helped to determine the best sensors to detect threats to the Sea Base.  Subsequently, radar, IR, 
and active sonar were the resulting sensors of choice.  The weapons category relates to the defeat 
function.  This study’s engagement analysis addressed the use of various weapons, including 
missiles, guns, torpedoes, and directed energy weapons.  These weapons were used to evaluate 
the effects of speed and range on force survivability.  Force composition is related to the deploy 
function by associating sensor and weapon systems with specific platforms.  Various platforms, 
including ships and unmanned vehicles (UAV, UUV, USV, and aerostat), were considered as the 
means by which to employ the selected sensors and weapons. 
The details from each of these three categories are described in greater detail in the 
following sections and will contribute to the final proposed force protection architecture. 
1. Sensor Architecture 
a. Sensor Type 
The type of sensors employed will describe the sensor architecture for the Sea Base.  The 
types of sensors analyzed in the Sensor Analysis were conventional microwave radar, lidar, IR, 
and sonar.  Because different sensors are better suited for certain applications over other sensors, 
the Sea Base should have the capability to use each type of sensor in a cooperative manner.  For 
example, radar could be used for search with IR acting as an additional cueing sensor, while a 
different radar could then provide target identification or tracking information. 
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b. Sensor Configuration 
Another means of describing the sensor architecture is by how the sensors are configured 
throughout the force.  The Search Analysis describes sensor configuration as either point or 
distributed.  In a point sensor architecture, search, track, and targeting data originate from 
individual platforms.  Ships in a Sea Base operating in close proximity to one another within a 
large operating area can be approximated to be a single point source.  However, due to the height 
of eye limitations addressed in the Sensor Analysis, the point sensor architecture alone cannot 
provide the necessary coverage for an extended search volume.  The Sensor Analysis also shows 
the advantage of increased radar detection ranges by achieving off-axis aspect angles with 
respect to the threat analyzed.  This is achieved in the distributed sensor architecture.  As 
described in the Search Analysis, a distributed sensor architecture can provide search, track, and 
targeting data from an aerostat, UAV, USV, or UUV.  With a distributed sensor architecture, the 
Sea Base could greatly extend its search volume.  Such an architecture would significantly 
benefit the Sea Base during Phase I (staging and build-up in the operating area) where the  
Sea Base could begin to collect locating data on threats, while remaining out of the enemy’s 
detection and weapons reach.  For example, the Sea Base could remain 200 nm from a hostile 
coast during the build-up phase, while a distributed sensor network provides targeting 
information to the force protection assets, thereby providing increased survivability.  As threats 
are mitigated, the Sea Base could move closer to the launching area in preparation for Phase II 
(assault), while remaining under the coverage of a distributed sensor system.  As the Sea Base 
approaches the launch area, the Search and Engagement Analyses demonstrated that distributed 
sensor architectures would improve the Sea Base’s reaction time against inbound threats.  
Because of the Sea Base’s similar offshore operating distances during Phase III (sustainment), 
the distributed sensor system again might provide additional reaction time against any expected 
short notice threats that may emerge during the sustainment of the forces ashore.  The 
cooperative radar network (CRANK) and MAV supporting studies provide additional 
information on the benefits of distributed sensor architectures. 
The Search Analysis determined that such an architecture, in order to achieve a 360o 
sensor coverage out to a range of 370 km, would have to employ an aerostat operating at an 
altitude of 50 km and 62 UAVs operating at 10 km in order to protect the Sea Base from 
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above/on the water threats.  The Search Analysis also determined that 163 USVs or UUVs 
operating on the water or at depths up to 300 m were required to counter on/below the water 
threats.  Resource limitations, however, may dictate the use of fewer unmanned vehicles.  It was 
decided, after analyzing some initial modeling results, that this study would accept the UAV 
requirement (62), but would lower the USV/V requirement to 23.  This lower number obviously 
will not provide the Sea Base sensor coverage out to 370 km, but will provide 360o coverage out 
to 50 km.  This study felt that was reasonable because the longest-range underwater threat came 
from TORP-1 at 37 km.  Figure V-59 and Figure V-60 demonstrate how overhead and side 
views of the distributed sensor architectures described above might look. 
c. Proposed Sensor Architecture 
From the Sensor and Search Analyses, the Sea Base should have the capability to deploy 
distributed sensor architectures (as seen in Figure V-26 and Figure V-27) that consist of radar, 
IR, and active sonar sensors.  Furthermore, these sensors should be cooperative in order to 
provide cueing or uninterrupted track data throughout the battle space.  This, in turn, will reduce 
uncertainty and lead to an increase in the force’s probability of survival.  The specifics of the 




Figure V-26 Distributed Sensor Configuration (UAV / Aerostat) 
Figure V-27 Distributed Sensor Configuration (USV / UUV) 
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2. Weapon Architecture 
a. Weapon Type 
Weapons defeat threats to the Sea Base.  The Engagement Analysis shows a weapon’s 
capability can be largely limited by a sensor’s range.  Since the proposed distributed sensor 
architecture provided an increased sensor range, the team decided to explore the effects of 
increasing the weapons’ speeds and ranges.  With this in mind, the SEA-4 Team categorized 
weapon types as either current or conceptual.  Current weapons were defined as weapons 
presently employed by ships, aircraft, or submarines and will be available in the 2016 timeframe.  
Though not analyzed in the Engagement Analysis, several weapons exist that may be present 
onboard Sea Base force protection assets.  The current weapons’ capabilities that may reside 
onboard assets of the Sea Base are summarized in Table V-47. 
WEAPON DESCRIPTION RANGE SPEED LAUNCH PLATFORM 
Surface-to-air missile (INT-1)* 80 nm Mach 2.5 CG, DDG 
Surface-to-air missile 30 nm Mach 3.6 TSSE LCS 
Surface-to-air missile 18 nm Mach 2.5 FFG 
Surface-to-air missile 6 nm Mach 3.6 ExWar 
Anti-ship cruise missile 67 nm 462 kts CG, DDG, FFG 
Helicopter launched anti-ship missile 25 nm Mach 1.2 SH-60 
Air-to-air missile 10 nm Mach 2 JSF 
Air-to-ground anti-armor missile 2 nm 640 kts AH-1Z 
Air-to-ground anti-armor missile 3 nm Mach 1.25 AH-1Z 
Air-to-air missile against aircraft (INT-3)* 29 nm Mach 4 UAV 
Land attack missile 600 nm 475 kts CG, DDG, SSN, SSGN 
Surface or air launched torpedo (T-1)* 4 nm 40 kts CG, DDG, FFG, UUV, USV
Submarine launched torpedo 25 nm 40+ kts SSN, SSGN 
Anti-submarine rocket:  travels through air; 
then water 
air:  6 nm 
submerged:  4 nm
air:  Mach 1 
submerged:  40 kts CG, DDG 
Naval gunfire against surface, air, and shore 
targets 13 nm 
2650 ft / sec 
rate: 20 rounds / min CG, DDG 
Naval gunfire against surface and air targets 9 nm 3363 ft / sec rate: 220 rounds / min TSSE LCS 
GPS-guided bombs 5 nm Launch platform dependent JSF 
*Current weapon modeled in Engagement Analysis. 
Table V-47 Current Weapon Characteristics 
Furthermore, the Engagement Analysis offers some conceptual weapons that are 
improved from current weapons by range and speed and focuses on conceptual weapons that 
provide an intercept capability against missiles, aircraft, or submarines.  Conceptual weapons 
that may replace or augment current weapons are listed in Table V-48. 
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WEAPON DESCRIPTION RANGE SPEED LAUNCH PLATFORM 
Surface-to-air missile (INT-2)* 200 nm Mach 5 CG, DDG 
Air-to-air missile against aircraft and missiles (INT-4)* 50 nm Mach 6 UAV 
Surface or air launched torpedo (T-2)* 6 nm 50 kts CG, DDG, FFG, UUV, USV
Naval gunfire against surface, air, and shore targets 63 nm 2650 ft / sec 
rate:  10 rounds / min
CG, DDG 
Free-Electron Laser (FEL)* 5 nm light speed CG, DDG 
Free-Electron Laser (-) 2.5 nm light speed TSSE LCS 
*Conceptual weapon modeled in Engagement Analysis. 
Table V-48 Conceptual Weapon Characteristics 
b. Weapon Configuration 
Much like the sensor architecture, weapons can be analyzed as part of a point or a 
distributed weapon system.  In a point weapon system, weapons are launched from individual 
platforms such as ships or aircraft located near the defined force center as defined in the 
Engagement Analysis (see Figure V-10).  In a distributed weapon system, weapons are launched 
from a fixed or defined location within the area of concern as defined in the  
Engagement Analysis (see Figure V-11).  This study assumes that distributed weapons are 
employed from the same unmanned vehicles utilized in the distributed sensor architecture.  
Weapons listed with unmanned vehicles as the launch platforms in Table V-47 and Table V-48 
are considered distributed weapons. 
c. Proposed Weapon Architecture 
In line with the proposed sensor architecture, this study proposes that the Sea Base have 
the capability to deploy distributed weapons as seen in Figure V-28, Figure V-29, Figure V-30, 
and Figure V-31.  When launched from the UAVs in the distributed sensor architecture, the 
distributed weapon system acts as the first line of defense for the Sea Base.  In addition to the 
distributed weapon capability, Sea Base platforms must also retain their point weapons 
capability.  Furthermore, with the expanded sensor coverage of a distributed network, the  
Sea Base should capitalize on the speed and range advantages of conceptual weapons.  As 
concluded in the Engagement Analysis, conceptual weapons in the distributed sensor architecture 
provide more engagement opportunities, thereby increasing the probability of kill against threats. 
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Figure V-28 Distributed / Current Weapon Configuration (UAV) 
Figure V-29 Distributed / Conceptual Weapon Configuration (UAV) 
Distributed / Current Weapon 
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Note: Images not to scale
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Figure V-30 Distributed / Current Weapon Configuration (UUV / USV) 
Figure V-31 Distributed / Conceptual Weapon Configuration (UUV / USV) 
Distributed / Current Weapon 
Configuration
(UUV / USV)
Note: Images not to scale
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3. Force Composition 
This study defines force composition as the number and type of assets in the Sea Base.  
The following supporting studies analysis assisted with determining the two force composition 
courses of action (COA).  The SEI-3 supporting operation analysis portion of the  
Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project proposed an escort force of three CGs, three DDGs, 
and three FFGs.  The LCS concept of operations for protecting the Sea Base developed by the 
TSSE LCS Team is comprised of 12 LCSs operating with one CG and one DDG.  The OR 
study’s analytical model recommended 10-13 defenders to provide 360° coverage for the HVUs.  
Through these supporting studies, the SEA-4 Team felt two force compositions with similar 
capabilities could be designed.  The two COAs proposed are:  COA A⎯a force based on cruisers 
and destroyers (CRUDES); and COA B⎯a force based on LCSs.  The total numbers of 
platforms from each COA would be analogous to the supporting study conclusions. 
In addition to surface ships, the team felt that a submarine should be present in each COA 
to provide the capability to conduct undersea warfare (USW) missions, strike missions, or 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.  The supporting study on SSGN 
contributions illustrates how the SSGN provides a means of reducing enemy lethality and 
contributes to an increased survivability for ExWar assets.  Since COA B has a reduced strike 
capability when compared to COA A, the SEA-4 Team decided to add the SSN to COA A and 
an SSGN to COA B. 
Along with the added surface and subsurface force protection assets, the ExWar ships 
have organic aircraft with force protection capabilities.  ExWar ships are designed to carry  
AH-1Zs and JSFs.  These aircraft are able to play a role in protecting transport areas by escorting 
air and surface transport assets and by patrolling landing zones.  Furthermore, as mentioned in 
Table V-47, the ExWar ships will have surface-to-air missiles to defend against anti-ship 
missiles and enemy aircraft.  Table V-49 summarizes the characteristics of the conceptual ExWar 




Length 1000 ft 
Beam 150 ft 
Displacement 70,000 ltons 
Speed 30+ kts 
Aircraft 6 HLACs, 14 MV-22s, 4 AH-1Zs, 6 JSFs, 4 UH-1s 
Surface Craft 2 LCU(Rs), 3 HLCACs, 18 AAAVs 
Table V-49 ExWar Ship Characteristics 
Both of the COAs include six ExWar ships.  The following will delineate the specific 
force protection assets of each COA. 
a. Course of Action A (COA A) 
The force protection assets for COA A include three CGs, three DDGs, three FFGs, and 
one SSN.  Figure V-32 graphically represents COA A.  Table V-50 summarizes the 
characteristics of each platform. 





Length 570 ft 
Beam 55 ft 
Displacement 9,600 ltons
Speed 30+ kts 
Aircraft 2 SH-60s 
DESTROYER (DDG) 
Length 510 ft 
Beam 60 ft 
Displacement 9,200 ltons
Speed 30+ kts 
Aircraft 2 SH-60s 
FRIGATE (FFG) 
Length 450 ft 
Beam 45 ft 
Displacement 4,100 ltons
Speed 29+ kts 
Aircraft 2 SH-60s 
ATTACK SUBMARINE (SSN) 
Length 360 ft 
Beam 30 ft 
Displacement (submerged) 6,900 ltons
Speed 20+ kts 
Table V-50 COA A Force Protection Asset Characteristics 
b. Course of Action B (COA B) 
The force protection assets for COA B include one CG, one DDG, 12 LCS, and one 
SSGN.  Figure V-33 graphically represents COA B.  Table V-51 summarizes the assets for each 
platform. 





Length 570 ft 
Beam 55 ft 
Displacement 9,600 ltons 
Speed 30+ kts 
Aircraft 2 SH-60s 
DESTROYER (DDG) 
Length 510 ft 
Beam 60 ft 
Displacement 9,200 ltons 
Speed 30+ kts 
Aircraft 2 SH-60s 
TSSE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) 
Length 400 ft 
Beam 98 ft 
Displacement 1,500 ltons 
Speed 45+ kts 
Aircraft 2 SH-60s 
GUIDED MISSILE SUBMARINE (SSGN) 
Length 560 ft 
Beam 40 ft 
Displacement (submerged) 18,750 ltons 
Speed 20+ kts 
Table V-51 COA B Force Protection Asset Characteristics 
4. Conclusion — Proposed Force Protection Architecture 
The product of the Design Chapter is a recommendation for a proposed force protection 
architecture.  The SEA-4 Team proposes the Sea Base should employ a distributed sensor and 
weapon system.  The Sea Base should take advantage of the increased sensor coverage offered 
by a distributed sensor network and utilize both point and distributed conceptual weapons in 
order to maximize total enemy engagements and thus increase the probability of kill against the 
enemy’s threats.  Furthermore, the force composition should include the force protection 
platforms defined in COA A or COA B. 
The next step is to test these proposed architectures and force compositions in order to 
determine which will possess a more robust force protection capability.  Modeling and analysis 















1. Modeling Tools 
Understanding the complex nature of force protection of the Sea Base required the use of 
modeling and simulation tools.  The first step in determining which modeling tools to use for the 
study was to investigate and compare various modeling and simulation tools available.  
Modeling and simulation tools initially assessed included:  Joint Army Navy Uniform Simulation 
(JANUS), Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS), Naval Simulation System (NSS),  
Enhanced ISSAC (Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat) Neural Simulation Toolkit 
(EINSTein), EXTEND, and Microsoft Excel. 
a. JANUS 
“JANUS is an interactive, multi-sided, closed, stochastic, ground combat simulation 
featuring precise high-resolution graphics.  The simulation provides sufficient resolution to 
model individual fighting systems for soldiers and can realistically model up to brigade-size 
maneuver forces.”  (U.S. Army Modeling and Simulation Office, 2001) 
b. JTLS 
“JTLS is an interactive, computer-assisted simulation that models multi-sided air, ground, 
and naval combat.  The forces simulated in the model are given Logistics, Special Operations 
Forces (SOF), and Intelligence capabilities.  JTLS was originally designed as an analysis tool for 
use in development of joint and combined (coalition) operation plans, but is frequently used as a 
training support model.  Its greatest use has been as an exercise driver for high-level military 
staff training, such as the CINC and JTF Commanders’ training provided by the  
Joint Warfighting Center.  Using JTLS substantially reduces the cost of such training exercises.”  




“The Naval Simulation System (NSS) is an object-oriented Monte Carlo modeling and 
simulation (M&S) tool under development by Space and naval Warfare Systems Command 
Program Manager, Warfare-131 and Metron, Inc. for Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
Command and Control (C2) Systems Division (N62).  NSS is a multi-warfare mission area tool 
designed to support operational commanders in developing and analyzing operational courses of 
action at the group / force level.  Its capacity to replicate Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) entities and organizations 
robustly makes it unique among M&S tools.”  (Metron, Inc., 2000) 
d. EINSTein 
EINSTein is a beta-version, agent-based simulation where entities are given “attributes” 
to describe mission, capabilities, and aggressiveness.  Agents represent individual combat units 
from troops to aircraft to capital ships.  Entities, such as ships, are free to move, act, engage, and 
disengage opposing forces according to these attributes.  Agents move using a stochastic  
time-step simulation.  EINSTein was originally designed to model small unit ground combat, but 
is now used as an artificial-life model to explore self-organized emergence in land combat. 
e. EXTEND 
EXTEND is a process-based, discrete-event, modeling and simulation tool that uses 
components, or blocks, and interconnections to model complex processes.  Creating block 
diagrams, where each block describes a part of a process, allows users to use a series of simple 
block definitions to describe complex processes. 
f. Microsoft Excel 
Microsoft Excel is a powerful spreadsheet that allows for simple calculation, but also can 
be applied as a simulation tool.  Though it does not provide the level of detail that most 
simulation specific applications afford, it can be used to build simple simulations that may 
provide useful insight to complex problems.  This insight can be translated into other, more 
robust, modeling and simulation applications. 
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2. Model Selection 
All of the systems were compared in terms of ease of use (which directly relates to risks 
relating to time), analysis capability, database of platforms, weapons, and sensors, applicability 
to amphibious force states, and technical support availability.  Figure VI-1 depicts the initial 
assessment of the modeling tools.  The colors red, yellow, and green represent high, medium, 
and low threat, respectively. 
Figure VI-1 Assessment of Modeling and Simulation Tools 
After assessing the options, two of the six choices were eliminated.  JANUS was 
eliminated since it focused on land combat.  JTLS was eliminated due to its lack of robust 
analysis capability, excessive set up time, and little available technical support.  JTLS is not 
capable of conducting numerous runs autonomously.  This greatly hinders its analysis capability, 
since the results of a wargame are only taken from a single run.  In terms of ease of use, the 
SEA-4 Team has had no formal training in the system and would require funding for contractor 
support.  Although funding contractor support would have been possible, running the scenario 
requires another large support group.  Since JTLS is primarily a staff-training tool, extra players 
would be required to play numerous roles for a complex scenario. 
The team decided to include NSS, EINSTein, EXTEND, and Microsoft Excel as part of 














include platforms, weapons, and sensors, the SEA-4 Team was familiar with the systems from 
use in various courses required for degree completion.  Furthermore, with the support of  
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) staff, the team felt they could develop appropriate aggregate 
and high-resolution models with systems that would not require contracting costs. 
The team then decided that models developed with EINSTein, EXTEND, and  
Microsoft Excel would require validation.  In order to validate the student-developed models, the 
team selected NSS as an additional modeling tool.  Although the team is not proficient in using 
NSS, funding and contractor support was available for the study.  Findings from various Excel 
models and the threat document provided inputs to NSS.  The results and insights gained from 
EXTEND and Microsoft Excel models could then be compared to results from NSS as a means 
of validation. 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Design of Experiments 
In order to adequately determine the relative performance of the proposed architectures 
developed by the team, a systematic design of experiments was developed to focus the model 
runs. 
The primary characteristics (variables) of the proposed architectures are force 
composition, sensor and weapons architecture, and weapon types.  Using the notion of a  
2n factorial design, two levels of each characteristic were developed.  The force composition 
levels are course of action (COA) A and B.  The sensor and weapons architecture are point and 
distributed.  Weapon types are current and conceptual weapons.  Figure VI-2 defines the various 
alternate force architectures that were tested in the modeling runs. 
It was determined that the previously defined Phase II (amphibious assault) would be the 
most challenging scenario for our system, and therefore would be the basis for our modeling 
runs.  Furthermore, the team determined that the first 24 hours of Phase II would present the 
most threats to the system. 
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Figure VI-2 Design of Experiments 
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
From the functional analysis, survivability was determined to be the key function in force 
protection of the Sea Base.  Therefore, the primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) of protecting 
the Sea Base was determined to be survivability of the Sea Base and its transport assets.  There 
are three primary MOEs that the team used to evaluate the ability of the alternative force 
architectures to protect the Sea Base.  These MOEs are as follows: 
• Number of ExWar Ships Surviving/Number of ExWar Ships at the Beginning 
• Number of Transport Aircraft Surviving/Number of Transport Aircraft at the 
Beginning 
• Number of Transport Surface Craft Surviving/Number of Transport Surface Craft 
at the Beginning 
These MOEs ultimately helped shape the flow of the models, and ensured that the team 



























As a method to determine which of the competing architectures was preferred, a detailed 
process simulation model was developed using EXTEND.  The EXTEND model provided a 
macro-view of sensor architecture-threat interactions.  The model’s overarching goal was to 
represent the formation level interactions between the threats, sensors, weapons, and platforms of 
the proposed architectures.  Although it would have been possible with EXTEND to model every 
asset of the force as an individual asset, it was determined that the formation level model would 
provide the team with the necessary outputs to determine the driving factors of a force protection 
system. 
2. Development 
After the threats to the Sea Base were determined, the team started looking at the ways 
those threats would affect expeditionary warfare operations.  It became immediately obvious that 
a model representing the threats would need to be built.  The basic flow on the model was first 
laid out on paper to ensure the modeling effort would proceed in the correct direction.   
Figure VI-3 represents the top-level flow of the model. 
Several assumptions drove the flow of the model.  Because the model represents the  
Sea Base at the formation level, threats were assumed to arrive along a common, but unspecified, 
threat axis.  A sensor and weapon were assumed to be along this axis as well.  Threats must be 
detected in order for the system to defeat them through hard or soft kill means.  If the threat is 
not detected, then only point defense systems and the threat own inaccuracy and reliability can 
prevent it from hitting a friendly platform.  Because of the process flow nature of the EXTEND 
model, there must be a break point at which the detection sensors stop attempting to detect a 
threat.  The assumption used is that the sensors will continue to search for a threat unit the threat 
is inside the minimum engage range of the force protection weapons. 
In order to scope the modeling effort, the team determined the most significant threats 
and platforms from the threat analysis to be represented.  All anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) 
and surface-to-air missile (SAM) types from the threat analysis were included in the model.  
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TORP-1 and DW-1 were modeled as the representative type of torpedo (TORP) and  
dumb weapon (DW), respectively.  ACFT-2, SB-3, and SUB-1 were modeled as the 
representative type of aircraft (ACFT), small boat (SB), and DW, respectively.  The functionality 
to incorporate all platforms and weapons is resident in the model.  Although the capability to 
generate mines exists in the model, it was determined that EXTEND was not the best tool to 
model the mine threat. 
Figure VI-3 Top-level Overview of the Threat Model 
From the top-level overview of the model, a rudimentary Excel model, depicted in  
Figure VI-4, was developed to determine if the model could be completed at the lowest level of 
detail possible.  Although this model was functionally correct, it did not provide the level of 


































































































































Figure VI-4 Basic Excel Threat Model 
In order to accurately represent the sensors and weapons, the team decided to build a 
detailed process model using EXTEND.  Figure VI-5 shows the top layer of the threat model. 
PDF CDF # PDF CDF #
0 Yes 0 Hit
80 0.8 0.8 No Yes 80 0.8 0.8 Miss Hit
0.2 1.0 0.2 1
PDF CDF # PDF CDF #
0 Kill 0 Kill
80 0.8 0.8 No Kill Kill 80 0.8 0.8 Damage Damage
0.2 1 0.2 1
PDF CDF # PDF CDF #
0 Soft Kill 0 1
80 0.8 0.8 No Soft Kill Soft Kill 0.25 0.25 2
0.2 1 0.25 0.5 3 3
0.25 0.75 4
0.25 1
Option 1 Detect Engage Soft Kill Hit Ship Kill Ship
No 0 0 Hit Kill
Option 2 Threat Detect Engage Soft Kill Hit Ship Kill Ship
2
 Threat 1 FALSE 0 0 0 0
D Threat 2 Yes No Kill Soft Kill 0 0
 Threat 3 FALSE 0 0 0 0
 Threat 4 FALSE 0 0 0 0
Threat Generator
Probability of Ship Hit
Probability of Ship Kill
Probability of Threat Detection
Probability of Threat Kill
Probability of Threat Soft Kill
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Figure VI-5 EXTEND Model Top Layer 
The EXTEND model is composed of four primary blocks:  threat generator, above the 
water, below the water, and outputs.  Each of these blocks will be discussed in detail, and 
specific inputs and values can be found in Appendix B of this study. 
a. Threat Generator 
The threat generator is responsible for generating enemy platforms and weapons at a 
given rate and number.  The threats were generated based on a poisson process with independent 
interarrival times.  Each platform has attributes that are used throughout the model.  These 
attributes include speed, launch range, altitude, raid size, and maximum weapon range.  The 
threats have similar attributes, including speed, launch range, altitude, raid size, and intended 
target.  These values were determined from the threat analysis.  Figure VI-6 is an expanded view 
of the threat generator block. 
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Figure VI-6 Threat Generator 
The threat generator shows direct linkage of the enemy platforms to weapons.  Where 
applicable platforms must be generated and survive the force protection architecture in order for 
it to subsequently fire its associated weapon.  An example would be an aircraft firing an anti-ship 
cruise missile. 
b. Above the Water 
Platforms and weapons that are a threat to the Sea Base above the water leave the threat 
generator and go to the above the water block.  These threats would be ACFT, SBs, ASCMs, 
SAMs, and DWs. 
The above the water block is further divided into four other blocks:  radar detection,  
infrared (IR) detection, defeat, and withstand.  From the threat generator, threats were routed to 
the appropriate sensor.  Figure VI-7 is an expanded view of the above the water block. 
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Figure VI-7 Above the Water 
(1) Radar Detection 
The radar detection block is a detailed process model of the point and distributed radar 
sensor architectures proposed by the team.  Probability of detection was calculated using the first 
principle equations used in the search analysis.  These equations were applied stochastically in 
the model to determine probability of detection based on search time.  Aircraft, small boats, and 
anti-ship cruise missiles are routed to this block.  For flexibility, the block can be reconfigured to 
represent any of the radar architectures proposed by the team. 
If detected, the threat continues through the model to the defeat block.  If it reaches the 
minimum engagement range of the force protection weapons, it continues to the withstand block.  
If it reaches its maximum weapons range, it returns to the threat generator where it triggers an 
associated weapon if applicable.  If a threat weapon is not detected, it is routed to the withstand 
block. 
(2) IR detection 
The IR detection block is a detailed process model of the point and distributed IR sensor 
architectures proposed by the team.  Probability of detection was calculated using the first 
principle equations used in the search analysis.  These equations were applied stochastically in 
the model to determine probability of detection based on search time.  The IR detection block is 
specifically designed to detect SAMs and DWs.  From the search analysis, it was concluded that 
IR would be the best detection sensor for these threats, and when Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
(UAV)-based, as in the distributed architecture, it is also the only sensor in close proximity to the 
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threat.  SAMs and DWs are routed to this block.  For flexibility, the block can be reconfigured to 
represent any of the IR sensor architectures proposed by the team. 
Because there are no current or conceptual weapons that are capable of hard killing 
SAMs and DWs in flight, the architecture does not attempt to hard kill SAMs or DWs.  Whether 
or not a SAM or DW is soft killed or a SAM or DW mission kills a friendly platform is 
determined in this block rather than the defeat and withstand blocks.  The result of this 
interaction is passed to the output block. 
(3) Defeat 
The defeat block is a detailed process model of the point and distributed weapon 
architectures with current or conceptual weapons proposed by the team.  If the radar block 
detects a threat, the defeat block then models the process of the friendly weapon’s chance to 
defeat the threats through hard kill and soft kill methods.  For flexibility, the block can be 
reconfigured to represent any of the weapon architectures proposed by the team. 
Threats that have been killed by the defeat block are routed to the outputs block.  Threats 
that were not killed are routed to the withstand block. 
(4) Withstand 
The withstand block is a detailed process model of the threat’s probability of hit, and 
subsequently, the probability of mission killing given hit of the friendly platforms.  Probability of 
mission kill given a hit was determined by gross level ship structure analysis assuming a uniform 
hit distribution across the hull.  A point defense system is modeled where appropriate to the 
platform.  Results of the interaction between the threats and friendly platforms are routed to the 
outputs block. 
c. Below the Water 
Platforms and weapons that are a threat to the Sea Base below the water, leave the threat 
generator and go to the below the water block.  These threats would be submarines (SUBs), 
TORPs, and mines. 
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The below the water block is further divided into three other blocks:  sonar detection, 
defeat, and withstand.  From the threat generator, threats were routed to the sonar detection 
block.  Figure VI-8 is an expanded view of the below the water block. 
Figure VI-8 Below the Water 
(1) Sonar Detection 
The sonar detection block is a detailed process model of the point and distributed sonar 
sensor architectures proposed by the team.  SUBs and TORPs are routed to this block.  For 
flexibility, the block can be reconfigured to represent any of the sonar architectures proposed by 
the team. 
If detected, the threat continues through the model to the defeat block.  If it reaches the 
minimum engagement range of the force protection weapons, it continues to the withstand block.  
If it reaches its maximum weapons range, it returns to the threat generator where it triggers an 
associated weapon if applicable.  If a threat weapon is not detected, it is routed to the withstand 
block. 
(2) Defeat 
The defeat block is a detailed process model of the point and distributed weapon 
architectures proposed by the team.  If the sonar block has detected a threat, the defeat block now 
models the process of the friendly weapon’s chance to defeat the threats through hard kill and 
soft kill methods.  For flexibility, the block can be reconfigured to represent any of the weapon 
architectures proposed by the team. 
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Threats that have been killed by the defeat block are routed to the outputs block.  Threats 
that were not killed are routed to the withstand block. 
(3) Withstand 
The withstand block is a detailed process model of the threats chance of hitting, and 
subsequently, mission killing the friendly platforms.  Results of the interaction between the 
threats and friendly platforms are routed to the outputs block. 
d. Outputs 
The outputs block accumulates the data required to evaluate the alternate force 
architectures.  It accumulates the data from both the above the water and the below the water 
blocks. 
The outputs compiled are the number of each type of friendly platforms mission killed 
and the number of mission kills attributed to each type of threat weapon.  Figure VI-9 is an 
expanded view of the outputs block. 
Figure VI-9 Outputs 
3. Results 
The model was run 100 times for the individual alternate force architectures developed in 
the design of experiments.  The results were then compiled and analyzed to determine if there 
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was a statistically significant difference between the different architectures.  Table VI-1 contains 
the average number of mission capable assets, standard deviation, and upper and lower 95% 
confidence intervals for the various alternate force architectures.  Figure VI-10 through  
Figure VI-15 are graphical representations of Table VI-1. 
Figure VI-16 represents the percentage of assets mission capable for the various alternate 
force architectures. 
Figure VI-17 represents the comparison of the torpedo and ASCM threat to the ships of 
the Sea Base. 
Table VI-1 Results of EXTEND Modeling Runs 












Upper 95% CI 3.57 9.46 16.59 107.10 33.12 81.01
Lower 95% CI 2.99 8.78 15.97 106.54 32.52 80.23
Average Mission 
Capable 3.28 9.12 16.28 106.82 32.82 80.62
Upper 95% CI 3.63 9.46 16.50 107.36 32.77 81.07
Lower 95% CI 3.09 8.72 15.90 106.94 32.05 80.47
Average Mission 
Capable 3.36 9.09 16.20 107.15 32.41 80.77
Upper 95% CI 5.88 11.99 18.01 108.00 36.01 84.00
Lower 95% CI 5.69 11.91 17.97 107.92 35.95 83.92
Average Mission 
Capable 5.78 11.95 17.99 107.96 35.98 83.96
Upper 95% CI 5.85 11.85 17.91 107.93 35.97 83.95
Lower 95% CI 5.65 11.65 17.77 107.77 35.86 83.83
Average Mission 
Capable 5.75 11.75 17.84 107.85 35.91 83.89
Upper 95% CI 3.41 9.12 16.44 107.28 32.95 80.92
Lower 95% CI 2.87 8.38 15.78 106.92 32.25 80.18
Average Mission 
Capable 3.14 8.75 16.11 107.10 32.60 80.55
Upper 95% CI 3.30 9.34 16.49 107.44 33.14 80.66
Lower 95% CI 2.72 8.56 15.93 107.08 32.42 79.98
Average Mission 
Capable 3.01 8.95 16.21 107.26 32.78 80.32
Upper 95% CI 5.88 12.00 17.99 108.01 36.01 83.98
Lower 95% CI 5.67 11.93 17.89 107.95 35.95 83.88
Average Mission 
Capable 5.78 11.97 17.94 107.98 35.98 83.93
Upper 95% CI 5.86 11.93 18.00 108.01 35.97 84.00
Lower 95% CI 5.66 11.79 17.92 107.95 35.85 83.94
Average Mission 














Figure VI-10 Number of Mission-Capable ExWar 
Figure VI-11 Number of Mission-Capable LCU(Rs) 









































Figure VI-12 Number of Mission-Capable HLCACs 
Figure VI-13 Number of Mission-Capable AAAVs 




































Figure VI-14 Number of Mission-Capable LRHLACs 
Figure VI-15 Number of Mission-Capable MV-22s 








































Figure VI-16 Comparison of Alternate Force Architectures 
Figure VI-17 Comparison of Torpedo and ASCM Threats 





































































Mission Kills due to TORPs
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From the results of the EXTEND model represented in the previous figures, there is a 
significant difference between the point and distributed architectures.  There is not a significant 
difference between the CRUDES- or the LCS-based protection force, nor the current weapon or 
the conceptual weapon architectures. 
The team has therefore concluded that in the EXTEND model, distributed sensors are the 
factor that most affects survivability of the Sea Base.  Also, the LCS-based protection force 
provides a level of force protection to the Sea Base equivalent to that of the cruiser- and 
destroyer-based protection force.  Furthermore, the longer range and speed of the conceptual 
weapons over that of the current weapons provides no improvement to the survivability of the 
Sea Base.  In order to gain benefits from the increase in range and speed, the sensor detection 
range must be improved.  This is exactly what the distributed sensors do for the system. 
With regard to threats to the Sea Base, the submarines and torpedoes are by far the most 
significant threat.  Figure VI-17 shows that torpedoes make up roughly 10% of the total threat 
(ASCMs and TORPs) to the Sea Base ships, but account for over 95% of the mission kills.  
Future requirements for force protection of the Sea Base should place high emphasis on  
Undersea Warfare (USW), and the need for a layered defense against torpedoes and other USW 
threats is a must. 
The Systems Engineering and Analysis curriculum has used EXTEND with great success 
in recent integration projects, as well as Joint Campaign Analysis courses.  EXTEND is an 
extremely easy modeling and simulation tool to learn.  It lends itself to the modeling of very 
complex processes.  In most cases it is very easy to troubleshoot, and visually represents the 
process being modeled.  Although it may not be the right tool for every Systems Engineering 
problem, the team highly recommends EXTEND whenever it is applicable. 
D. NAVAL SIMULATION SYSTEM (NSS) 
1. Overview 
NSS provided a means of analyzing the characteristics of the proposed force protection 
architectures.  The ability of NSS to support the generic threats identified in this study and the 
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various architectures proposed by the study made NSS a prime candidate for a modeling system.  
Furthermore, the team felt NSS’s ability to set-up multiple replications of a single scenario and 
to collect data for the defined MOEs proved to be useful for this study.  NSS allowed the team to 
investigate the proposed architectures as a system-of-systems by simulating the interactions 
between various entities such as ships, aircraft, landing craft, and weapons.  This study intended 
to use NSS as a means to compare results of EXTEND and Excel models. 
2. Development 
The SEA NSS model was built in coordination with a representative from the  
Roland’s and Associates Corporation.  The model was developed incrementally with the 
development of a baseline scenario and database that was verified by the SEA Team.  The  
SEA Team provided inputs for the scenario, while the representative from Roland’s and 
Associates entered the data into NSS.  As the baseline was built, the SEA Team concurrently 
verified the characteristics and employment of the platforms and weapon systems residing in the 
scenario.  For example, the team had to verify the detection and capability of all of the platforms 
and weapons.  Such verification ensured weapons did not perform outside of their intended 
capability, such as an anti-ship missile engaging an aircraft.  Once the baseline passed the 
expectations of the team, the baseline was adapted to create separate databases for each of the 
alternate force architectures. 
Various inputs relating to type of asset, asset employment, and time were needed in order 
for NSS to perform a simulation.  Assets included ships, aircraft, submarines, and land-based 
weapon systems.  In terms of asset employment, each of the assets was assigned a region or track 
and a tactic that defined how the asset would act in the case of detecting another asset.  Lastly, a 
length of time had to be determined for the simulation.  With these parameters, NSS simulated 
engagements between opposing forces by moving the assets in the prescribed manner for the 
defined length of time.  As each asset moved according to its defined employment, NSS 
monitored sensor detection events and created weapon fires events based on defined tactics.  
NSS captured statistics from the simulation based on selected MOEs.  Although MOEs are not 
required to be set in order to conduct a simulation of the scenario, they are required if the user 
intends to perform a statistical study. 
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The NSS model was developed to support the design of experiments previously 
discussed.  The design of experiments included three factors: force composition, sensor and 
weapon architecture, and weapon type.  These three factors were organized into eight alternate 
force architectures.  Alternate Force Architecture One acted as the baseline.  Subsequent force 
architectures were then adapted from the baseline.  The remainder of this section will discuss the 
various inputs needed to develop the model:  scenario, length of time, threats, force composition, 
sensor and weapon architecture, and weapon types. 
a. Scenario 
The NSS model utilized the scenario discussed in the Threat/Futures Analysis section of 
the Problem Definition study.  The conceptual Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-sized 
amphibious force has been tasked with expelling Chinese forces from the Philippine island of 
Palawan.  The NSS scenario was designed to model this study’s definition of Phase II of an 
amphibious operation⎯the amphibious assault.  As depicted in Figure VI-18, the amphibious 
force was placed in a sea echelon area 25 nm off the eastern coast of Palawan.  The sea echelon 
area acted as the operating area for the ExWar ships and launching area for the transport assets.  
Two objectives that would support follow-on forces were identified on Palawan.  Objective A 
was a seaport that could support large commercial vessels and ExWar logistic ships.  The other 



























As seen in Figure VI-18, landing areas for transport assets were identified for the NSS 
model.  Two littoral penetration sites (LPS) to the north and south of Objective A would support 
the landing of surface transport assets, such as Heavy Lift Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
(HLCAC), Landing Craft Utility (Replacement) (LCU(R)), and Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV).  Two landing zones (LZ) would support the air transport assets such as MV-22 
and the LRHLAC.  A detailed assault schedule and landing area diagram can be found in 
Appendix B. 
b. Length of Simulation 
A period of 24 hours was determined to be the length of time for the NSS simulation.  
The start of Phase II was recognized as the point at which the transport assets began their 
movement to the objective.  The end of Phase II occurs when the all of the needed landing force 
equipment, personnel, vehicles, and supplies for the main effort are on Palawan.  Then Phase III, 
sustainment of the operation begins.  In order to eliminate the ambiguities of defining the needed 
landing force equipment, personnel, vehicles, and supplies for this particular operation, the  
SEA-4 Team decided to model the first 24 hours of Phase II, as it represented the most 
threatening period of the Phase.  This study utilized the surge sortie rates for transport assets 
identified in last year’s Integrated Expeditionary Warfare study.  Furthermore, preliminary 
analysis found that the initial threat level identified reached a steady-state before the end of the 
24-hour period. 
c. Threats 
The NSS model utilized all of the threats identified in the Threat Analysis of this study.  
The majority of the threats to the Sea Base originated from Palawan.  Other threats, such as the 
larger small boats (SB-3) and larger submarines (SUB-1, SUB-2), were assumed to be operating 
in the Sulu Sea.  Threats employment varied from single weapon and platform attacks to large 
swarms of patrol boats and large ASCM raids.  A detailed listing of the threats and their 
employment can be found in Appendix B. 
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d. Force Composition 
The two COAs identified in the Proposed Architecture section of this study were 
represented on an individual entity level.  In other words, NSS has the capability to simulate each 
individual platform in the NSS model.  Figure VI-19 depicts COA A, with three CGs, three 
DDGs, three FFGs, one SSN, and six ExWar ships in vicinity of the sea echelon area. 
Figure VI-19 Force Composition (COA A):  CRUDES-based 
In COA A, a DDG was placed in the center of the ExWar ship formation to defend 
against any threats that bypass outer defenses.  A CG and two DDGs were placed along the high 
threat axis between the sea echelon area and Palawan.  A CG and FFG were each placed to the 
northeast and southwest of the Sea Echelon area, and a single FFG was placed on the southeast 
side of the sea echelon area.  An SSN was free to patrol the entire Sulu Sea area. 
In COA B (see Figure VI-20), 12 LCSs, one CG, one DDG, and one SSGN protect the 
ExWar ship formation.  A single CG was placed in the center of the force to protect against 





three groups of four LCSs were placed along the other sides of the sea echelon area.  A SSGN 




















Figure VI-20 Force Composition (COA B):  LCS-based 
In addition to ships, aircraft were modeled in NSS.  The CG, DDG, FFG, and LCS each 
had two embarked SH-60s available for undersea warfare and surface warfare roles.  
Furthermore, AH-1Zs and Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) embarked on the ExWar ships were 
included in the model.  Since the AH-1Z and JSF are considered landing force assets, the team 
decided to limit their role in the model to primarily interdicting land-based threats. 
e. Sensor and Weapon Architecture 
Both the point and distributed sensor and weapon architectures were modeled in NSS.  
For the point sensor and weapon architecture, the sensors and weapons originate from the 
platforms as depicted in the Force Composition section.  Modifications had to be made to the 
proposed distributed architecture discussed in the Search Analysis.  Due to the amphibious 
force’s close proximity to the objective, the radius of the UAV sensors in the distributed sensor 





of the Aerostat coverage, the UAVs radius was decreased to approximately 45 nm to provide 
coverage against threats originating from Palawan.  Keeping the UAV radius at 200 nm from the 
center of the force would have negated the usefulness of the UAV’s sensors and weapons.  The 
Aerostat coverage remained centered on the amphibious force with a radius of 200 nm.   




















Figure VI-21 Distributed Sensor and Weapon Architecture Modeled in NSS 
f. Weapon Types 
Both current and conceptual weapon types discussed in the proposed architectures were 
modeled as systems onboard the platforms in the NSS model.  Table VI-2 lists current weapons 










WEAPON DESCRIPTION RANGE SPEED LAUNCH PLATFORM
Surface-to-air missile 80 nm Mach 2.5 CG, DDG 
Surface-to-air missile 30 nm Mach 3.6 TSSE LCS 
Surface-to-air missile 18 nm Mach 2.5 FFG 
Surface-to-air missile 6 nm Mach 3.6 ExWar 
Anti-ship cruise missile 67 nm 462 kts CG, DDG, FFG 
Helicopter launched anti-ship missile 25 nm Mach 1.2 SH-60 
Air-to-air missile 10 nm Mach 2 JSF 
Air-to-ground anti-armor missile 2 nm 640 kts AH-1Z 
Air-to-ground anti-armor missile 3 nm Mach 1.25 AH-1Z 
Air-to-air missile against aircraft 
(Distributed weapon) 29 nm Mach 4 UAV 
Land attack missile 600 nm 475 kts CG, DDG, SSN, SSGN 
Surface- or air-launched torpedo 4 nm 40 kts CG, DDG, FFG 
Submarine-launched torpedo 25 nm 40+ kts SSN, SSGN 
Anti-submarine rocket.  Travels through air 
then water. 
air:  6 nm 
submerged:  4 nm
air:  Mach 1 
submerged:  40 kts CG, DDG 
Naval gunfire against surface, air, and shore 
targets 13 nm 
2650 ft / sec 
rate:  20 rounds/min CG, DDG 
Naval gunfire against surface and air targets 9 nm 3363 ft / sec rate:  220 rounds / min TSSE LCS 
GPS-guided bombs 5 nm Launch platform dependent JSF 
Table VI-2 Current Weapons 
Conceptual weapons replaced or augmented many of the current weapons.  The  
surface-to-air missiles onboard the ships were replaced with longer range weapons.  An 
improved naval gunfire system replaced the gun systems on the CG and DDG.  A free-electron 
laser was added to the CG, DDG, and LCS.  A summary of the conceptual weapons is listed in 
Table VI-3. 
WEAPON DESCRIPTION RANGE SPEED LAUNCH PLATFORM
Surface-to-air missile 200 nm Mach 5 CG, DDG, TSSE LCS 
Air-to-air missile against aircraft and missiles 
(Distributed weapon) 
50 nm Mach 6 UAV 
Surface- or air-launched torpedo 6 nm 50 kts CG, DDG, FFG 
Naval gunfire against surface, air, and shore targets 63 nm 2650 ft / sec 
rate:  10 rounds / min 
CG, DDG 
Free-Electron Laser 5 nm light speed CG, DDG 
Free-Electron Laser (-) 2.5 nm light speed TSSE LCS 
Table VI-3 Conceptual Weapons 
g. Phase I Excursion 
Due to the close proximity of the amphibious force to the objective in the NSS scenario, 
the SEA Team decided to conduct an excursion to compare the point and distributed sensor and 
weapon architectures with a threat originating from a distance greater than 200 nm from the 
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force.  The team decided that this geography was representative of Phase I, the staging and  
build-up of forces.  Since the excursion modeled Phase I, all of the transport assets remained 
onboard the ExWar ships. 
The team limited the threats in the excursion to long-range airborne threats to reduce the 
amount of noise in the model and, in turn, allow greater resolution to the effects of a distributed 
versus point architecture.  The threat included 800 ASCM-3s arriving in large raid sizes and  
50 ACFT-2.  A robust targeting capability for the enemy force was simulated using 10 UAVs.  
The UAVs were not capable of being targeted by the blue force, allowing the missiles and 
aircraft to receive targeting information throughout the excursion.  The relative positioning of the 
ships remained the same as in the alternate force architectures. 
Due to time limitations, the team used alternate force architectures five and seven for the 
excursion.  In order to provide more insight into the effectiveness of the Total Ship Systems 
Engineering (TSSE)-designed LCS, the team decided to use the LCS-based force composition 
with current weapon for both the point and distributed sensor and weapon architectures. 
Additionally, the team investigated the effects of enemy targeting.  Using the same 
numbers of missiles and aircraft in the excursion, the team decreased the number of UAVs 
providing targeting information to enemy missiles and aircraft from 10 to one.  The decreased 
number of UAVs represented the results of battle space preparation efforts to degrade the 
enemy’s ability to detect amphibious forces. 
3. Results 
a. Mission-Capable Assets 
All eight of the alternate force architectures developed in the design of experiments were 
run with 30 replications.  The results were then compiled and analyzed to determine if there were 
statistically significant differences between different architectures.  Table VI-4 contains the 
average number of mission-capable assets, standard deviations, and upper and lower 95% 




















1 Average Mission 
Capable 
5.86 11.18 17.14 106.04 33.25 80.96 
 Standard Deviation 0.36 1.31 1.27 3.62 2.44 2.44 
 Upper 95% CI 5.98 11.65 17.60 107.33 34.12 81.84 
 Lower 95% CI 5.73 10.71 16.69 104.74 32.38 80.09 
2 Average Mission 
Capable 
5.90 11.45 17.31 106.03 34.00 80.48 
 Standard Deviation 0.31 0.83 1.26 3.77 1.93 2.82 
 Upper 95% CI 6.01 11.74 17.76 107.38 34.69 81.49 
 Lower 95% CI 5.79 11.15 16.86 104.68 33.31 79.47 
3 Average Mission 
Capable 
6.00 11.46 16.96 105.14 34.97 81.51 
 Standard Deviation 0.00 1.07 1.50 4.10 1.03 2.49 
 Upper 95% CI 6.00 11.85 17.50 106.61 35.34 82.40 
 Lower 95% CI 6.00 11.08 16.43 103.68 34.60 80.62 
4 Average Mission 
Capable 
6.00 11.39 17.68 106.68 34.32 81.75 
 Standard Deviation 0.00 0.88 0.77 2.33 1.66 1.58 
 Upper 95% CI 6.00 11.71 17.95 107.51 34.91 82.31 
 Lower 95% CI 6.00 11.08 17.40 105.85 33.73 81.19 
5 Average Mission 
Capable 
6.00 11.54 17.11 106.39 33.54 81.04 
 Standard Deviation 0.00 0.84 1.66 2.82 1.91 2.65 
 Upper 95% CI 6.00 11.84 17.70 107.40 34.22 81.98 
 Lower 95% CI 6.00 11.24 16.51 105.38 32.85 80.09 
6 Average Mission 
Capable 
6.00 11.62 17.66 107.21 34.52 81.76 
 Standard Deviation 0.00 0.68 0.81 2.50 1.66 2.20 
 Upper 95% CI 6.00 11.86 17.95 108.10 35.11 82.55 
 Lower 95% CI 6.00 11.38 17.36 106.31 33.92 80.97 
7 Average Mission 
Capable 
5.93 11.50 17.64 106.04 33.18 80.82 
 Standard Deviation 0.26 0.92 0.73 3.66 1.56 2.80 
 Upper 95% CI 6.02 11.83 17.90 107.34 33.74 81.82 
 Lower 95% CI 5.83 11.17 17.38 104.73 32.62 79.82 
8 Average Mission 
Capable 
5.89 11.68 17.71 105.82 34.54 81.46 
 Standard Deviation 0.31 0.77 0.76 4.69 1.93 2.83 
 Upper 95% CI 6.01 11.95 17.99 107.50 35.23 82.48 
 Lower 95% CI 5.78 11.40 17.44 104.14 33.84 80.45 
Table VI-4 Average Number of ExWar Ships and Transport Assets Mission Capable 
Figure VI-22 is a graphical representation of data from Table VI-4. 
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Figure VI-22 Comparison of Alternate Force Architectures with Current Weapons for  
ExWar Ships and Transport Assets 
All architectures defend the Sea Base at 94% or better.  In the case of the ExWar ship, we 
would expect that the distributed architecture would perform better than the point architecture.  
Although the results are very close, in the case of the LCS-based COA, the point architecture 
resulted in a 100% survivability for the ExWar ships, while the distributed architecture resulted 
in a 98.81%.  The team hypothesized that the possible differences in the NSS scenario may be 
due to tactical considerations.  The LCS, by nature of their increased numbers and their relative 
closeness to land act as a distributed sensor, making it difficult to distinguish between the point 
and distributed architectures.  Furthermore, the distributed sensor has a slower scan rate than the 
point sensor, making the LCS more vulnerable to short notice threats when in the distributed 
architecture. 
In addition to analyzing the survivability of the ExWar ships and transport assets, NSS 
provided the capability to investigate the survivability of force protection assets.  Table VI-5 
contains the average number of mission capable force protection assets and statistics for the 
CRUDES-based force (COA A). 
 
Alternate Force Architectures: Average Percentage of 


















































Table VI-5 Average Number Force Protection Assets Mission Capable in COA A 
Figure VI-23 is a graphical representation of COA A ships and contains data from  
Table VI-5 for force protection ships and data from 0 for the ExWar ships.   
Figure VI-23 shows the percentage of mission-capable ships with both the point and distributed 
sensor and weapon architecture, along with both current and conceptual weapon types. 
CG       
(3)
DDG      
(3)
FFG      
(3)
JSF       
(36)
AH-1Z    
(24)
SSN       
(1)
Average Mission 
Capable 2.79 2.39 2.79 19.75 13.68 0.96
Standard Deviation 0.42 0.63 0.50 3.22 3.55 0.19
Upper 95% CI 2.94 2.62 2.96 20.90 14.95 1.03
Lower 95% CI 2.64 2.17 2.61 18.60 12.41 0.90
Average Mission 
Capable 2.79 2.90 2.76 22.41 14.00 0.86
Standard Deviation 0.41 0.31 0.44 4.91 2.99 0.35
Upper 95% CI 2.94 3.01 2.91 24.17 15.07 0.99
Lower 95% CI 2.65 2.79 2.60 20.66 12.93 0.74
Average Mission 
Capable 2.93 2.93 2.82 20.61 13.93 0.93
Standard Deviation 0.26 0.26 0.48 4.97 3.75 0.26
Upper 95% CI 3.02 3.02 2.99 22.39 15.27 1.02
Lower 95% CI 2.83 2.83 2.65 18.83 12.59 0.83
Average Mission 
Capable 2.93 3.00 2.82 21.29 15.64 0.82
Standard Deviation 0.26 0.00 0.39 4.80 2.98 0.39
Upper 95% CI 3.02 3.00 2.96 23.00 16.71 0.96












Figure VI-23 Comparison of COA A Ships Mission Capable 
Table VI-6 contains the average number of mission-capable force protection assets and 
statistics for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)-based force Course of Action (COA) B. 
Table VI-6 Average Number Force Protection Assets Mission Capable in COA B 











































CG DDG FFG ExWar
CG       
(1)
DDG      
(1)
LCS      
(12)
JSF       
(36)
AH-1Z    
(24)
SSGN     
(1)
Average Mission 
Capable 0.96 0.89 9.89 18.11 13.11 0.75
Standard Deviation 0.19 0.31 1.34 3.70 3.93 0.44
Upper 95% CI 1.03 1.01 10.37 19.43 14.51 0.91
Lower 95% CI 0.90 0.78 9.41 16.78 11.70 0.59
Average Mission 
Capable 0.93 1.00 10.07 19.28 15.90 0.93
Standard Deviation 0.26 0.00 1.49 4.15 2.65 0.26
Upper 95% CI 1.02 1.00 10.60 20.76 16.84 1.02
Lower 95% CI 0.84 1.00 9.54 17.79 14.95 0.84
Average Mission 
Capable 1.00 1.00 10.00 17.96 12.39 0.93
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 1.66 3.70 3.78 0.26
Upper 95% CI 1.00 1.00 10.59 19.29 13.75 1.02
Lower 95% CI 1.00 1.00 9.41 16.64 11.04 0.83
Average Mission 
Capable 1.00 1.00 10.04 20.68 15.43 0.86
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 1.40 4.50 2.81 0.36
Upper 95% CI 1.00 1.00 10.54 22.29 16.43 0.98
Lower 95% CI 1.00 1.00 9.53 19.07 14.42 0.73
7
8








Figure VI-24 is a graphical representation of COA B ships and contains data from  
Table VI-6 for force protection ships and data from Table VI-4 for the ExWar ships.   
Figure VI-24 shows the percentage of mission-capable ships with both the point and distributed 
sensor and weapon architecture, along with both current and conceptual weapon types. 
 
Figure VI-24 Comparison of COA B Ships Mission Capable 
b. Threat Drawdown 
The team explored other metrics to differentiate between point and distributed 
architectures.  One metric used was the rate by which the threats decreased.  The team 
hypothesized that the more rapidly the number of threats reached zero, the better the architecture.  
Table VI-7 shows the expected number of mission-capable SB-1s over a 24-hour period for the 
eight alternate force architectures.  Figure VI-25 shows a graphical representation of the 
drawdown for the SB-1 threat in the NSS scenario.  Similar graphs and tables for additional 
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Table VI-7 Expected Number of Mission-Capable SB-1s 
The highlighted values in Table Vi-7 indicate there are zero mission-capable SB-1s for 
that particular run.  Therefore, Table VI-7 shows that alternate force architecture 8 was the only 
architecture to totally eliminate SB-1. 
TIME (hrs) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000
1 15.9286 13.6897 10.8214 2.0357 24.7143 14.1034 18.3571 4.7500
2 11.2857 10.2759 9.4643 1.6429 20.5000 9.8621 14.3571 3.2500
3 9.6786 7.6207 8.2500 0.5357 16.5714 7.0000 11.3214 1.6429
4 8.4643 7.1035 6.8929 0.4643 14.0714 5.8966 6.3571 0.7857
5 8.2857 5.7586 6.5357 0.4643 11.9643 4.8621 4.4643 0.4643
6 8.1071 5.3103 5.9286 0.4643 10.0000 3.6207 2.6071 0.1071
7 7.7500 4.2759 5.4643 0.4643 7.9286 2.8276 1.6429 0.0714
8 7.6429 3.9310 5.0357 0.4643 6.8571 2.5172 1.3214 0.0714
9 7.3214 3.7931 4.3214 0.0714 5.6429 1.9310 0.9643 0.0357
10 7.2143 3.7931 4.0357 0.0714 5.0000 1.7586 0.7500 0.0357
11 7.0000 3.7931 3.5714 0.0714 4.4286 1.5172 0.5714 0.0357
12 6.5714 3.6897 3.0357 0.0714 3.7857 1.3448 0.5357 0.0357
13 6.4643 3.4483 2.8929 0.0714 3.5000 1.1379 0.5000 0.0357
14 6.1071 3.3103 2.5714 0.0714 3.3929 1.1379 0.4643 0.0357
15 6.0000 2.7586 2.2500 0.0357 3.0357 1.0690 0.3571 0.0357
16 5.8571 2.4138 1.9643 0.0357 2.8571 0.9655 0.3571 0.0000
17 5.6786 2.4138 1.5714 0.0357 2.6429 0.8966 0.2857 0.0000
18 5.5714 2.0690 1.4643 0.0357 2.2143 0.7586 0.2857 0.0000
19 5.4286 2.0690 1.1786 0.0357 2.1429 0.7241 0.2857 0.0000
20 5.3571 2.0690 0.8929 0.0357 2.0357 0.7241 0.2857 0.0000
21 5.3214 2.0690 0.8214 0.0357 1.8929 0.6207 0.2857 0.0000
22 5.2500 2.0690 0.6429 0.0357 1.7857 0.6207 0.2500 0.0000
23 5.2143 2.0690 0.5000 0.0357 1.7857 0.5862 0.2500 0.0000
24 5.1429 2.0690 0.4286 0.0357 1.6429 0.5862 0.2143 0.0000































Figure VI-25 Expected Number of Mission-Capable SB-1s 
As seen in Figure VI-25, the SB-1 threat is decreased the quickest in alternate force 
architectures 4 and 8. 
b. Interceptor Launches 
The metric of analyzing the expected number of threats over time produced no conclusive 
evidence differentiating point and distributed architectures.  The team considered the number of 
surface-to-air interceptor launches as an additional metric to distinguish between the point and 
distributed architectures.  The team believed that since the force was highly survivable among all 
alternate force architectures, the number of interceptor launches would reveal the effectiveness 
of the force protection assets in mitigating the threats.  Figure VI-26 shows the total number of 
interceptor launches for the amphibious force.  The total number of interceptor launches 
includes:  surface-to-air missiles launched from ships; air-to-air missiles launched from UAVs in 
the distributed architecture; and free-electron laser (FEL) shots. 
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Total Interceptor Launches     


























Figure VI-26 Total Number of Amphibious Force Interceptor Launches 
As seen in Figure VI-26, the distributed architecture utilized considerably less 
interceptors than the point architecture.  Further investigation into the number of interceptor 
launches for all of the ExWar ships reveals the same trends. 



























Figure VI-27 Number of Interceptors Launched by ExWar Ships 
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Figure VI-27 reveals that the ExWar ship launches considerably less interceptors in the 
distributed architecture. 
c. Phase I Excursion Results 
Table VI-8 contains the average number of mission capable ships, standard deviations, 
and upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for the missile raid excursion of alternate force 
architectures 5 and 7. 













Capable 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.90 
Standard deviation 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.47 
Upper 95% CI 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.43 
5 
Lower 95% CI 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.37 
Average Mission 
Capable 0.03 0.00 4.20 2.87 
Standard Deviation 0.18 0.00 2.19 1.33 
Upper 95% CI 0.10 0.00 4.98 3.34 
7 
Lower 95% CI -0.03 0.00 3.42 2.39 
Table VI-8 Mission-Capable Ships in Phase I Missile Raid Excursion 
Figure VI-28 is a graphical representation of data from Table VI-8. 
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Figure VI-28 Average Percentage of COA B Ships Mission Capable in the  
Phase I Excursion 
Figure VI-28 shows that the distributed architecture outperformed the point architecture 
when the threats originate outside the distributed architecture coverage.  For the LCS and  
ExWar ships, there is a significant statistical difference between the point and distributed 
architectures.  For the CG and DDG, there is no statistical difference because there were only 
one of each in the scenario and both of them become non-mission capable. 
Table VI-9 contains the average number of mission-capable ships, standard deviations, 
and upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for the excursion of alternate force architectures  
5 and 7 with a degraded red targeting capability.  As mentioned earlier, the threat level remained 
the same as in the missile raid excursion.  The only difference was the enemy’s degraded 
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Phase I: Missile Raid Excursion
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Table VI-9 Mission-Capable Ships in COA B With Degraded Enemy Targeting 
Figure VI-29 shows a comparison of ExWar ship survivability for both point and 
distributed architectures with both an enhanced and degraded enemy targeting capability. 
Figure VI-29 Comparison of ExWar Ship Survivability With Varied Enemy Targeting 












































Average Percentage of ExWar Ships Mission Capable 
Phase I:  Missile Raid Excursion - Varied Enemy Targeting 
(COA B With Current Weapons)
CG       
(1)
DDG      
(1)
LCS      
(12)
ExWar    
(6)
Average Mission 
Capable 0.00 0.07 0.31 2.55
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.26 1.04 1.57
Upper 95% CI 0.00 0.16 0.68 3.11
Lower 95% CI 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 1.99
Average Mission 
Capable 0.07 0.37 5.00 3.87
Standard Deviation 0.25 0.49 2.51 1.46
Upper 95% CI 0.16 0.54 5.90 4.39










a. Mission-Capable Assets 
There was no statistical difference among alternate force architectures for the 
survivability of the transport assets in the NSS scenario.  In other words, there was no statistical 
difference in survivability between force compositions, point or distributed sensor and weapon 
architectures, and current of conceptual weapons.  However, there were confounding results in 
the case of the ExWar ships.  In the case of the ExWar ship we would expect that the distributed 
architecture would perform better than the point architecture.  Although the results are very 
close, in the case of the LCS-based COA, the point architecture resulted in 100% survivability 
for the ExWar ships, while the distributed architecture resulted in a 98.81%.  Although this result 
may not be statistically significant, the team felt that the fact that one architecture had zero 
ExWar ship losses compared to another architecture with 0.07 ExWar ship losses was militarily 
significant.  The team hypothesized that the possible differences in the NSS scenario may be due 
to tactical considerations.  The LCS, by nature of their increased numbers and their relative 
closeness to land, act as a distributed sensor, making it difficult to distinguish between the point 
and distributed architectures.  Furthermore, the distributed sensor has a slower scan rate than the 
point sensor making the LCS more vulnerable to short notice threats when in the distributed 
architecture. 
Although there were trends reflecting an improvement in the distributed architecture with 
the survivability of the defending assets (CG, DDG, FFG, LCS), there was still no statistical 
difference.  However, in the case of the DDGs in COA A, there was a statistical difference 
between point and distributed architectures.  In the NSS scenario, two DDGs were placed 
between the threat and the defended ExWar ships.  Therefore, the results show that in the case of 
defending assets placed along the threat axis, the distributed architecture provides improved 
survivability. 
b. Threat Drawdown 
All of the data regarding threat drawdown can be found in Appendix B.  Trends in the 
data show that for the most part, the distributed architecture seems to facilitate a quicker 
drawdown of threats.  Additionally, investigation into the force composition reveal that the 
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CRUDES-based force structure seems to better handle subsurface threats, while the LCS-based 
force structure seems to better handle small boat threats.  This was possibly explained by the fact 
that the CRUDES ships in the scenario have more capable hull-mounted sonar than the LCS 
ships.  The LCS-based force has an increased number of ships and therefore has an increased 
number of SH-60s.  The same number of SH-60s played a role in USW for both force 
compositions.  However, in the LCS-based force, the additional SH-60s were utilized in  
surface warfare (SUW); greatly assisting in tackling the small boat problem. 
c. Interceptor Launches 
The distributed architecture is more effective in its use of weapons.  Figure VI-26 and 
Figure VI-27 show a decreased number of interceptors launched in the distributed architecture 
than in the point architecture.  These results were related to the high survivability results from 
Figure VI-22, Figure VI-23, and Figure VI-24.  The distributed architecture provided better 
targeting information and is more effective in assigning threat-weapon pairs.  Furthermore, the 
distributed architecture was able to detect and defeat threat platforms before they were able to 
launch their weapons. 
d. Phase I Missile Raid Excursion 
Figure VI-28 shows the advantages of the distributed architecture when the threat level 
and distance from the force to the threat origin were increased.  Furthermore, Figure VI-29 
reveals that there was a statistical difference in ExWar ship survivability between an enhanced 
and degraded enemy targeting capability for both point and distributed architectures.  In other 
words, the improved survivability from a degraded enemy targeting capability revealed the 
importance of gaining battle space superiority by sanitizing the ExWar force operating area from 
enemy assets capable of providing targeting information. 
e. SEA-4 Evaluation of NSS 
NSS had numerous advantages.  The system’s flexible database allowed the team to input 
the characteristics of sensor and weapon systems, platforms, and generic threats used in each of 
the alternate force architectures.  NSS’ ability to conduct analysis of numerous replications and 
to export metrics to Excel assisted the team in conducting statistical analysis of data.  While NSS 
provided a means to analyze numerous replications, conducting 30 replications required 
250 
 
approximately 15 hours.  Therefore, the team was constrained in the number of replications due 
to processing time for each scenario.  NSS also provided a means for the study to investigate 
tactical effects, such as ship positioning in relation to the threat axis, and at the same time, 
provided a look at interactions of individual assets in the scenario.  However, this high-resolution 
capability of NSS also proved, at times, to be a disadvantage.  The team found that with the 
numerous moving parts inherent to the scenario it was often difficult to distinguish cause and 
effect relationships.  In some cases, NSS provided confounding results that were difficult to 
explain.  The team assessed that utilizing NSS was not feasible without the help of an expert.  
NSS is a complicated system that may require a quarter’s worth of instruction to learn how to 
create a basic scenario with few interactions.  However, the fact that the team was required to 
work with a modeler provided a valuable learning experience with regard to  
Systems Engineering management.  The team had to clearly express their needs and 
requirements, manage deadlines, and verify and validate each of the alternate force architectures.  
The team felt that NSS provided useful insights into the force protection problem and was 




A. KEY FINDINGS 
The Navy-Marine Corps Team has been executing expeditionary operations since its 
inception.  Few of these operations have been unopposed.  Future adversaries will continue to 
probe perceived weaknesses, and will develop plans to deny access to their regions. 
Conventional and asymmetric strategies will be employed to conduct attacks on the Sea Base, 
landing craft, and aircraft components of the expeditionary warfare force.  Although sea basing 
reduces overall force protection requirements, it focuses those requirements on protecting the 
ships of the Sea Base and its airborne and seaborne transport assets. 
This study analyzed the threats to the Sea Base and determined the key functions 
associated with the protection of the Sea Base.  From functional analysis and requirements 
generation, survivability was determined to be the primary measure of effectiveness of force 
protection.  Survivability was further divided into the measures of susceptibility and 
vulnerability.  Susceptibility is the ability of the system to prevent and defeat enemy attacks or 
actions, while vulnerability is the ability of the system to withstand the enemy attacks or actions.  
This functional hierarchy was applied to the three primary mission areas of Air Warfare,  
Surface Warfare, and Undersea Warfare and their respective threats from the Threat Analysis. 
Detecting threats is the critical first step in defending the Sea Base and its transport 
assets.  If the force cannot “see” the enemy, it cannot defend against it.  This study attempted to 
bound the force protection problem by taking a realistic look at threat-sensor pairings.  The  
Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA-4) Team modeled radar, infrared (IR), lidar, active 
sonar, and passive sonar against the threats.  Though the Sensor Analysis itself is not all 
encompassing, with regard to the number of sensors available, or the tactics and techniques in 
which the ones mentioned above might be employed, several basic initial insights from the 
mathematical models developed can be drawn.  First, in most cases, a sensor can detect threats at 
greater ranges if it is relatively positioned so the threat presents a 90o (broadside) target angle.  
Second, the visual horizon, the environment, or both, may limit many of the sensors’ 
performance levels.  Third, several of the sensors detected the threats at greater ranges when 
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compared to the others because of the various target properties.  The key to achieving greater 
detection ranges is through the employment of different types of sensors that are able to take 
advantage of the inherent trade-offs with respect to the targets’ characteristics. 
In the Search Analysis, the SEA-4 Team explored the use of the various sensor types with 
respect to threat detection by varying the numbers, tactics, and techniques with which the sensors 
could be employed.  The distribution of sensors was determined to offer greater detection ranges 
by extending the sensors’ horizons and by achieving greater target aspects.  The benefits of a 
distributed sensor network throughout the battle space are readily apparent from the results 
because the potential for attaining favorable target angles on future representative threats 
increases.  By detecting the threats at greater ranges, the distributed sensor network provided the 
force with more time to react to the postulated threats. 
An interesting sensor system relationship (see Figure VII-1) emerged from the  
Search Analysis.  Each search system for a given sensor type is a trade-off of the number of 
search platforms, the search time, and the probability of detection in a defined volume.  The 
goals of the system are to minimize the search time, minimize the number of search platforms 
required, and maximize the probability of detection.  Any two of these goals may be satisfied to 
the detriment of the third.  The relationship between these variables follows the probability of 
detection formulas identified for each sensor. 
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Figure VII-1 Sensor System Relationship 
Another interesting insight obtained from the Search Analysis is that the point and 
distributed sensor configurations appear to complement each other very well.  By employing a 
mix of point and distributed sensor systems, an effective tripwire against every threat to the  
Sea Base could be achieved.  Furthermore, a distributed sensor network offers the benefits of 
greater detection ranges and more reaction time by extending the sensors’ horizons and by 
achieving greater target cross sections against a variety of the threats.  For example, the point 
sensor, assumed to be a ship, provides an early warning capability for the airborne assets in its 
vicinity against inbound surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  Likewise, the distributed sensors, 
assumed to be on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned underwater 
vehicles/unmanned surface vehicles (UUVs/USVs), provide early warning for the point assets 
against many of the other threats.  Cued acquisition from various sensor platforms might be able 
to provide uninterrupted track data throughout the battle space.  Even without the use of cued 
acquisition, a distributed sensor network could reduce the uncertainty of threat positions and 
narrow the scope of subsequent reacquisition searches, thus providing a more robust force 
protection capability to the expeditionary force.  Point-only sensor systems (radar, infrared (IR), 










achieve a 0.95 probability of detection for several threat platforms prior to maximum weapons 
release ranges.  This capability gap drives the need for a sensor system that is able to detect 
threat platforms at longer ranges and with ample time to counter them before they can reach their 
weapons’ maximum effective ranges.  The use of the IR and radar systems further allows the 
expeditionary warfare force to exploit attempted enemy trade-offs in reflectivity and emissivity.  
For these reasons, a mixed distributed and point sensor network system composed of IR, radar, 
and active sonar systems are recommended for implementation in future force structures. 
A necessary next step in defeating the threat platforms is to develop weapons systems 
capable of destroying the targets prior to their weapons release points.  From the  
Engagement Analysis, it is readily apparent that the ability to detect a threat at a longer range 
leads to a greater probability of kill for a given weapon system.  The models show that a 
weapon’s range is largely irrelevant if the sensor’s range is limited in comparison.  The weapon’s 
speed, however, is a desirable attribute, particularly if longer reaction times are required; but the 
weapon’s speed is clearly secondary to the sensor’s search speed and range.  This rationale is 
predicated on the assumption that a threat must be detected in order to be defeated.  Therefore, 
the ability to expand the sensor coverage and improve the sensor’s search speed, will allow the 
force to capitalize on a defensive weapon’s potential speed and range advantages, which, in turn, 
will create more engagement opportunities, thereby increasing the probability of kill against the 
postulated threats. 
From the EXTEND model, the team determined that distributed sensors are the factor 
that most affects survivability of the Sea Base.  Also, the LCS-based protection force provides a 
level of force protection to the Sea Base statistically equivalent to that of the cruiser- and 
destroyer-based protection force.  Furthermore, the longer range and speed of the conceptual 
weapons over that of the current weapons, provides no improvement to the survivability of the 
Sea Base.  In order to gain benefits from the increase in range and speed, the sensor detection 
range must be improved.  This is exactly what the distributed sensors do for the system. 
With regard to threats to the Sea Base, the submarines and torpedoes are by far the most 
significant threat.  In the EXTEND model, torpedoes make up roughly 10% of the total threat 
(anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and torpedoes (TORPs)) to the Sea Base ships, yet they 
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account for over 95% of the mission kills.  Future requirements for force protection of the  
Sea Base should place high emphasis on Undersea Warfare.  The need for a point defense system 
and highly effective torpedo countermeasures is a must. 
The Systems Engineering and Analysis curriculum has used EXTEND with great success 
in recent integration projects, as well as Joint Campaign Analysis courses.  EXTEND is an 
extremely easy modeling and simulation tool to learn.  It lends itself to the modeling of very 
complex processes.  In most cases, it is very easy to trouble shoot, and visually represents the 
process being modeled.  Although it may not be the right tool for every Systems Engineering 
problem, the team highly recommends EXTEND whenever it is applicable. 
From the Naval Simulation System (NSS) model, the cruiser and destroyer  
(CRUDES)-based force and LCS-based force were found to be roughly equivalent in their ability 
to protect the force.  Investigation into the force composition reveal that the CRUDES-based 
force structure seems to better handle subsurface threats, while the LCS-based force structure 
seems to better handle small boat threats. 
In terms of sensor and weapon architecture, NSS results showed that the distributed 
architecture improves survivability.  However, the benefits of the distributed architecture are 
more evident during Phase I (arrival and assembly), when the force is a greater distance from the 
threat.  In Phase II (assault), it was difficult to distinguish between the point and distributed 
architectures.  When the force is within close proximity to the threat, assets along the threat axis 
have a higher survivability in the distributed architecture. 
The distributed architecture more effectively employs weapons and had a significantly 
less number of interceptor launches than the point architecture.  The distributed architecture 
provides better targeting information and is more effective in assigning threat-weapon pairs.   
Additionally, the distributed architecture is able to detect and defeat threat platforms before they 
are able to launch their weapons. 
Another key finding with NSS was that conceptual weapons required the distributed 
sensor architecture in order to maximize their effectiveness.  Without the distributed sensor 
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architecture, the conceptual weapons are roughly equivalent to current weapons in protecting the 
force.  This finding revealed that the limiting factor in employing weapons is the sensor range. 
NSS had numerous advantages.  The system’s flexible database allowed the team to input 
the characteristics of sensor and weapon systems, platforms, and generic threats used in each of 
the alternate force architectures.  NSS’ ability to conduct analysis of numerous replications and 
to export metrics to Excel assisted the team in conducting statistical analysis of data.  While NSS 
provided a means to analyze numerous replications, conducting replications required a long 
period of time.  Therefore, the team was constrained in the number of replications allowed due to 
processing time for each scenario.  NSS also provided a means to investigate tactical effects, 
such as ship positioning in relation to the threat axis, and provided a look at interactions among 
individual assets in the scenario.  The high-resolution capability of NSS proved to be a 
disadvantage in a large scenario.  The team found that with the numerous moving parts inherent 
to the scenario it was often difficult to distinguish cause and affect relationships.  In some cases, 
NSS provided confounding results that were difficult to explain.  The team assessed that utilizing 
NSS was not feasible without the help of an expert.  However, the fact that the team was required 
to work with a modeler provided a valuable learning experience with regard to systems 
engineering management.  The team had to clearly express their needs and requirements, manage 
deadlines, and verify and validate each of the alternate force architectures.  The team felt that 
NSS provided useful insights into the force protection problem and was therefore a viable 
simulation tool for this study. 
B. RECOMMENDED ARCHITECTURES 
From the models analyzed, the key factor in attaining higher survivability for the  
Sea Base and its transport assets was the ability of the sensor system to provide more reaction 
time, and therefore more engagement opportunities, to the weapons systems.  For Phase I 
operations, it was assumed that the Sea Base would operate at extended distances from the shore.  
For this reason, the ability to achieve greater reaction times was accomplished through the use of 
the distributed sensor system and its ability to detect the threats further away.  In Phases II and 
III, the force was placed in close proximity to the threats, and as a result, greater reaction times 
were provided by the point sensors’ more rapid scan rates.  By placing the point sensors in close 
257 
 
proximity to the threats, the radius of the area of concern was greatly reduced when compared to 
Phase I.  This resulted in the point sensor and point weapon architectures closely approximating 
that of the distributed sensor and distributed weapon architectures. 
Further analysis into the two force compositions (LCS and CRUDES) revealed no 
significant difference with respect to survivability.  Furthermore, the weapons’ speed and range 
advantages were determined to be largely dependent on sensor performance.  Therefore, no 
significant difference was determined to exist with respect to survivability between the current 
and conceptual weapons types. 
As a result of these analyses, the proposed architecture can be either LCS- or  
CRUDES-based and possess either current or conceptual weapons.  For Phase I operations, 
however, the proposed architecture must employ the distributed sensor system.  For 360° 
coverage, this sensor system will require an aerostat operating at an altitude of 50 km overhead 
of the force center and 62 UAVs operating at an altitude of 10 km and distributed at a range of 
352 km from the force center.  The aerostat must possess a 20 GHz radar.  The UAVs must 
possess 20 GHz radars and IR sensors operating in the 3-5 µm spectrum.  Additionally, the 
distributed radar systems must use cone search geometries, while the IR systems must use 
hemisphere search geometries.  For undersea threats, this system will require 23 USVs or UUVs, 
deployed at a range of 50 km from the force center, with 1 kHz active sonars.  This system must 
use a cylinder search geometry.  More specific system parameters may be obtained in the Sensor 
or Search Analysis sections of the Design chapter.  Figure VII-2 graphically represents the 
distributed sensor system. 
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Figure VII-2 Distributed Sensor System 
For Phase II and Phase III, the proposed architecture must possess the point sensor 
system.  The point sensor system is composed of at least six platforms operating relatively close 
to the force center and equipped with a 3 GHz radar system using a cylinder search geometry and 
an IR system operating in the 3-5 µm spectrum using a hemisphere search geometry.  More 
specific system parameters may be obtained in the Sensor or Search Analysis sections of  
Chapter V.  Figure VII-3 graphically represents the point sensor system. 
Distributed Sensor Configuration
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Figure VII-3 Point Sensor System 
The choice of sensor architectures is driven by the phase in which the force is operating.  
In all cases, however, the distributed sensor architecture allows the weapons systems to take 
fewer shots, thereby conserving the force’s fighting potential.  In the final analysis, both sensor 
architectures are necessary for the accomplishment of expeditionary force protection.  The 
decision of which force composition or defensive weapons to use, however, shows no significant 
difference when compared using survivability.  Ultimately, the decision to use an LCS-based or 
CRUDES-based force and the decision to use the given current or conceptual weapons must be 
based on a measure of effectiveness other than survivability. 
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Introduction 
The SEA-4 Team was tasked to develop a system of systems conceptual solution to 
provide force protection for the Sea Base and its transport assets.  The team was forced to scope 
the project based on the available resources.  As this was a broad analysis, the results are  
broad-based as well.  In order to do a complete analysis of Sea Base force protection, many more 
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areas where further research will increase the understanding of force protection issues and 
provide a meaningful contribution to future Sea Base force protection efforts. 
2. Systems Engineering and Analysis 
The SEA Team was responsible for defining the problem to be solved, generating 
requirements, and integrating the efforts of supporting teams into a cohesive product.  For future 
SEA Teams, further research is recommended in the following areas: 
• Distributed Sensors – This study showed that distributed sensors were more 
effective than point sensors in most scenarios.  Further study should include a 
more thorough analysis of distributed sensor requirements for the Sea Base, to 
include actual sensor capabilities, emerging technologies, reliability and 
maintainability factors, acquisition strategies, realistic timelines for deployment, 
and associated trade-off analyses. 
• Distributed Weapons – This study showed that distributed weapons are an ideal 
complement to distributed sensors.  Further study should include a more thorough 
analysis of distributed weapon requirements for the Sea Base, to include actual 
weapon capabilities, emerging technologies, reliability, maintainability, and 
availability factors, acquisition strategies, realistic timelines for deployment, and 
associated trade-off analyses. 
• Mine Warfare – This study and the previous study showed the need for the  
Sea Base to have a robust mine warfare capability.  Further study should include 
requirements and prospective designs for specific search sensors, search methods, 
and search platforms, in addition to countermeasures, neutralization equipment 
and techniques, and weapons needed for breaching.  This should also include 
analysis of current and planned systems and acquisition strategies and the 
development of acquisition strategies for conceptual systems. 
• Enhanced Network Sea Basing – The Information Assurance supporting study 
provided an outstanding analysis of threats to this kind of network.  Further study 
should provide a detailed definition of Enhanced Network, analyze its strengths 
and weaknesses in regards to force protection, and determine the requirements 
needed to make it an integral part of the Sea Base force protection system. 
• Multiple Objectives – The models used for this study were limited to a single 
objective.  Further study should consider the effects of multiple objectives with 
varied spacing.  The existence of widely spaced objectives will complicate the 
force protection problem and additional systems requirements may surface.  
Further study should consider aircraft survivability studies, distributed weapons 
and sensors, asset placement, platform capabilities, and associated trade-off 
analyses. 
• Anti-Submarine Warfare – This study demonstrated the need for an undersea 
layered defense concept and the need for effective torpedo countermeasures.  
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Further study should include a detailed analysis of the undersea threat and the 
generation of requirements for a layered undersea defense system.  Requirements 
should be developed for a complete undersea defense system, to include sensor 
system performance, weapon system performance, countermeasures, and 
communications architecture. 
• Emerging and/or Classified Technology – This study was limited to open 
source information.  Electronic warfare systems, space systems, and emerging 
technologies in weapon and sensor systems were not considered due to their 
classification.  Further study should include classified research and analysis into 
force protection issues and the identification and incorporation of sensor and 
weapon technologies that will enhance Sea Base force protection efforts. 
• Non-Lethal Weapons Technology – This study showed that unconventional 
vessels were a direct threat to the Sea Base.  The biggest challenge with these 
vessels is determining their intent.  Warfare commanders need an option of 
stopping or slowing any suspect vessel by non-lethal means to help determine its 
intent.  Further study should include research into non-lethal systems and their 
applicability to Sea Base force protection.  This should include identification of 
candidate technologies, proposed systems, and their incorporation into the force 
protection system.  This technology should also be explored to determine its role 
in protecting ships in port and in areas where maneuverability is restricted. 
3. Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) 
The 2003 TSSE Team was responsible for designing a LCS with force protection of the 
Sea Base as a primary mission.  The ship was designed to meet requirements provided by the 
SEA Team.  For future projects, the TSSE Teams will likely continue to design vessels based on 
requirements provided by the SEA Teams.  For future TSSE Teams, further research is 
recommended in the following areas: 
• USV Design – This study proposed using USVs as part of the force protection 
system.  Further study should focus on specific USV design, to include hull, 
propulsion systems, power systems, control systems, sensor systems, weapon 
systems, and defensive systems.  Classified research can also be done to 
incorporate emerging technologies into the USV design. 
• UUV Design – This study proposed using UUVs as part of the force protection 
system.  Further study should focus on specific UUV design, to include hull, 
propulsion systems, power systems, control systems, sensor systems,  
weapon systems, and defensive systems.  Classified research can also be done to 
incorporate emerging technologies into the UUV design. 
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4. Supporting Studies 
Supporting Studies from the Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) Teams were 
responsible for contributing information in their specific areas of study.  Other NPS theses were 
identified and used as parts of the integrated study.  The SEA-4 Team used these studies to meet 
requirements generated for protection of the Sea Base.  Future TDSI Teams and students in other 
curricula can contribute further studies in the following areas: 
• Aerospace Engineering – This study used an aerostat and UAVs as part of the 
force protection system.  Further study should focus on specific UAV and aerostat 
design in addition to availability and reliability analyses.  Also, more in-depth 
aircraft survivability studies should be included to optimize survivability of  
Sea Base air transport assets. 
• Sensors – As sensors are an integral component of the force protection system, 
further study on sensor systems needed to protect the Sea Base should focus on 
specific sensor systems design.  Efforts should also include availability and 
reliability studies and proposed acquisition strategies. 
• Weapons – As weapons are an integral component of the force protection system, 
further study on weapon systems should include specific design for missiles, 
guns, artillery rounds, lasers, torpedoes, countermeasures, and other weapon 
systems needed for the protection of the Sea Base.  Efforts should also include 
availability and reliability studies and proposed acquisition strategies. 
• Space Systems – This study did not research or analyze any space systems that 
could contribute to force protection of the Sea Base.  Further study efforts should 
identify and/or propose space systems that would enhance Sea Base force 
protection efforts.  This should also include integration into the force protection 
system and detailed analysis of availability and reliability. 
• Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems – Sea Base force 
protection efforts will rely heavily on C4ISR systems.  Further study should 
include hardware design, software requirements, and built-in growth capability 
for both.  The study should also include a detailed analysis of availability and 
reliability. 
• Electronic Warfare (EW) – This study identified the need for soft kill systems to 
work in conjunction with hard kill systems to achieve the desired level of force 
protection.  Detailed, classified analyses should be done in this area in addition to 
specific proposals for EW threat warning systems, jamming systems, 
countermeasures, deception systems, and other self-protection systems.  The study 
should also include a detailed analysis of availability and reliability. 
• Operations Research – SEA students performed most of the analysis for this 
study.  Future efforts with a dedicated operations research team should focus on 
detailed campaign-level and high-resolution modeling of various force protection 
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scenarios.  Modeling efforts can analyze different force compositions, disposition 
of distributed sensors and weapons, asset placement for operations with multiple 
objectives, and a logistics analysis of the force protection system.  The study 
should also examine various modeling tools and determine or design a tool most 
appropriate for continued research of Sea Base force protection. 
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Effects (CBRNE) – This 
study identified the need for CBRNE defense, but did not research or analyze any 
specific systems that could contribute to this component force protection of the 
Sea Base.  Further study efforts should identify and/or propose systems that 
would effectively sense, identify, and protect the Sea Base from these threats.  
This should also include integration into the overall force protection system and 
detailed analysis of availability and reliability of proposed systems. 
5. Conclusion 
The recommendations for further study were based on resources that are expected to be 
available at NPS in the future.  Larger SEA classes will be able to complete more thorough 
analyses and provide in-depth research into all of the components of their selected system.  The 
SEA-4 Team scoped the project and elected to focus on a macro-view of force protection.  These 
recommendations for further studies are intended to identify areas beyond this macro-view where 
NPS students can conduct meaningful research to fill in gaps that this team identified, but did not 
have the resources to cover adequately.  Having identified those areas, it is recommended that 
any further study into force protection of the Sea Base strongly consider one of these 
recommendations. 
D. PROMISING SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Overview 
Due to the unclassified nature of this study, research was limited to open source 
information.  Additionally, resource constraints did not allow the exploration and research of 
some emerging lethal and non-lethal technology areas.  Several emerging technologies exist that 
have the potential to enhance Sea Base force protection.  Available resources, limited 
information, modeling complexity, and classification issues did not allow in-depth analysis of 
these technologies.  Sensor technologies that exploit environmental disturbances (e.g., internal 
waves) or emissions (e.g., exhaust or magnetic fields) were not explored.  Open source 
information on the capabilities of these systems warranted their mention as weapon and sensor 
systems that may be available in the future as applications to protect the Sea Base.  Additionally, 
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improvements to existing sensors and weapons or those conceptualized in other studies also have 
the potential to enhance Sea Base force protection. 
2. Capabilities Needed 
To facilitate recommendation of specific systems to aid in the defense of the Sea Base, 
data from the needs analysis and system requirements was used to develop a list of capabilities 
needed.  These capabilities were addressed by warfare area for clarity. 
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) capabilities needed: 
• Quick detection and identification of high-speed threat 
• Long detection ranges to facilitate increased reaction time to counter high-speed 
threats 
• Neutralize threat platform at standoff distances 
• Improved aircraft countermeasures against air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles 
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) capabilities needed: 
• Quick detection and identification of hostile surface craft 
• Long detection ranges to facilitate increased reaction time against high-speed 
surface craft 
• Non-lethal means of slowing or stopping suspect craft to determine their 
intentions 
• Neutralize threat platform at stand-off distance 
• Increase probability of kill of existing weapons against small boat threat 
• Quickly and economically field more effective weapons to engage asymmetric 
ASUW threats 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities needed: 
• Alternative ASW sensors and weapons that exploit emerging technologies 
(distributed systems, deployable arrays, etc.) 
• Improved shallow water ASW capabilities for existing ships and aircraft 
• Improved sonar-processing capabilities 
• Improved non-acoustic sensors 
• Radar systems with automatic periscope detection capability 
• More effective ASW weapons (torpedoes, depth bombs, mines) 
• Torpedo countermeasures 
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Mine Warfare (MIW) capabilities needed: 
• Mine avoidance capability for combatants 
• Improved and eventually automated electro-optical (EO)/IR/radar detection and 
classification of surface mine-like objects 
• Improved and eventually automated sonar detection and classification of mine-
like objects in the water volume 
• Improved and eventually automated detection and classification of bottom and 
buried mine-like objects 
• Countermeasures for acoustic and magnetic influence mines 
• Improved mine-clearing capabilities in all zones 
a. Candidate Systems 
Several candidate sensor and weapon systems⎯either existing, planned, or 
conceptual⎯may be available for force protection of the Sea Base in the 2015-2020 timeframe.  
Several systems were identified, but resource constraints did not allow in-depth research or 
modeling of these candidate systems.  For future studies, consideration should be given to 
including these or similar systems in any system of systems design to protect the Sea Base. 
b. Lidar Systems 
Lidar sensors work on the same principles as radar, except that they use laser light in 
place of radio waves.  Several lidar sensors have been evaluated for use as USW search sensors.  
Existing research and development programs and advancements in technology may eventually 
yield effective and reliable lidar search sensors to detect submarines and mines in the littorals. 
Magic Lantern® is an airborne lidar mine countermeasures system designed to provide 
rapid reconnaissance of moored and floating mines.  Electronic shutters in Magic Lantern®’s 
receivers are set to open at different depths, therefore providing coverage in multiple zones.  The 
receivers image the reflected laser light to detect and classify mine reflections and shadows. 
A lidar sensor system adapted from Magic Lantern® could be used in the future to 
provide the capability of improved and eventually automated detection and classification of all 
types of mines in shallow water, surf zone, and beach areas.  The Magic Lantern® concept of 




Figure VII-4 Magic Lantern® MIW Concept of Operations 
Systems developed using Magic Lantern® technology could also be used as a  
non-acoustic ASW sensor.  A representative concept of operations for this sensor is shown in 
Figure VII-5. 
 
Figure VII-5 Lidar System ASW Concept of Operations 
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Other Lidar systems in development are the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System 
(RAMICS) sensor and the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS).  RAMICS is a  
helicopter-mounted mine countermeasures system that uses lidar to locate and target mines in 
shallow water.  Targeting information is provided to a 30mm rapid-fire gun system that fires a 
super cavitating, armor-piercing projectile designed to enter the water and strike the targeted 
mine at high velocity.  The projectile is designed to penetrate the mine casing and destroy  
and/or sink the mine.  RAMICS components and concept of operations are shown in  
Figure VII-6. 
Figure VII-6 RAMICS Concept of Operations and Components 
ALMDS is a helicopter-mounted lidar sensor system designed to detect mines in shallow 
water.  The lidar scans a wide path of the ocean while the helicopter flies at high speed.  The 
system generates computer-enhanced image of the shapes, sizes, and locations of mine-like 
objects.  The sensor is designed to locate and identify mines in a single pass over the target area, 
which minimizes threats to the helicopter. 
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System
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The abundance of planned lidar sensors proves its potential as a viable undersea warfare 
system.  In the future, lidar sensors, such as those described, can be used to enhance force 
protection of the Sea Base from underwater threats. 
c. Hyperspectral Sensors 
Spectral imaging uses specialized sensors to capture and interpret color images.  These 
imaging systems can “see” multiple colors from the ultraviolet through the far infrared.  
Hyperspectral sensors collect color images in many contiguous color bands.  Information 
collected from these sensors is used to determine the nature of the material, object, or condition 
being viewed.  This enables these systems to detect, classify, and identify these various 
materials, objects, or conditions.  Systems such as the Littoral Airborne Sensor-Hyperspectral 
(LASH) and the Littoral Mine Countermeasures Rapid Reconnaissance System (L-MCM RRS) 
have been designed and are in the early stages of testing. 
Hyperspectral sensors can be used to detect submarines and mines in the littoral 
environment where the Sea Base and its transport assets will be operating.  Future applications of 
these systems on aircraft and/or UAVs could provide additional force protection for the fleet.  
Use of these or similar systems will provide the capability to support mine detection in the surf 
zone and beach zone.  These systems could also provide additional capability as improved  
low-cost, non-expendable, non-acoustic sensors.  Notional designs for a helicopter-mounted 




Figure VII-7 Hyperspectral Sensors 
d. Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) Systems 
MAD systems sense disturbances in the earth’s magnetic field caused by the movement 
of large ferrous metal objects, such as submarines.  Navy ASW aircraft have been using these 
sensors for years, but recent advances in technology have increased their range and will 
eventually aid on classification of targets.  In the future, these systems may be mounted on 
helicopters and/or UAVs and used to search the littoral area for the presence of enemy 
submarines.  These passive, non-acoustic sensors would provide improved shallow water ASW 
capabilities to help protect the Sea Base. 
e. Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) 
ATR systems augment existing sensor systems by detecting, tracking, and identifying 
threats without operator action.  For example, the Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and 
Discrimination (ARPDD) uses ATR to discriminate periscopes from clutter, debris, and small 
objects on the ocean surface in the littoral environment over a large area in a short time period.  
Due to the complexity of the littoral battle space, sensor operators will need a reliable means to 
Hyperspectral Sensors
Prototype LASH system 
pod-mounted on SH-60.
Prototype L-MCM RRS 




interpret a vast amount of data and reliably identify potential threats.  In the future, ATR can be 
applied to lidar, radar, sonar, MAD, and other systems to facilitate immediate identification of 
threats.  A direct outgrowth of the ARPDD program could be the use of ATR to automatically 
identify classes of ships, aircraft, and other threats well beyond effective weapon ranges.  These 
systems can be used to provide the capability of immediate threat identification at long range for 
various sensors.  This capability will augment Sea Base force protection efforts. 
f. Countermeasures Systems 
Countermeasures systems are used to defend aircraft against radio frequency (RF) and IR 
surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.  Systems in development such as the Directional Infrared 
Countermeasures System (DIRCM) and the Integrated Defensive Electronics Countermeasures 
System (IDECM) are examples of systems that could provide the needed self-protection and 
survivability for future Sea Base air transport assets. 
DIRCM is an integrated system designed to provide threat IR missile identification and 
warning, and automatically activate the appropriate IR countermeasure needed to defeat the 
incoming threat missile.  It was designed to counter the threat of new generation, highly 
proliferated IR threat missiles.  As with all modern systems, it was designed with growth 
capability that would make it an ideal candidate aircraft force protection system in the  
2015-2020 timeframe. 
IDECM is designed to provide self-protection and increased survivability for tactical 
aircraft against RF and IR surface-to-air and air-to-air threat missiles.  The system consists of 
threat warning receivers, processors, a transmitter, a towed decoy, and expendable decoys.  This 
system is designed to integrate all EW functions, such as radar warning, self-protection jamming, 
chaff/flare dispersers, and towed decoys into a single system.  Eventually, this could be used as a 
model to fully integrate shipboard EW functions as well. 
The Sea Base of the future depends on aircraft for execution of Ship-to-Objective 
Manuever (STOM).  Aircraft survivability will be critical if the force is to accomplish the 
intended mission.  Aircraft will need protection from air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles and 
these or similar systems would be ideal candidate systems to perform that task.  The battlefield 
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of the future will require automated, effective, affordable, and reliable self-protection systems 
that will free crews to concentrate on executing their assigned mission and ensure a high rate of 
survivability for Sea Base aircraft. 
g. Effective Low-Cost Weapons 
Existing weapons systems are complex and costly.  Some of these complex systems are 
marginally effective against threats such as small boats.  Additionally, the cost of these weapons 
is many times the cost of the threat against which it is being used.  For example, an expensive 
Harpoon missile would not normally be employed against a small boat.  For this reason,  
Sea Base ships need a low-cost, effective weapon to use against this type of threat. 
Sea Javelin is a concept developed in an NPS student thesis to provide an effective,  
low-cost measure of force protection against small boat attack.  The Javelin Anti-armor missile is 
a 49.5-pound, man-portable, fire-and-forget, surface-attack, anti-tank missile originally designed 
to counter the current and future threat armored combat vehicles.  The Sea Javelin concept uses 
this system in a non-traditional role aboard ships to provide force protection in restricted waters, 
in port, or in any situation where primary weapon systems were powered down or in an unusable 
state.  One advantage of the Sea Javelin concept is that its stand-alone design does not require 
integration into the ship’s weapon and sensor systems.  The weapon was also evaluated to be 
mechanically and tactically sound for shipboard operation.  Probability of hit and probability of 
kill analyses showed greater than 0.90 for both.  Cost effectiveness was evaluated using  
cost-per-kill as a measure of performance.  Cost-per-kill was significantly less than any other 
existing or proposed missile system.  Only gun systems performed better in this area; this was an 
expected outcome as most unguided projectiles are significantly cheaper than missiles. 
This concept and other innovative concepts that use existing weapons have the potential 
to significantly increase force protection efforts in a cost effective manner.  Systems such as this 
could provide specific capability to neutralize threat platforms at stand-off distances, increase 
probability of hit and probability of kill against small boat threats, and provide a quick, 
economical means of engaging asymmetric ASUW threats. 
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h. Non-Lethal Systems 
One of the biggest challenges to the Sea Base force protection is the asymmetric threat.  
One method to consider would be the employment of non-lethal weapons to slow or neutralize 
any potential threat until its intentions can be determined.  Two candidate systems currently in 
development are the Running Gear Entanglement System (RGES) and the Vessel Stopper 
System (VSS).  These systems can effectively be used to stop small boats and very large ships 
using asymmetric tactics. 
The RGES is designed to surround the ship or restricted area with a barrier and use an 
entanglement device to foul the propellers of unauthorized vessels that penetrate the barrier.  The 
RGES concept is show in Figure VII-8. 
Figure VII-8 Running Gear Entanglement System 
The VSS is designed to stop merchant ships by blocking the exhaust stack.  The 
operational concept is to drop the device into the stack of a ship using a helicopter.  Once 
dropped into the stack, the VSS explosively expands to completely seal the stack.  Backpressure 
causes the engines to stall in a very short period of time.  The system does not cause any 
Running Gear Entanglement System
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permanent damage to the vessel and can later be removed to return the vessel back to normal 
operation. 
System concepts such as these will provide additional options for commanders when they 
may be unsure of the intentions of a potential threat.  They can also facilitate search and seizure 
of suspect vessels and directly provide the capability to slow or stop these vessels using  
non-lethal means. 
3. Summary 
Several emerging technologies exist that have the potential to enhance Sea Base force 
protection.  The chapter introduced a few of those technologies and identified the capabilities 
that systems such as these could provide to the Sea Base.  Resources, classification issues, and 
modeling complexity did not allow an in-depth analysis of these technologies.  The existence 
warranted mention as these technologies will be available in the 2015-2020 timeframe and may 
be used as integral components in the Sea Base force protection system.  Additionally, inclusion 
of these sensor technologies can be used as a springboard for further research opportunities.  
Further research is highly recommended in these areas.  Future SEA classes may have 
significantly greater resources available and may be able to split into teams to address different 
topics.  One team could be dedicated to research in classified areas to add that perspective to this 
or any other study.  When resources allow, these emerging technologies should not be 



























INITIAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT  
for 
TOTAL SHIP SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (TSSE) DESIGN PROJECT 
Summer and Fall Quarter 2003 
17 July 2003
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
1. Mission Need Statement 
The top-level mission need is stated in the Project Guidance Memorandum from 
Professor Calvano (22 May 2003) stored on the Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA-4)  
Naval Postgraduate School network share drive.  This need is to “address protection of the ships 
of the Sea Base while at sea in the operating area, as well as the protection of the airborne 
transport assets moving between the Sea Base and the objective and the surface assets moving 
between the Sea Base and the beach or a port.”  The integrated teams are specifically not 
required to address protection of the Sea Base assets while in port.  Furthermore, the tasking does 
not include addressing the protection of the land force itself or land transport from the beach to 
the objective. 
The Systems Engineering and Integration (SEI-3) study paints a broad picture of 
expeditionary warfare as it might look like by the year 2020.  The SEI-3 study embodies the 
capabilities of pertinent documents germane to expeditionary warfare. 
2. Overall Mission Area:  Expeditionary Force Protection (EFP) 
SEA-4 has defined expeditionary force protection as actions taken to prevent or mitigate 
hostile action against the Sea Base, to include resources, facilities, and critical information.  
These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and 
place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to 
enable the effective employment of the joint force, while degrading opportunities for the enemy.  
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Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, 
weather, or disease.  (Adapted from the Department of Defense Dictionary definition of  
Force Protection.) 
3. Description of Proposed System 
This system is intended to be a platform, or family of platforms, that encapsulates all 
mission capabilities and meets system-level requirements contained in this document.  The 
system will support the operational flexibility and rapid operational tempo required for the 
protection of the expeditionary warfare force (SEI-3’s conceptual architecture).  It will support 
littoral operations across the spectrum of conflict—from small-scale contingency missions as 
part of a forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), to forcible entry missions in a 
major theater war as part of a large naval expeditionary force.  It must be able to enhance the 
protection of the ExWar ships and associated delivery vehicles. 
This system must be capable of integration with current and future joint, combined, or 
interagency systems.  This system must allow the Navy to fully use the capabilities of future 
systems such as vertical take-off and landing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned 
surface vehicles (USV), or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), as well as future force 
protection and battle management command, control, communications, computers and 
intelligence (BMC4I) capabilities.  The system will need to be designed to accommodate growth 
trends and the insertion of new technologies throughout its service life to avoid built-in 
obsolescence. 
B. SYSTEM STATES AND ASSOCIATED THREATS 
Three system states have been identified for the expeditionary warfare force.  The 
following are SEA-4 determined system states and their associated primary threats: 
1. State I – Staging/Buildup (Operating Area) 
• Anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) 
• Small Boats (SBs) 





2. State II – Ship-to-Shore/Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) 
• SBs 
• Mines 
• Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 
• Unguided munitions 
• Aircraft/UAVs 






C. WARFARE AREAS 
The Sea Base will operate as an amphibious strike group.  For a Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade (MEB)-sized force, a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) will be operating in the vicinity of the 
Sea Base. 
1. Air Warfare (AW) 
The system must detect, identify, track, and defeat air targets that have been launched 
without warning or have eluded AW defenses provided by other fleet units (i.e., “leakers”).  The 
employment of these threats may vary from low density to saturation attack. 
• ASCM 
• Attack aircraft 
• UAV 
• Low, slow flyer 
2. Surface Warfare (SUW) 
The system must detect, identify, track, and defeat a variety of surface craft.  The surface 
craft themselves may vary from asymmetric/unconventional boats to patrol craft.  The 
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employment of these threats may vary from low density to saturation.  In the dense, cluttered, 
and environmentally complex littoral regions, the system must be able to: 
• Detect surface threats with ownship and networked sensors 
• Deconflict potentially hostile craft from friendly and neutral shipping 
• Direct, support, and/or embark aircraft conducting SUW 
• Engage surface threats to the expeditionary warfare force 
3. Undersea Warfare (USW) 
The system must support both anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasures 
(MCM).  Furthermore, the system must be able to detect, identify, track, and defeat UUVs and 
no-warning torpedo attacks.  The design must provide for the control and support of USW 
helicopters/UAVs, and the control of UUVs.  The ship must also support mine warfare (MIW) 
assets.  This includes: 
• Hosting of remote mine search capability (i.e., USV/UUV and/or very shallow 
water (VSW) detachment operated from the ship) from deep water to surf zone 
• Possess ownship capabilities to conduct MCM from deep water to VSW 
• Possess an offensive mining capability 
4. Information Operation/Information Warfare (IO/IW) 
The Command and Control (C2) architecture must support planning, gaining, and 
maintaining situational awareness, decision-making, order generation, weapons direction, and 
ship system monitoring and control with uninterrupted voice, video, and data connectivity.  The 
system must be able to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information in support of operations.  Interoperability, not just compatibility, of C2 systems 
across the joint/combined/interagency force is required. 
The system must be capable of deploying an expeditionary sensor grid with the following 
characteristics: 
• Communication suite allowing fully networked assets (helicopters, UAVs, USVs, 
UUVs) 
• Deployable surface and bottom acoustic and radio frequency (RF) arrays to act as 
tripwire and early warning of threats 
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• Deployment of systems, such as aerostats and robotic airships, to extend the 
horizon and provide a stable sensor array versus low observable targets such as 
small, fast movers 
The system must be capable of conducting electronic attack (EA), electronic protection 
(EP), and/or electronic support (ES). 
D. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Operational Requirements: 
• Operate in deep water to VSW 
• Operate as far as 200 nm offshore 
• Capability to operate at a sustained speed of 35 kts at sea states three or better 
• Trans-oceanic crossing capability 
• Employ full capabilities in a sea state of five 
• Employ full capabilities in a chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) 
environment 
• Employ full capabilities in temperatures ranging from –18° C to 40° C (outside 
dry bulb) 
These initial operational capabilities have been determined by SEA-4 through the use of 
Needs Analysis.  More detailed operational capabilities will be delivered after further analysis of 
the force protection system.  The SEA-4 Team has reviewed the Chief of Naval Operations 
Expeditionary Warfare (N7) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) interim requirements document (IRD), 
and while the TSSE Team should take into consideration the operational characteristics 
identified in the N7 LCS IRD, they should not feel constrained by those requirements. 
2. Environmental, Safety and Occupational Health (ESOH) and Other System 
Characteristics 
• Must comply with Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and  
Naval Occupational Safety and Health (NAVOSH) regulations and international 
law as applicable 
3. Supportability Requirements 
The system must be capable of sustainment from legacy and future CLF ships, as well as 
from ExWar ships.  Prolonged expeditionary operations will demand that the Sea Base force 
protection assets be able to remain on-station for the duration of the campaign.  This capability 
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will facilitate the elimination of an operational pause and permit the force to conduct STOM and 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS).  By gaining and maintaining access throughout 
the littorals, the U.S. Navy will become the chain link that will provide the capability to conduct 
joint, combined, and interagency expeditionary operations.  The system must have  
intermediate-level (I-Level) maintenance for platforms in company and by itself. 
4. Human Systems Integration 
• Reduced manning concepts must be employed 
• Ensure crew comfort/quality of life 
E. REFERENCES 
• SEI-3 Expeditionary Warfare Study 
• Project Guidance for AY 2003 SEA-4 Team (Professor Calvano memo  
dtd May 22, 2003) 
• LCS Concept of Operations 
(Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC) website 
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/LCSCONOPS.asp) 
• The Maritime Vision 
• The Naval Operational Concept 
• The Maritime Concept 
• Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 
• Seabased Logistics, May 1998 
• MPF 2010 and Beyond 
• STOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
• LCS Flight 0 Preliminary Design IRD (N7) 
Note:  All documents are located in the SEA lab or on the SEA Share Drive. 
F. POINTS OF CONTACT 
• LT Chris Wells (ckwells@nps.navy.mil, (831) 656-7880) 






a. Top-Level Assumptions 
The EXTEND model was built to represent the formation level interactions of the threats, 
sensors, and weapons.  It was not intended to represent every friendly platform and its respective 
sensors and weapons.  Therefore, it is assumed that threats arrive along a common bearing to the 
Sea Base and that there is a sensor and weapon along that bearing. 
Threats must be detected in order for the system to defeat them through hard or soft kill 
means.  If the threat is not detected, then only point defense systems and the threat’s own 
inaccuracy and reliability can prevent it from hitting a friendly platform. 
b. Configuration, User Inputs and Outputs 
A major benefit to modeling with EXTEND is the ease of manipulating the configuration 
of the model.  The user has the capability to change the model to represent the various alternate 
force architectures by simply changing inputs and rerouting within the model.  This allowed the 
team to build one model that could be reconfigured to represent the desired force architecture. 
There are two primary means by which to input data to the model⎯manually or 
automatically.  Manual inputs do not change while the model is running, while automatic inputs 
do change during a model run depending on the process being represented.  An example would 
be maximum radar detection range, which changes depending on the threat being detected. 
With only one exception, the automatic inputs to the EXTEND model were input using a 
common Excel spreadsheet labeled Inputs.xls.  This spreadsheet must be resident in the same 
folder as the EXTEND model.  This spreadsheet contains the following worksheets: 
• Probability of Single Hit Mission Kill 
• Radar Maximum Detection Range 
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• IR Maximum Detection Range 
• Sonar Maximum Detection Range 
• Weapons Inputs 
The one exception to this is the Weapon Inputs.  Although there is a worksheet in the 
Excel file labeled Weapons Inputs, this data was exported to a text file labeled  
Weapon Inputs.txt.  As with the Excel file, the text file must be resident in the same folder as the 
EXTEND model. 
The specific data contained in the above input files will be discussed later in the 
appendix. 
To ease data collection at the completion of the runs, output text files were used to 
capture data specific to measuring the effectiveness of the alternate force architectures.  As with 
the input files, the output files must be resident in the same folder as the EXTEND model.  The 
files are as follows: 
• ACFT Killed.txt 
• ASCM Kills.txt 
• DW Kills.txt 
• SAM Kills.txt 
• Ships Killed.txt 
• TORP Kills.txt 
• Transports Killed.txt 
c. Units of Measure 
The units adopted for the model were metric units.  Specifics are listed in Table B-1. 
MEASURE UNITS ABBREVIATION 
Distance Meters m 
Speed Meters per Second m/s 
Time Seconds s 
Frequency Hertz Hz 
Volume Meters Cubed m^3 
Table B-1 Units of Measure Used in the Model 
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d. Block Descriptions 
The following sections will give detailed descriptions of the various blocks in the model.  
The description will include the flow of the process being represented, the assumptions of the 
block, and inputs to block. 
(1) Threat Generator 
(a) Description 
Threat platforms and land-based weapons are initially generated using a poisson process 
with exponentially distributed interarrival times.  From the generator they are split into multiple 
entities based on raid or salvo size.  Platforms are then assigned the attributes of specific type, 
speed, altitude, launch range, and maximum weapon range.  Land-based weapons are assigned 
the attributes of specific type, intended target, speed, altitude, and launch range. 
Platforms that are not detected by subsequent detection blocks, return to the threat 
generator and are converted to platform-based weapons to represent a weapon firing.  These 
platform-based weapons are then split into multiple entities based on raid or salvo size and 
assigned the attributes of specific type, intended target, speed, altitude, and launch range.  
Because the weapon has been generated from a platform, the attribute of maximum weapon 
range is removed from it at this time.  Also specific to platform-based weapons, the launch range 
attribute is set to the range of the platform at time of launch. 
(b) Assumptions 
In most cases, threats are generated at 80% of their maximum range.  The exception to 
this is when the range is extremely long, in which case they are generated just outside the defined 
search region of the architecture (i.e., 370 km).  This helps the model to run faster as processing 
time is wasted, decrementing the threat range until it is within maximum detection range. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-2 contains the values for the intended target attribute.  Table B-3 contains the 
values for the specific type attribute for the threats, the friendly platforms the threat can target, 
and the threat weapon of the threat platform.  As stated in Chapter VI, due to the bounds based 
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on the size of the team, only the threats that were deemed to have the most impact on the  
Sea Base were modeled to help scope the modeling effort.  Details of the distributions used to 
determine intended target can be found later in this appendix.  Table B-4 contains the other 
descriptive attributes of the threats. 
 












*In COA A FFG is used, and in COA B LCS is used. 
Table B-2 Intended Target Attribute Values 
Table B-3 Specific Type Attribute Values and Possible Targets 
THREATS SPECIFIC TYPE ATTRIBUTE POSSIBLE INTENDED TARGETS POSSIBLE WEAPONS
WEAPONS
ASCM-1 1 1,2,3,4 N/A*
ASCM-2 2 1,2,3,4 N/A*
ASCM-3 3 1,2,3,4 N/A*
SAM-1 4 8,9,10,11 N/A*
SAM-2 5 8,9,10,11 N/A*
DW-1 6 5,6,7 N/A*
DW-2 7 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
DW-3 8 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
TORP-1 9 1,2,3,4 N/A*
TORP-2 10 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
TORP-3 11 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
MINE-1 12 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
MINE-2 13 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
MINE-3 14 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
MINE-4 15 Not Currently Modeled N/A*
PLATFORMS
ACFT-1 16 N/A* Not Currently Modeled
ACFT-2 17 N/A* ASCM-2
ACFT-3 18 N/A* Not Currently Modeled
UAV-1 19 N/A* Not Currently Modeled
SB-1 20 N/A* Not Currently Modeled
SB-2 21 N/A* Not Currently Modeled
SB-3 22 N/A* ASCM-1
SUB-1 23 N/A* TORP-2
SUB-2 24 N/A* Not Currently Modeled




Table B-4 Descriptive Attributes 
(2) Radar Detection 
(a) Description 
When threats enter the block, they are routed initially based on the architectural setup of 
the model.  If the model is setup for the point architecture, threats are sent to the point sensor 
loop.  If the model is setup for the distributed architecture, threats are sent to the unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) sensor loop. 
In the UAV sensor loop, the model determines whether or not the threat is either outside 
the UAV footprint, or above the UAV in altitude.  If the threat meets either of these criteria, it is 
passed to the aerostat sensor loop.  If neither criterion is true, then the threat continues in the 
UAV sensor loop.  The model then determines when the threat is within maximum detection 
range.  If the threat is not within maximum detection range, the range is decreased until it is with 
in maximum detection range.  While a platform is in the UAV sensor loop, the range is 
compared to the maximum weapon range to determine if the threat platform can launch its 
THREATS # OF RAIDS RAID SIZE SPEED (m/s) LAUNCH RANGE (m) ALTITUDE (m) MAX WEAPON RANGE (m)
WEAPONS
ASCM-1 # 2 300.0 * 3 N/A
ASCM-2 # 4 825.0 * 5 N/A
ASCM-3 4 5 1650.0 372000 24000 N/A
SAM-1 100 2 1852.0 160000 5000 N/A
SAM-2 20 1 824.0 8000 5000 N/A
DW-1 50 6 N/A 23705 -213.4 N/A
DW-2 N/A
DW-3 N/A














SB-3 8 2 20.6 372000 0 120000
SUB-1 5 1 5.1 100000 -213.4 37040
SUB-2
SUB-3
# - Based on number of threat platforms surviving to launch.
* - Based on range of threat platform at time of launch.


















weapon.  Once the threat is within maximum detection range, probability of detection was 
calculated using the first principle equations used in the search analysis.  These equations were 
applied stochastically in the model to determine probability of detection based on search time.  
The threat remains in this loop until it reaches its maximum weapon range, is detected, or 
transitions out of the UAV footprint.  If it transitions out of the UAV footprint, the threat is 
routed to the aerostat sensor loop. 
The aerostat and point sensor loops are functionally identical.  In either loop, the model 
determines when the threat is within maximum detection range.  If the threat is not within 
maximum detection range, the range is decreased until it is within maximum detection range.  
While a platform is in the sensor loop, the range is compared to the maximum weapon range to 
determine if the threat platform can launch its weapon.  Once the threat is within maximum 
detection range, the probability of detection is calculated based on the amount of time the sensor 
has to search for the threat.  The threat remains in this loop until it reaches its maximum weapon 
range, the minimum engagement range of the force protection weapons, or until it is detected. 
Platforms that reach their maximum weapon range return to the threat generator to 
represent a weapon firing.  Detected threats are routed to the defeat block, and not detected 
threats are routed to the withstand block. 
(b) Assumptions 
The same assumptions and theory used in the sensor and search analysis sections were 
applied to the development of the radar detection block. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-5 contains the maximum detection ranges for the various radar sensor 
architectures.  This data is input into the model using the Excel Input.xls file. 
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Table B-5 Radar Maximum Detection Ranges 
(3) IR Detection 
(a) Description 
The IR detection block is specifically designed to detect surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 
and dumb weapons (DWs).  From the search analysis, it was concluded that IR would be the best 
detection sensor for these threats.  When UAVs are based as in the distributed architecture, it is 
also the only sensor in close proximity to the threat.  This block is also unique in the fact that the 
soft kill of the threat and the threat’s chance of mission killing a friendly platform is processed 
here and not in the withstand block. 
When threats enter the block, they are initially routed based on the architectural setup of 
the model.  If the model is setup for the point architecture, threats bypass the IR sensor and are 
routed to the processing loop that determines soft kill of the threat and mission kill of a friendly 
platform.  If the model is setup for the distributed architecture, threats are sent to the distributed 
sensor loop. 
In the distributed sensor loop, the model determines when the threat is within maximum 
detection range.  If the threat is not within maximum detection range, the range is decreased until 
it is with in maximum detection range.  Once the threat is within maximum detection range, 
probability of detection was calculated using the first principle equations used in the search 
Frequency 3 GHz
THREAT Search Area Type Point / Cylinder Aerostat / Cone UAV / Cone
ASCM-1 14100 101338 18012
ASCM-2 17800 189206 18013
ASCM-3 18100 238544 No Detect*
SAM-1 118394 150517 9005
SAM-2 8660 21564 9005
DW-1 10206 87841 14431
DW-2 3000 No Detect* No Detect*
DW-3 1100 No Detect* No Detect*
ACFT-1 26100 370039 18016
ACFT-2 147215 332872 9005
ACFT-3 22200 63861 18016
UAV-1 20700 No Detect* 17901
SB-1 13000 99996 18010
SB-2 13000 370037 18010
SB-3 13000 370037 18010
*Either the sensor cannot detect the threat or it won't detect it prior to threat impact.




analysis.  These equations were applied stochastically in the model to determine probability of 
detection based on search time.  The threat remains in this loop until it is no longer in detection 
range, or until it is detected.  Once it is detected it is routed to the processing loop that 
determines soft kill of the threat and mission kill of a friendly platform. 
The processing loop that determines soft kill of the threat and mission kill of a friendly 
platform models a flaming datum type process.  This is to say that once a threat has fired and is 
detected, the friendly platforms can avoid the area, and supporting fires can neutralize the threat. 
(b) Assumptions 
The assumptions for the flaming datum theory vary based on architecture.  If point 
architecture is selected, the threat is neutralized (i.e., soft killed) linearly.  If distributed 
architecture is selected, the threat is neutralized exponentially.  The increased neutralization rate 
for distributed is because of the advantage of having the UAV-based IR sensor.  The team felt 
that the cooperative nature of the distributed sensor architecture would allow for faster 
notification of the threats, and subsequently allow for supporting fires to neutralize the threat at a 
faster rate. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-6 contains the maximum detection ranges for the IR sensor architectures.  This 
data is input into the model using the Excel Input.xls file. 
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Table B-6 IR Maximum Detection Ranges 
(4) Above the Water Defeat 
(a) Description 
As detected threats enter the block, the model determines when the threat is within 
maximum engagement range of the force protection weapons.  If the threat is not within 
maximum engagement range of the force protection weapons, the range is decreased until it is 
within maximum engagement range of the force protection weapons.  While a platform is in this 
loop, the range is compared to the maximum weapon range to determine if the threat platform 
can launch its weapon.  Once the threat is within maximum engagement range of the force 
protection weapons, the probability of hard killing the threat is calculated.  The threat remains in 
this loop until it reaches its maximum weapon range, the minimum engagement range of the 
force protection weapons, or until it is hard killed. 
Platforms that reach their maximum weapon range return to the threat generator to 
represent a weapon firing.  Hard killed threats are routed to the outputs block, and not hard killed 
threats are routed to the soft kill loop. 
The soft kill loop represents the effects of soft kill weapons, such as EW suites, decoys, 
and expendables (i.e., chaff and flares). 
Frequency 3-5 micormeters
















*Either the sensor cannot detect the threat or it won't detect it prior to threat impact.
MAX DETECTION RANGE (m) - HORIZONTAL
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Soft killed threats are routed to the outputs block, while not soft killed threats are routed 
to the withstand block. 
(b) Assumptions 
The team used an assumed probability of hard kill for the force protection weapons of 
0.7.  The team used an assumed probability of soft kill for the force protection system of 0.5. 
The team assumed that the ships of the force protection force (i.e., CG, DDG, LCS) 
would defend the ExWar ship and themselves, but not one another.  Therefore, the combined 
probability of hard kill of a threat targeting an ExWar ship is 0.91. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-7 contains the values for maximum and minimum engagement ranges, weapon 
speed, and probability of hard kill for the force protection weapons.  This data is input into the 
model using the Excel Input.xls file and Weapon Input.txt file. 
Table B-7 Weapon Inputs 
(5) ATW Withstand 
(a) Description 
The withstand block models the last chance of defeating a threat through point defense 
type systems.  If the point defense systems fail, it determines whether or not a threat hits a 
friendly platform, and subsequently, whether it mission kills a friendly platform. 
MAX ENGAGEMENT RANGE (m) MIN ENGAGEMENT RANGE (m) WEAPON SPEED (m / s)
Current ATW 130000 5000 825
Conceptual ATW 370000 5000 1650
Current BTW 7300 100 20.6
Conceptual BTW 11000 100 25.7





FFG / LCS* 0.7
#Higher Probability of Kill based on combined defense from CG and DDG.
*In COA A FFG is used, and in COA B LCS is used.
ATW = Above the Water.
BTW = Below the Water.
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Threats that weren’t detected or weren’t soft killed enter the block and are routed to the 
appropriate loop that determines the probability of the threat hitting its target.  There are two 
loops:  targets with point defense (i.e., ExWar, CG, DDG, LCS) and those without point defense 
(i.e., LCU(R), HLCAC, AAAV).  If the threat misses its target, it is routed to the outputs block.  
If the threat hits its target, it is routed to the loop that determines if it mission kills a friendly 
platform. 
Mission kills are computed two ways:  one as a single hit mission kill (meaning the threat 
hits a vital part of a friendly platform) and two as an accumulation of hits.  In either case, the 
number of mission kills is routed to the outputs block.  Details of the calculation of single hit 
probability of mission kill can be found later in this Appendix. 
(b) Assumptions 
The team used an assumed probability of hit for the threats of 0.5. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-8 contains the probability of single hit mission kill for the various threats and 
their intended targets.  Table B-9 contains the number of hits to non-vital areas that equate to a 
mission kill. 




INTENDED TARGET ASCM-1 ASCM-2 ASCM-3 SAM-1 SAM-2 DW-1 DW-2 DW-3
ExWar 0.11 0.11 0.11
CG 0.20 0.20 0.20
DDG 0.20 0.20 0.20
FFG / LCS* 0.20 0.20 0.20
LCUR 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.16
HLCAC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
AAAV 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.23
LRHLAC 1.00 1.00 1.00
MV-22 1.00 1.00 1.00




Table B-9 Number of Hits Above the Water to Mission Kill 
(6) Sonar Detection 
(a) Description 
When threats enter the block, they are routed initially based on the architecture setup of 
the model.  If the model is setup for the point architecture, threats are sent to the point sensor 
loop.  If the model is setup for the distributed architecture, threats are sent to the distributed 
sensor loop. 
In the distributed sensor loop, the model determines whether or not the threat is within 
the distributed sensor’s detection area.  If the threat is inside of the distributed sensor’s detection 
area, it is passed to the point sensor loop.  If the threat is outside of the distributed sensor’s 
detection area, then the threat continues in the distributed sensor loop.  The model then 
determines when the threat is within maximum detection range.  If the threat is not within 
maximum detection range, the range is decreased until it is within maximum detection range.  
While a platform is in the distributed sensor loop, the range is compared to the maximum 
weapon range to determine if the threat platform can launch its weapon.  Once the threat is 
within maximum detection range, the probability of detection is calculated based on the amount 
of time the sensor has to search for the threat.  The threat remains in this loop until it reaches its 
maximum weapon range, the minimum engagement range of the force protection weapons, or is 
detected. 
Platforms that reach their maximum weapon range return to the threat generator to 
represent a weapon firing.  Detected threats are routed to the defeat block, and not detected 
threats are routed to the withstand block. 
The point sensor loops is functionally identical to the distributed sensor loop.  The model 
then determines when the threat is within maximum detection range.  If the threat is not within 




FFG / LCS* 2
*In COA A FFG is used, and in COA B LCS is used.
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maximum detection range, the range is decreased until it is within maximum detection range.  
While a platform is in the distributed sensor loop, the range is compared to the maximum 
weapon range to determine if the threat platform can launch its weapon.  Once the threat is 
within maximum detection range, the probability of detection is calculated based on the amount 
of time the sensor has to search for the threat.  The threat remains in this loop until it reaches its 
maximum weapon range, the minimum engagement range of the force protection weapons, or is 
detected. 
(b) Assumptions 
The same assumptions and theory used in the sensor and search analysis sections were 
applied to the development of the sonar detection block. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-10 contains the maximum detection ranges for the various sonar sensor 
architectures.  This data is input into the model using the Excel Input.xls file. 
Table B-10 Sonar Maximum Detection Ranges 
(7) Below the Water Defeat 
(a) Description 
As detected threats enter the block, the model routes them based on type.  Submarine 
threats (SUBs) are routed to a loop that represents hard kill, and torpedo threats (TORPs) are 
Frequency 1 kHz Sonar - Point 1 kHz Sonar - Distributed











MAX DETECTION RANGE (m) - HORIZONTAL
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routed to a loop that represents soft kill.  This is because there is not currently, nor is there 
envisioned, a hard kill force protection system against torpedoes. 
Within the hard kill loop, the model determines when the threat is within maximum 
engagement range of the force protection weapons.  If the threat is not within maximum 
engagement range of the force protection weapons, the range is decreased until it is within 
maximum engagement range of the force protection weapons.  While a platform is in this loop, 
the range is compared to the maximum weapon range to determine if the threat platform can 
launch its weapon.  Once the threat is within maximum engagement range of the force protection 
weapons, the probability of hard killing the threat is calculated.  The threat remains in this loop 
until it reaches its maximum weapon range, the minimum engagement range of the force 
protection weapons, or until it is hard killed. 
Platforms that reach their maximum weapon range return to the threat generator to 
represent a weapon firing.  Hard killed threats are routed to the outputs block, and not hard killed 
threats are routed to the soft kill loop. 
The soft kill loop represents the effects of soft kill weapons such as acoustic 
countermeasure suites, and decoys. 
Soft killed threats are routed to the outputs block, while not soft killed threats are routed 
to the withstand block. 
(b) Assumptions 
The team used an assumed probability of hard kill for the force protection weapons of 
0.7.  The team used an assumed probability of soft kill for the force protection system of 0.5. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-7, previously discussed, contains the values for maximum and minimum 
engagement ranges, weapon speed, and probability of hard kill for the force protection weapons.  




(8) BTW Withstand 
(a) Description 
The withstand block models the last chance that a threat hits a friendly platform, and 
subsequently, whether it mission kills a friendly platform. 
Mission kills are computed two ways:  one as a single hit mission kill (meaning the threat 
hits a vital part of a friendly platform) and two as an accumulation of hits.  In either case, the 
number of kills is routed to the outputs block.  Details of the calculation of single hit probability 
of mission kill can be found later in this Appendix. 
(b) Assumptions 
The team used an assumed probability of hit for the threats of 0.5. 
(c) Inputs 
Table B-11 contains the probability of single hit mission kill for the various threats and 
their intended targets.  Table B-12 contains the number of hits to non-vital areas that equate to a 
mission kill. 
Table B-11 Probability of Single Hit Mission Kill 
Table B-12 Number of Hits Below the Water to Mission Kill 




FFG / LCS* 2
*In COA A FFG is used, and in COA B LCS is used.
INTENDED TARGET TORP-1 TORP-2 TORP-3 MINE-1 MINE-2 MINE-3 MINE-4
ExWar 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
CG 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
DDG 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
FFG / LCS* 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
LCU R 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
HLCAC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AAAV 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00






The outputs block accumulates the data required to evaluate the proposed system 
architectures.  It accumulates the data from both the above the water and the below the water 
blocks. 
The outputs compiled are the number of each type of friendly platforms mission killed 
and the number of mission kills attributed to each type of threat weapon.  These outputs are then 
exported to the previously mentioned text files at the end of each run. 
(b) Assumptions 
There are no specific assumptions for this block. 
(c) Inputs 
There are no inputs required for this block. 
2. Naval Simulation System (NSS) 
The NSS was utilized to provide the team with a means to investigate detailed 
interactions among entities.  In order to build the Palawan scenario, the team had to provide 
numerous inputs to the NSS modeler.  Many of the inputs were already discussed in the  
Analysis Chapter of this study.  This Appendix covers more detailed inputs required to build the 
scenario.  Additionally, this section contains miscellaneous results from the enemy drawdown. 
a. Scenario Inputs 
(1) Landing Plan 
In order to properly simulate Phase II in the NSS model, landing plan information had to 
be developed for the NSS modeler.  The landing plan information provided to the modeler 
included a drawing of the Palawan Littoral Penetration Zone (LPZ) seen in Figure B-1.  The LPZ 
contains two littoral penetration sites (LPS A AND B) that supported the landing of Heavy Lift 
Landing Craft Air Cushioned (HLCAC), Landing Craft Utility (Replacement) (LCU(R)), and 
297 
 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).  Two landing zones (LZ Hawk and Eagle) 
were designed to support the landing of the Long Range Heavy Lift Aircraft (LRHLAC) and the 
MV-22. 
Figure B-1 Palawan LPZ 
A line of departure, craft routes, craft control points, and landing penetration points are 
all included in the littoral penetration zone.  In addition to the LPZ diagram, the team provided 
planning factors for the ship to shore movement.  The planning factors are listed in  
Table B-13. 
SPEED (kts) DELAY (min) ASSET AVG MAX SHIP OBJ 
SURGE  
SORTIE 
LCU(R) 15 18 20 10 4 
HLCAC 30 40 15 7 9 
AAAV 20 25 N/A* N/A* N/A* 
LRHLAC 225 250 30 25 3 
MV-22 250 275 20 15 4 
*Not Applicable. 
Table B-13 NSS Planning Factors 
The delay columns represent the loading and offloading times for the various surface and 
aircraft onboard the ship and at the objective.  The surge sortie column represents the amount of 











LCAC/LCU Craft Departure Pt (CDP)
Release Point
Littoral Penetration Point (LPP)
Craft Control Pt (CCP) 
Decision Pt (DP)
Craft Landing Zone (CLZ)
LCAC / LCU Primary Rt





defined in the SEI-3 Expeditionary Warfare Project.  For the scenario, it is assumed that once the 
AAAV reaches the LPS it would conduct its land mission and therefore required no associated 
objective delay or sortie rate. 
The landing schedule for the air and surface assaults are shown in Table B-14 and  
Table B-15.  L-HOUR represents the LZ touchdown time for the first wave of air assets and  
H-HOUR represents the LPS touchdown time for the surface craft. 
Table B-14 Air Landing Schedule 


























 ASSAULT WAVES (AIR)
Wave 








LPS A AAAV 36
LPS B AAAV 36
LPS A HLCAC 9
LPS B HLCAC 9
LPS A LCU(R) 6
LPS B LCU(R) 6
 ASSAULT WAVES (SURFACE)
Wave 






(2) Enemy Order of Battle 
The team utilized all of the generic threats developed in the Threat Analysis.  Through 
careful research, the team equated the enemy order of battle defined in the Joint Campaign 
Analysis South China Sea Scenario to this study’s threats for the NSS model.  The list of threats 
and how they were employed in the NSS scenario is summarized in Table B-16. 
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SUB-3 10 TORP-1 2 Originate from Palawan
DW-2 2














DW-2 2 / 500 rnds
DW-3 3 / 1000 rnds
ASCM-1 4
TORP-3 2
DW-2 2 / 500 rnds












DW-1 Launcher 50 DW-1 6 rockets each Randomly appear near landing sites
ASCM-1 Launcher 5 ASCM-1 3 missiles each Randomly appear on Palawan
ASCM-2 Launcher 5 ASCM-2 2 missiles each Randomly appear on Palawan
ASCM-3 Launcher 20 ASCM-3 1 missile each Fired from Spratly Islands
SAM-1 Launcher 10 SAM-1 4 missiles each Randomly appear on Palawan
SAM-2 Launcher 100 SAM-2 1 missile each Randomly appear on Palawan
Weapon Qty Employment
SUB-1 5 Patrolling Sulu Sea
Threats  Quantity Weapons
SUB-2 2 Patrolling Sulu Sea
SB-1 30 Originate from Palawan and attack in 3 swarms of 10
SB-2 15 Originate from Palawan and conduct a multi-axis attack in 3 swarms of 5
SB-3 8 Patrolling Sulu Sea and conduct a multi-axis attack in 4 groups of 2
UnconVes A 1 Randomly appear in the Sea Echelon Area and launches all of its cruise missiles
UnconVes B 30 Randomly appear in the Sulu Sea
ACFT-1 20 Originate from Palawan and conduct a multi-axis attack in 5 swarms of 4
ACFT-2 40 Originate from Palawan and conduct random multi-axis attacks in 20 groups of 2
ACFT-3 10
Originate from somewhere in South China Sea (assumed 
from Spratly Islands or from a carrier) and conduct 
random attacks
UAV / UCAV 10 Randomly patrolling Sulu Sea
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b. Enemy Drawdown Results 
Table B-17 through Table B-27 reflect the drawdown of enemy assets.  The tables show 
the number of mission-capable threats over time for each of the alternate force architectures.  
The shaded threat blocks represent the time period when the threat was eliminated for each 
alternate force architecture.  The highlighted alternate force architectures represent architectures 
that facilitated the quickest defeat of threats. 
Table B-17 Expected Number of SB-1 Mission Capable 
Table B-18 Expected Number of SB-2 Mission Capable 
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000
1 15.9286 13.6897 10.8214 2.0357 24.7143 14.1034 18.3571 4.7500
2 11.2857 10.2759 9.4643 1.6429 20.5000 9.8621 14.3571 3.2500
3 9.6786 7.6207 8.2500 0.5357 16.5714 7.0000 11.3214 1.6429
4 8.4643 7.1035 6.8929 0.4643 14.0714 5.8966 6.3571 0.7857
5 8.2857 5.7586 6.5357 0.4643 11.9643 4.8621 4.4643 0.4643
6 8.1071 5.3103 5.9286 0.4643 10.0000 3.6207 2.6071 0.1071
7 7.7500 4.2759 5.4643 0.4643 7.9286 2.8276 1.6429 0.0714
8 7.6429 3.9310 5.0357 0.4643 6.8571 2.5172 1.3214 0.0714
9 7.3214 3.7931 4.3214 0.0714 5.6429 1.9310 0.9643 0.0357
10 7.2143 3.7931 4.0357 0.0714 5.0000 1.7586 0.7500 0.0357
11 7.0000 3.7931 3.5714 0.0714 4.4286 1.5172 0.5714 0.0357
12 6.5714 3.6897 3.0357 0.0714 3.7857 1.3448 0.5357 0.0357
13 6.4643 3.4483 2.8929 0.0714 3.5000 1.1379 0.5000 0.0357
14 6.1071 3.3103 2.5714 0.0714 3.3929 1.1379 0.4643 0.0357
15 6.0000 2.7586 2.2500 0.0357 3.0357 1.0690 0.3571 0.0357
16 5.8571 2.4138 1.9643 0.0357 2.8571 0.9655 0.3571 0.0000
17 5.6786 2.4138 1.5714 0.0357 2.6429 0.8966 0.2857 0.0000
18 5.5714 2.0690 1.4643 0.0357 2.2143 0.7586 0.2857 0.0000
19 5.4286 2.0690 1.1786 0.0357 2.1429 0.7241 0.2857 0.0000
20 5.3571 2.0690 0.8929 0.0357 2.0357 0.7241 0.2857 0.0000
21 5.3214 2.0690 0.8214 0.0357 1.8929 0.6207 0.2857 0.0000
22 5.2500 2.0690 0.6429 0.0357 1.7857 0.6207 0.2500 0.0000
23 5.2143 2.0690 0.5000 0.0357 1.7857 0.5862 0.2500 0.0000
24 5.1429 2.0690 0.4286 0.0357 1.6429 0.5862 0.2143 0.0000
ALTERNATE FORCE ARCHITECTURES
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 15.0000 15.0000 15.0000 15.0000 15.0000 15.0000 15.0000 15.0000
1 0.0714 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.4286 0.0800 2.2143 0.5357
2 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.4643 0.0357
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.1071 0.0000




Table B-19 Expected Number of SB-3 Mission Capable 
Table B-20 Expected Number of SUB-1 Mission Capable 
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000
1 4.8214 4.9310 1.6429 0.1429 5.2500 4.1724 3.3214 1.3571
2 2.9286 1.5517 1.0714 0.0357 1.7143 0.7241 1.5357 0.1429
3 1.7857 0.1379 0.5000 0.0000 0.3214 0.0345 0.2857 0.0357
4 0.5000 0.0000 0.1786 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5 0.1429 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ALTERNATE FORCE ACHITECTURES
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000
1 4.3571 3.9310 4.0357 4.1071 4.0714 3.9655 4.4286 4.5357
2 4.0714 3.4483 3.5357 3.5714 3.7143 3.5862 4.0714 4.0000
3 3.7500 3.0345 2.8929 3.1071 3.3214 3.2759 3.7857 3.7500
4 3.3571 2.6552 2.6429 2.8214 3.1071 3.0345 3.5357 3.4286
5 2.8214 2.0690 2.3571 2.3571 2.5714 2.4483 3.3214 3.1071
6 2.2143 1.8966 2.1071 2.0714 2.3214 2.2759 2.8929 2.6429
7 1.8214 1.6207 1.6786 1.8214 2.0357 1.8966 2.5000 2.3929
8 1.3929 1.1379 1.3929 1.3214 1.4643 1.3103 1.7500 1.8571
9 0.9286 0.8276 1.0357 0.8929 1.1071 0.8621 1.1786 1.3929
10 0.6786 0.6897 0.8929 0.7857 1.0000 0.6897 0.9286 1.0357
11 0.5714 0.6552 0.8214 0.7143 0.7143 0.6207 0.7500 0.7857
12 0.3929 0.4828 0.6786 0.4643 0.5714 0.4483 0.5714 0.5000
13 0.1071 0.2069 0.3214 0.3929 0.3571 0.2069 0.4286 0.4286
14 0.0000 0.0690 0.2857 0.2143 0.2500 0.1724 0.2857 0.3214
15 0.0000 0.0690 0.2143 0.2143 0.2143 0.1034 0.1786 0.2500
16 0.0000 0.0345 0.1429 0.1071 0.1071 0.0690 0.0714 0.0357
17 0.0000 0.0345 0.0714 0.0357 0.1071 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000
18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0714 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000




Table B-21 Expected Number of SUB-2 Mission Capable 
Table B-22 Expected Number of SUB-3 Mission Capable 
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000
1 1.7500 1.5517 1.4286 1.4643 1.5000 1.5862 1.6786 1.6786
2 1.5714 1.3793 1.1786 1.1786 1.3214 1.3793 1.4286 1.4286
3 1.3929 1.2069 1.0714 1.1071 1.2143 1.3103 1.3571 1.3571
4 1.2143 1.1379 0.9643 1.0357 1.1786 1.2414 1.2500 1.2857
5 1.1429 1.0000 0.8929 0.8571 1.1429 1.1724 1.1786 1.1786
6 0.9286 0.9655 0.7857 0.7500 1.0714 1.0690 0.8214 0.9643
7 0.8214 0.7931 0.6071 0.6786 0.9286 0.8276 0.6786 0.7857
8 0.7500 0.6552 0.5357 0.6071 0.7143 0.6552 0.6071 0.6429
9 0.6786 0.4828 0.3571 0.3571 0.6786 0.6207 0.5357 0.5000
10 0.5000 0.3448 0.2857 0.2857 0.4286 0.4828 0.3929 0.4286
11 0.4286 0.3448 0.1429 0.1786 0.3214 0.3793 0.3929 0.3929
12 0.2143 0.2069 0.1071 0.1429 0.2500 0.2759 0.2857 0.2500
13 0.1071 0.1379 0.0357 0.0714 0.1071 0.1379 0.1429 0.1429
14 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0345 0.0714 0.0714
15 0.0000 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0345 0.0714 0.0714
16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0357
17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357
18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ALTERNATE FORCE ARCHITECTURES
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000
1 3.3571 3.3793 3.6429 3.7857 3.9286 3.7931 4.5000 4.2143
2 1.4643 1.8621 2.0357 1.9643 1.6429 1.6552 2.3571 2.0714
3 0.6071 0.8276 0.7143 0.7500 0.6071 0.6207 1.2857 1.0357
4 0.2857 0.3448 0.4643 0.3929 0.5357 0.3793 0.7857 0.8571
5 0.2143 0.3103 0.3571 0.3571 0.3571 0.3103 0.5714 0.3929
6 0.1429 0.1379 0.1429 0.1071 0.2143 0.1724 0.1429 0.2500
7 0.0714 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0357 0.1379 0.1071 0.0357
8 0.0714 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0357 0.1034 0.0357 0.0357
9 0.0714 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0690 0.0000 0.0000
10 0.0714 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0690 0.0000 0.0000
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0690 0.0000 0.0000
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000




Table B-23 Expected Number of Combined DW-1 and SAM-2 Launcher  
Mission Capable 
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000
1 22.0714 20.2414 20.7857 19.8571 22.0357 20.7241 22.7500 22.2500
2 13.3929 12.1724 12.3929 11.8214 13.1429 12.0345 13.8571 13.2143
3 8.1429 7.2069 7.0357 7.1429 7.3571 7.3103 7.2857 6.7857
4 5.5357 4.7586 4.3214 4.6429 4.8929 4.7931 5.1786 4.1071
5 3.8929 3.1035 2.7857 2.8929 3.1071 2.9310 3.3929 2.4286
6 2.6429 1.8621 1.6786 2.0357 2.1429 2.0345 2.1786 1.6786
7 2.0000 1.4138 1.1429 1.5000 1.7143 1.5172 1.5357 1.2143
8 1.4643 0.7931 0.8571 1.0357 1.0357 1.0690 1.2143 1.0357
9 0.9286 0.4828 0.6786 0.7500 0.8929 0.9655 0.8929 0.9286
10 0.6786 0.4138 0.4643 0.6071 0.6429 0.7586 0.7143 0.7500
11 0.2500 0.3103 0.2857 0.4286 0.5357 0.5172 0.5357 0.4286
12 0.2500 0.2759 0.2500 0.3571 0.3214 0.3793 0.3929 0.1786
13 0.1786 0.2069 0.2500 0.2857 0.2143 0.2414 0.3214 0.1786
14 0.1429 0.1379 0.1429 0.1786 0.1786 0.2069 0.2500 0.1786
15 0.1071 0.1034 0.1429 0.1786 0.0714 0.1724 0.0000 0.1071
16 0.0714 0.0690 0.1429 0.1786 0.0714 0.1724 0.0000 0.1071
17 0.0714 0.0690 0.1429 0.1786 0.0000 0.1379 0.0000 0.1071
18 0.0357 0.0690 0.1429 0.1071 0.0000 0.1379 0.0000 0.1071
19 0.0357 0.0690 0.1429 0.1071 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0714
20 0.0357 0.0345 0.1071 0.0714 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0714
21 0.0000 0.0345 0.1071 0.0714 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0714
22 0.0000 0.0345 0.1071 0.0714 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0714
23 0.0000 0.0345 0.0714 0.0714 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0714




Table B-24 Expected Number of SAM-1 Launchers Mission Capable 
 
Table B-25 Expected Number of ACFT-1 Mission Capable 





TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
1 1.5714 1.1724 0.0000 0.0000 2.1071 2.1379 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.1071 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000 0.3928 0.2069 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ALTERNATE FORCE ARCHITECTURES
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000
1 5.6786 5.3793 5.6786 5.6786 5.2500 4.6207 5.3214 4.7857
2 3.5714 3.8621 3.9286 3.8214 3.8929 3.2759 3.7857 3.6071
3 2.3571 2.5517 2.3571 2.4286 2.3214 2.1379 2.2857 2.1786
4 1.5714 1.8276 1.7500 1.7143 1.6429 1.4828 1.7143 1.6071
5 1.0714 1.4828 1.2857 1.2857 1.2500 1.0690 1.4643 1.3214
6 0.7857 0.9655 0.9286 0.8929 0.9643 0.7931 1.2500 1.2143
7 0.5357 0.8276 0.7857 0.6429 0.7143 0.6552 1.0357 1.0000
8 0.3929 0.7241 0.5714 0.4286 0.3929 0.3793 0.6786 0.8571
9 0.3214 0.5517 0.3929 0.3214 0.3571 0.3103 0.4643 0.6786
10 0.2500 0.4828 0.2857 0.2500 0.1786 0.1724 0.2143 0.4643
11 0.2500 0.3793 0.2500 0.2143 0.1429 0.1034 0.1429 0.3571
12 0.1786 0.3103 0.1786 0.1786 0.0357 0.0690 0.1071 0.3571
13 0.1429 0.2414 0.1786 0.1786 0.0357 0.0345 0.0714 0.3214
14 0.1429 0.2069 0.1071 0.1429 0.0357 0.0345 0.0714 0.2857
15 0.1429 0.2069 0.1071 0.1429 0.0357 0.0345 0.0357 0.2857
16 0.1071 0.2069 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500
17 0.1071 0.2069 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
18 0.1071 0.2069 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
19 0.1071 0.2069 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
20 0.1071 0.1724 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
21 0.1071 0.1724 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
22 0.1071 0.1724 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
23 0.1071 0.1724 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
24 0.1071 0.1724 0.1071 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2143
ALTERNATE FORCE ARCHITECTURES
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
1 19.1786 18.7241 18.1429 18.6071 19.7500 18.2414 19.1429 17.2143
2 6.9286 6.9655 6.9286 6.9285 6.9286 6.8966 7.0000 6.8929
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000




Table B-27 Expected Number of ACFT-3 Mission Capable 
3. Miscellaneous Analysis 
d. Targeting Distributions 
In order to determine the probability of a given friendly platform being targeted by a 
specific threat, the team had to determine which threats would be a factor to which friendly 
platforms.  This also helped to scope and bound the EXTEND modeling effort.  Through subject 
matter expert inputs it was determined that the following assumptions applied with respect to 
targeting: 
• ASCMs are a threat to the ships that make up the Sea Base and Sea Base 
protection force 
• DWs are a threat to the surface-based transport assets of the Sea Base, specifically 
when they in the vicinity of the beach 
• SAMs are a threat to the air transport assets of the Sea Base, specifically when 
they are in the vicinity of the objective 
The team then determined what was the defining characteristic of the targeted platform 
that would determine the targeting distribution.  Using the work completed by the  
Summer Quarter 2003 Joint Campaign Analysis course, OA4602, relative size and number of 
platforms would be the best predictor of the targeting distribution. 
TIME (HRS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
1 7.0000 7.0345 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0357
2 5.0357 5.0345 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0345 5.0000 5.0000
3 2.4286 2.4483 2.3571 2.3929 2.5357 2.3448 2.2143 2.2143
4 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000




(1) ASCM Targeting 
For the ships of the Sea Base, the applicable measure of relative size was determined to 
be displacement.  In order to normalize the size, a relative size factor was computed for each 
class of ship by comparing it to the smallest ship class in the force.  This relative size factor was 
then multiplied by the number ships by class to determine a density.  This density was divided by 
the sum of the densities to determine the probability of being targeted by an ASCM. 
Because the team developed two force compositions for the force protection force, the 
calculations had to be computed for both COA A and COA B.  COA A is a CG, DDG, and  
FFG-based protection force, while COA B is a LCS-based protection force. 
After determining the probabilities of being targeted by an ASCM, the team realized that 
the probability was artificially high for the ExWar ship due to its size.  Subject matter expert 
opinion was again applied that accounted for the proximity to the threat.  These new corrected 
probabilities of being targeted were then used in the EXTEND model. 
Table B-28 and Table B-29 contain the targeting distribution data for COA A and  
COA B, respectively.  
Table B-28 ASCM Targeting Distribution for COA A 
Table B-29 ASCM Targeting Distribution for COA B 
COA B Displacement
Class (tons) Relative Size Number of Units Number Multiple Probability of Target Corrected Probability of Target
ExWar 86000 26.1 6 156.4 0.898 0.5
CG 9600 2.9 1 2.9 0.017 0.06
DDG 9200 2.8 1 2.8 0.016 0.06
LCS 3300 1.0 12 12.0 0.069 0.38
SUM 108100 174.1 1 1
Min 3300
COA A Displacement
Class (tons) Relative Size Number of Units Number Multiple Probability of Target Corrected Probability of Target
ExWar 86000 21.0 6 125.9 0.883 0.5
CG 9600 2.3 3 7.0 0.049 0.175
DDG 9200 2.2 3 6.7 0.047 0.175
FFG 4100 1.0 3 3.0 0.021 0.15




(2) DW Targeting 
For the surface transport assets of the Sea Base, the applicable measure of relative size 
was determined to be displacement.  In order to normalize the size, a relative size factor was 
computed for each type of transport by comparing it to the smallest transport in the force.  This 
relative size factor was then multiplied by the number transports expected to be in the vicinity of 
the beach at any one time to determine a density.  This density was divided by the sum of the 
densities to determine the probability of being targeted by a DW. 
Table B-30 contains the targeting distribution data for DWs. 
Table B-30 DW Targeting Distribution 
(3) SAM Targeting 
For the aircraft of the Sea Base, the applicable measure of relative size was determined to 
be plan form area.  In order to normalize the size, a relative size factor was computed for each 
type of aircraft by comparing it to the smallest aircraft in the force.  This relative size factor was 
then multiplied by the number transports expected to be in the vicinity of the objective or LZ at 
any one time to determine a density.  This density was divided by the sum of the densities to 
determine the probability of being targeted by a SAM. 
Table B-31 contains the targeting distribution data for SAMs. 
Table B-31 SAM Targeting Distribution 
Number Multiple Probability of Target
Type Displacement 
(tons)
Relative Size Number of Units Max Number 
on the Beach
Max Number on the 
Beach
Max Number on the 
Beach
LCU R 1078 28.9 12 6 173.6 0.535
HLCAC 300 8.1 18 12 96.6 0.298
AAAV 37.25 1.0 108 54 54.0 0.167
SUM 1415.25 324.3 1
Min 37.25
Plan Form Area Number Multiple Probability of Target
Type (ft^2) Relative Size Number of Units Max Number at LZMax Number at LZ Max Number at LZ
LRHLAC 10780.2 6.7 36 6 39.9 0.401
MV-22 4777.3 2.9 84 14 41.3 0.415
JSF 1620.0 1.0 36 8 8.0 0.080
AH-1 2784.0 1.7 24 6 10.3 0.104




b. Probability of Single Hit Mission Kill 
In order to determine the probability of a single hit mission kill of a given friendly 
platform, expert opinion was used to divide the platforms up by vital and non-vital areas.  Ships 
and surface based transport assets were further divided by above the water line and below the 
line.  Examples of this work are shown in Figure B-2 and Figure B-3.  A percentage was 
determined by dividing the vital area by the overall area of the platform. 
After the percentages of vital area were determined, expert opinion was applied to each 
platform and its possible threats to determine an overall probability of single hit mission kill.  In 
some cases, the probability of single hit mission kill was determined to be the same as the 
percentage of vital area, and in other cases it was determined that a single hit from a given threat 
would result in a mission kill.  This data was previously presented in Table B-8 and Table B-11. 
Figure B-2 Example Vital Area Distribution of a Ship 
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Figure B-3 Example Vital Area Distribution of an Aircraft 
- Vital Area
Vital Areas of an Aircraft
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
ACFT Aircraft 
ARG Amphibious Ready Group 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASM  Anti-Ship Missile 
AW Air Warfare 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Effects 
CES Cooperative Engagement Strategy 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
COA Course of Action 
CONUS  Continental United States 
COP Common Operational Picture 
COTS Commercial Over The Shelf 
CRANK Cooperative Radar Network 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
DOD Department of Defense 
DW Dumb Weapon 
EA Electronic Attack 
ECE Electrical Computer Engineering 
EINSTein Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Toolkit 
EMW Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 
ERG Electromagnetic Rail Gun 
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ERGM Extended Range Guided Munitions 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FEL Free-Electron Laser 
GCE Ground Combat Element 
HDT High Density Threat 
HETF High Explosive Timed Fuse 
HLAC Heavy Lift Aircraft 
HLCAC Heavy Lift Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
HQ Headquarters 
HSB High Speed Boat 
HSV High Speed Vessel 
HVU High Value Unit 
IA Information Assurance 
IAAM Information Assurance Analysis Model 
IOC Impact on Operational Capability 
IPT Integrated Project Team 
IR Infrared 
IRC Impact on Resource Costs 
IRDM Infrared Dual Mode Enable 
IS Information Systems 
ISAAC Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat 
JANUS Joint Army Navy Uniform Simulation 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter 
JTLS Joint Theater Level Simulation 
KETF Kinetic Explosive Timed Fuse 
LAV Light armored vehicles 
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion 
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LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
LCU(R) Landing Craft Utility (Replacement) 
LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off 
LRHLAC Long Range Heavy Lift Aircraft 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MAV Micro-Air Vehicle 
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MSSE Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
NESG Naval Expeditionary Strike Group 
NGFS Naval Gun Fire Support 
NM Nautical Miles 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSS Naval Simulation System 
OMFTS Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
OPNAV N7 Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
OR Operations Research 
OTH  Over-the-Horizon 
POA&M Plan of Action and Milestones 
RF Radio Frequency 
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile 
SB Small Boat 
SEA Systems Engineering and Analysis 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SEI Systems Engineering and Integration 
SEMP Systems Engineering and Management Process 
314 
 
STAMRA Single Transmitter Multiple Receiver Arrangement 
STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver 
STOVL Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing 
SUB Submarine 
SUW Surface Warfare 
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TF Task Force 
TORP Torpedo 
TSSE Total Ships System Engineering 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UN United Nations 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
USW Undersea Warfare 
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
UV Unconventional Vessel 
VTOL Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
WC Water Camouflage 
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